China's Response

After India’s nuclear explosions of May 1998, its recent enthusiasticresponse to American President’s April 1^st proposal for missiledefence has come as another big surprise for China’s analysts andpolicy-makers. Nevertheless, there has been no official reaction so far and,characteristic of the Chinese, one is not likely to come very soon either.Chinese authorities are likely to take this up at their next bilateral meetings,both with the United States and India.

Going by the grapevine in strategic circles, however, experts have begun tospeculate on India’s motivations for this sudden bonhomie with Washington.Broadly speaking, China’s official circles describe India’s move as againstall international trends. For them, not only China and Russia, but all Americanallies have been either reluctant or opposed to Bush Junior’s enthusiasm onthe NMD issue. Also, given its connotations for Taiwan, NMD remains an extremelysore issue in China’s official circles which has its connotations for theiranalysis on India’s motivations. For Beijing, neither Russia’s fledgling butstill huge missile stockpiles nor North Korean rudimentary few missile systemscan ideally provide any logical explanation for such a grandiose anti-missilebuild-up. For them this clearly remains directed at mid-sized arsenals like thatof India and China and would affect their security and sovereignty in the long run.

This brave-face tirade against the NMD, however, has lately begin to appearas one goaded more by Beijing’s increasing fears of becoming isolated asUnited States begins to engage both India and Russia. The popular theory doingrounds here is that India has almost joined the Western bandwagon with severalrecent instances provided as examples. The narration begins with ForeignMinister Jaswant Singh being escorted by Bush Junior to his Oval Office followedby sudden change in India’s attitude towards the whole NMD issue which hassince moved from becoming silent on its criticism of NMD to now an open supportfor Bush proposals. The last few press briefings by US official spokespersonshave witnessed them clubbing India along with South Korea and Japan as "goodfriends" of the United States. The US National Security Advisor, Ms.Condoleeza Rice is reported to have spoken to Jaswant Singh few hours before MEAissued that official statement expressing India’s support for Bush proposals.And finally, the special envoy of Bush Junior, Richard Armitage, DeputySecretary of State, on a tour to illicit support for Bush proposal amongstAmerican allies, included India to his itinerary of visiting Japan, South Koreaand Australia, which is seen as a paradigm shift in Indo-US relations. There areseveral other linkages that are being circulated as scholars try to decipherIndia’s motivation for this policy shift of historic dimensions.

As for its impact on Sino-Indian relations this statement has not come atbest of the times. Premier Zhu Rongji, currently visiting South Asia, will befacing Pakistani rhetoric on India’s expansionist policies especially on India’srecent military exercises. For variety of reasons, last few years had witnessedChina’s pro-India tilt in its South Asian policy initiatives. But thisstatement of India’s support to Bush proposals has begun to make China feelisolated in its anti-NMD crusade where both Russia and India had once appearedat its natural partners. And here, given their historical "all weather"friendly relations, India’s support for NMD proposals may further strengthenthis fledgling Sino-Pak nexus and revive their defence and strategiccooperation. This obviously will also complicate India’s continued policy of"cease-fire" in Kashmir and "no-talks" with Pakistan until groundsituation improves in Jammu & Kashmir have resulted in diplomatic isolationof General Musharaf.

Therefore, the important question for India’s policy-makers would be toensure that the overall package of this so-called new paradigm shift in India’sforeign policy must finally make a value addition in India’s overall stature.The first thing to keep caution must to be ensure that Washington must not beonly playing up India as part of its strategy to deal with China. There are manyChinese, as also Indian experts, who believe this to be the case. One only hopesthat India has done some hard bargaining for this unprecedented move ofproviding an unstinted support for such an American proposal. Otherwise, atfirst look this appears so uncharacteristic of India’s diplomacy of last 55years. And as for its implications for Sino-Indian ties, in the end the Chinesewould sure be more friendly to a stronger India than one that becomes morevulnerable.

(Dr. Swaran Singh is currently a Visiting Faculty at Peking University’sSchool of International Studies, Beijing)