Back To 1996 And Beyond

In cautiously-worded remarks after a visit to Mumbai on July 14,2006, thePrime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, has been quoted as saying with reference tothe likely Pakistani role in the multiple terrorist strikes of July 11:"The terrorists behind Tuesday's serial blasts in Mumbai were supported byelements across the border. Without the support from elements across the border,the terrorists would not have been able to carry out strikes with such aneffect. "

He did not name Pakistan, but it was obvious he had it in mind. During hismeeting with Shri A.B. Vajpayee, the then Indian Prime Minister, at Islamabad inJanuary, 2004, Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf gave a formalassurance that he would not allow the use of Pakistani or Pakistani-controlledterritory for acts of terrorism against India. The expression Pakistaniterritory referred to Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, the North-West FrontierProvince (NWFP) and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) andPakistani-controlled territory to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and theNorthern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan).

The government of Pakistan and the jihadi organisations controlled by it havebeen following a dual policy with regard to jihadi terrorism in Indianterritory. They denied that what was happening in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)amounted to terrorism. Instead, they projected it as a justified "freedomstruggle". The government of Pakistan did not deny that it was givingpolitical, diplomatic and moral support to this "freedom struggle",but denied giving it any material support in the form of funds, training, armsand ammunition and operational guidance. The Pakistani jihadi terroristorganisations made no secret of their role in assisting this "freedomstruggle". They did not hesitate to claim credit for their operations inJ&K.

With regard to acts of jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K,the government of Pakistan always condemned it as terrorism and did not try toproject it as a "freedom struggle". The Pakistani jihadi organisationsdid not condemn them as acts of terrorism, but denied any role in those acts. Atthe same time, they expressed their moral and religious support to theirco-religionists in Indian territory who, according to them, were fighting fortheir "liberation" from Hindu domination.

Even before Gen Musharraf's commitment to Shri Vajpayee in January, 2004, onehad noticed two significant changes in the activities of the Pakistani jihaditerrorist organisations operating in the Indian territory. First, there was asharp drop in acts of Pakistani-sponsored jihadi terrorism in the Indianterritory outside J&K. There was no major act of jihadi terrorism in theIndian territory outside J&K between September, 2003, and July, 2005. Thiswas attributable to two reasons. A Pakistani decision to keep the operations ofthe organisations sponsored by it confined to J&K and successful preventiveactions by the Indian intelligence, which detected and neutralised many sleepercells in different parts of the country.

Second, the Pakistani organisations operating in the J&K startedconcentrating on attacking the security forces and their political masters andavoided attacking civilians. There were instances of civilian deaths ascollateral damage, but very few targeted attacks on civilians. This change wasprobably motivated by the bad name which Pakistan was getting from theinternational community.

There was a reversal of this policy from July, 2005. Pakistani organisationsresumed their acts of terrorism in the Indian territory outside J&K fromJuly 5, 2005, when they unsuccessfully attacked a Hindu temple at Ayodhya inUttar Pradesh. This was followed by the twin explosions in a shopping area ofNew Delhi in October, 2005, in which 59 civilians were killed, the attack on theparticipants in a conference of scientists at Bangalore in December, 2005,resulting in the death of one scientist, the explosions in Varnasi, the Hinduholy town, in March, 2005, and the latest Mumbai attack of 11/7, which is themost serious and well-organised targetted attack on civilians since theMarch,1993 explosions in Mumbai.

Simultaneously, the Pakistani jihadi organisations resumed their policy oftargeted attacks on civilians in J&K---- tourists from other parts of India,Hindus in the Jammu area etc. They have kept up these attacks. Interestingly,this period also saw the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) resumingits assistance to the Taliban and Gulbuddin Heckmatyar's Hizbe Islami to enablethem to stage a come-back in Afghanistan.

Why this reversion to the pre-September,2003, version of the use of thejihadi weapon against India and Afghanistan? Two explanations are available froman analysis of reports from reliable Pakistani sources and Pakistani mediareports. Firstly, an assessment by the Corps Commanders of the Pakistani Army inJune last year that the non-use of the jihadi sword could result in the de factostatus quo in J&K and Afghanistan becoming a de jure reality. They felt thiswould be detrimental to Pakistan's interests.

Secondly, Musharraf's need of the assistance of the jihadi organisations todefeat the attempts of Mrs Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's PartyParliamentarians and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League to win next year'sgeneral elections. In the elections of October, 2002, Musharraf used thefundamentalist organisations, which contested the elections, and the jihadiorganisations, which worked in the field without contesting the elections, todefeat the candidates of the parties of Ms.Bhutto and Mr. Sharif. The result:the coming to power of the fundamentalist parties in the NWFP and Balochistan.This gave a filip to the activities of the remnants of the Al Qaeda and theTaliban, which enjoy the support of the ruling dispensation in these two keyprovinces.

It is said that Musharraf has already asked the ISI to give the jihadiorganisations all the assistance they need for their operations in India andAfghanistan in return for their support to him and the parties controlled by himin next year's elections. He has also ordered the suspension of all actionagainst madrasas, which have been training foreign jihadis.

It is, therefore, likely that the activities of the ISI-sponsored jihaditerrorist organisations in India and Afghanistan would continue and escalate inthe coming months, irrespective of whether there is any progress in the dialoguebetween India and Pakistan or not. What should be India's response in respect ofthe peace process and the Pakistani-sponsored terrorism?

Under Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and P.V. Narasimha Rao, India followed a policy of "talk, talk, hit, hit". They and their officialscontinued meeting and talking to their Pakistani counterparts, whether there wasany useful outcome or not. At the same time, they gave a free hand to theirintelligence agencies to do whatever they felt was necessary to hurt Pakistancovertly for its use of terrorism against India. This policy contributed in noinsignificant measure to the success of counter-terrorism in Punjab.

Narasimha Rao added a psychological component to this policy to highlightbefore the international community Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism againstIndia. It was largely as a result of this that he succeeded in persuading theClinton Administration to place Pakistan on a newly-created suspectedState-Sponsors of Terrorism from January to July, 1993.

15. Since 1996, our policy towards Pakistan has lacked coherence, lucidityand single-minded determination to hurt it. Shri I.K. Gujral gave up the"hit, hit" and the psychological components in the hope that thisunilateral gesture would make Pakistan change its ways. His hopes were belied.

The hopes of our intelligence agencies that the BJP-led government wouldrestore these components were belied too. One started feeling for the first timethe impact of the US influence on our policy towards Pakistan. Fond hopes thatthe US would succeed in pressuring Musharraf to drop his jihadi sword have notmaterialised. The time has come for reverting back to the policy followed before1996.

Talk, talk, bite, bite.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai.