Down But Not Out

The Taliban movement has widely regrouped itself in Afghanistan, mostly along the Pakistan-Afghanistanborder areas. The social, geographical and political characteristics of the whole of this tribal belt favorthe Taliban fighters, and the Pakistani, US and Afghan authorities just cannot control the Taliban in thisspecific region.

The guerilla war in Afghanistan has really taken shape since October 2002. Earlier, between October 7, 2001,and December 2001, heavy US precision bombing had coerced the Taliban to leave their controlling positions anddisperse to places where they could find a shelter. Mullah Omar's decision of retreat from Kabul and Kandaharforced most of his commanders to hide themselves in Pakistani tribal areas. Ordinary Taliban foot soldierseasily melted into the civilian Afghan population. Several replaced their black turbans from Pakhool andjoined the new Afghan administration. Many chose to go back to their tribes and resumed a routine life asordinary citizens. However, the Taliban took only a few months to prove that US claims of destroying theirnetwork were wrong.

By October 2002, the Taliban had widely regrouped. Most of their top commanders including Mullah Akthar Usmani,Mullah Dadullah and Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani restored their links and were subsequently able to contacttheir followers, restoring the 'struggle'. Their messages, circulated through pamphlets and audio tapes, gavea general call for jehad against the occupying foreign forces.

In the succeeding months, the Taliban established a regular relationship with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar'sHizb-I-Islami Afghanistan (HIA), once the largest militant group fighting against the former USSR. Hekmatyar,a former student leader of the Engineering University of Kabul was also nominated an interim Prime Minister inthe Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani-led Coalition government in 1993, which was finally booted out by theTaliban. The Taliban had issued a fatwah (religious decree) for the assassination of GulbuddinHekmatyar in the mid-1990s, as they considered him responsible for bloodshed among the Afghans to fulfill hisgreed for power.

As a matter of record, it is useful to note that, despite the current and congenial ties between theTaliban and the HIA and the joint struggle they have launched against the US and her allies, the fatwah wasnever taken back.

Regular contacts and coordination between the Taliban and the HIA were eventually transformed into analliance, which was named 'Saiful Muslemeen'. The remnants of the Al Qaeda also became part of this network.According to sources, after the formation of this group, all three constituents have agreed on a single andintegrated strategy in which finance and human resources would be shared in future coordinated operations.

At present, the resistance movement has chosen Zabul, Spin Boldak and Hilmand as the areas where they have tore-establish their authority. These districts are situated all along the mountainous terrain, which bestserves a guerilla campaign. This terrain leads to safe routes that go across areas demarcated by the DurandLine, which separates Pakistan from Afghanistan, and exists only on the map. Practically, there is no cleardemarcation of the border, and there are dozens of villages located on the Line, part in Afghanistan and partin Pakistan.

The people on both sides of the notional Durand Line belong to the same tribes (the Noor Zai and theAchakzai) and have traditionally moved freely on both sides of the divide for centuries. These are thecircumstances that make it possible for the Taliban to attack their targets on Afghan soil, using themountainous terrain to strategic advantage, and then melting into the villages in the Pak-Afghan border areas.The Pakistani tribal areas, consequently, provide natural strategic depth to the Taliban fighters.

The people who live all around the Chaman area on the Pakistani side of the divide are extremely religious,and numerous madrassas (Islamic seminaries, numbering approximately 200) are the ideological centers of theTaliban movement. The location of these seminaries is, again, problematic, since they exist along the linewhere a clear demarcation of Pakistani and Afghan territory is impossible.

With these key factors complementing their modus operandi, the Taliban have established their writ in Zabul,Hilmand and Spin Boldak. The US Forces in Afghanistan are unwilling to take casualties, and consequently onlyprovide limited aerial support to the Afghan Army in their operations in the area. On occasion, some USsoldiers have been sent in to reinforce the Afghan militia's line of defense, but these soldiers rarelyparticipate in the action and generally limit their role to guiding the operations. This has tended todemoralize the Afghan administration and Forces, and they now increasingly accept the presence of the Talibanin these three districts.

Although the Taliban is yet to appoint its own administration in these areas, they have established a kindof de facto rule and a strong presence in the mountainous terrain around the area. The localadministration is aware that, if they act against the will of the Taliban, the consequences would be extreme.

In Khost, Paktia, Paktika and Gazni, the Taliban seek to inflict terror on the US Forces. They do not controlany significant areas in these provinces, but gather in the Northern and Southern Waziristan area of Pakistanas well as in the Kurram Agency to execute strikes across the border and then retreat to the relative safetyof Pakistani territory. Once again, they hide out in the mountains in areas where the nebulous Durand Lineseparates Pakistan from Afghanistan.

There is a long-standing tradition, within this specific area, of the local Waziri tribes who live on bothsides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, to move across the divide for trade. They move as a Lashkar (group)and always carry guns and ammunition with them. For centuries, they have never been prevented from freemovement in the area, and no one has ever asked them for travel documents. The result is that neither theAfghan security guards nor the Pakistanis can make out the difference between these tribal groups and themovement of the Taliban.

US Forces have tried to chase the Taliban operating in this area on several occasions. In rare cases, USForces successfully track them crossing into Pakistani areas. By and large, however, they generally hide inthe mountainous terrains and, when the dust settles, cross over into the Pakistani tribal belt as a tribalLashkar to live a routine life for a few weeks, while they plan another mission in Afghanistan.

The Taliban, HIA and Al-Qaeda have, so far, been using the Kunar Valley as their strategic reserve where theyhave protected their manpower, but where they do not engage in any violent activities. The localadministration is dominated by Jehadi commanders who are loyal to the HIA and the Taliban, and these groupschoose not to bother them with their guerilla attacks.

A similar, though not identical, situation prevails in Jalalabad, where the HIA has reportedly establishedcamps, and a kind of truce exists between the local administration and the guerillas. They cooperate with eachother and there is an agreement that, if the resistance takes shape in eastern Afghanistan, the presentadministration would surrender to the emerging Force in accordance with the Afghan custom, and would notengage the emerging Force in a fight.

Within this context, the recent Pakistan Army operation in Bannu near North Waziristan was conducted becausethe US intelligence apparatus had secured information about the presence of an important Al-Qaeda operative ofIraqi origin (Abdul Hadi Al-Iraqi), along with several other Arab Afghans and Pakistani militants. However,the intense reaction of the tribals caused the troops to halt abruptly, and they were sent back to their oldpositions.

According to sources, the Al Qaeda operatives never dwell in Wana or Miran Shah, the headquarters of Southand North Waziristan, respectively, but always stay in the no man's land near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border,with supporters in Pakistan sending them medical and food supplies, as well as requirements of daily life.

In effect, in this area, their presence is yet to be significantly challenged.

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Correspondent, Asia Times. Courtesy, the South Asia IntelligenceReview of the South Asia Terrorism Portal