A Storm In A Teacup

The invitation for tea extended to the leaders of the All-Party HurriyatConference by the Pakistan High Commissioner, Mr. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, hasgenerated a heated debate. Should he have invited them for tea? Has he, in anyway, transgressed the diplomatic etiquette by doing so? Or, is the Indianpolitical elite flirting with norms of diplomacy by making prescriptive demandsin the invitation list? The breach of de rigueur may be a topic of speculationfor students of diplomacy, but students of politics would be more intriguedabout the intricacies of the political cost and benefit analysis behind thenotorious invitation.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee's invitation to the PakistanPresident, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for talks and its acceptance has put thePakistani establishment in a political dilemma. It has left them in a quandary.They had been harping on the theme of tripartite negotiations and had expressedtheir open disdain for any sort of bilateral negotiations. The Hurriyat wasovertly and covertly dissuaded from entering into any sort of negotiations withIndia.

And, in a rare show of camaraderie, the Hurriyat resisted all attempts byIndia to enter into a dialogue. But while it resisted a dialogue, citingPakistan's absence as the reason, Pakistan's acceptance of a bilateral dialoguetantamounted to a perfidious shift in its policy. The Pakistani establishmentwould have to explain the shift in its policy. The Kashmiris were fundamentallyupset with Islamabad's digression from its avowed policy of trilateral dialogue.The Kashmiri reaction forms an integral part of the Pakistani policy, becausethe disturbed conditions act as the engine, from which Pakistan derives itspresent status at the negotiating table. The political costs of accepting anIndian offer for bilateral talks, precluding the Hurriyat, were very high.

The Pakistani establishment started an ingenious damage control exercise.First, they identified the cause of the problem which clearly was the exclusionof the Kashmiris. A way had to be found to divert attention from the exclusion.This was done by making selective leaks, which suggested that Pakistan wanted todetoxify the political environment and would not put the summit in jeopardy atthe cost of the Hurriyat.

Emphasis was laid on detente between India and Pakistan. It was conveyedthrough official channels that Pakistan had to accede to India's request andthat the General would not be able to meet the Hurriyat leaders during hisvisit. Even the invitation for the high tea was ruled out.

The Kashmiris, who were smarting over the exclusion, were furtherdisillusioned. The denial of a meeting became the new subject of speculation.This was allowed to go on for some time until it became a topic of a fulldebate. Once it acquired a status big enough to erase the memories of theexclusion, the Hurriyat leaders were sent invitation cards for the teareception. And now started the debate whether the Hurriyat should have beeninvited and whether other invitees should boycott or attend the meeting. Thebitter memories associated with the exclusion of Kashmiris have been literallychased away into oblivion.

An invitation would not have been able to placate the Kashmiris. The song anddance created by the Indian establishment over the invitation provided theescape route for both the Pakistan establishment and the Kashmiri leadership.The Kashmiri leadership was able to rake up a new issue of humiliation by Indiaas a substitute for Pakistani betrayal. Pakistan needs to be commended for itsdeft handling of a potentially damaging situation fraught with high politicalcosts. It has impressively turned around its weak position into a position ofstrength.

Islamabad's strategy has worked. The new situation has had a multipliereffect on the political benefits accruing to Pakistan. It has resulted in avirtual exculpation of Pakistan and obliterated any feelings of betrayal byPakistan. The ground realities remain the same. The Kashmiris are as excluded asthey were before. However, Pakistan has been able to make a face- savinggesture. It has been able to provide a decent cover up for its politicalexpediency sans morality.

The story of the Indian response in the whole saga has been one of few upsand many downs. India started off with a high score by relenting from anobstinate, unrealistic posture and inviting Pakistan for talks. In the end, itmay well find itself paying heavy political costs for a situation, which wasinitiated by it in order to reap some political benefits.

The Indian actions are ambiguously vacillating between extremes of logic andabsence of logic. The question that stares in your face is whether India isacting in covert unison with Pakistan to bail out Gen. Musharraf, expectingreciprocation in the near future, or is it a unilateral exercise brought aboutby an extremely active streak of self destruction.

In case New Delhi is an active participant in the efforts to bail out theGeneral, the stealthy details may be a pointer towards logic, in Indiandecision-making process. However, if Indian actions are part of an independentpolicy response, one would be hard pressed to find any trace of logic.

If the Indian actions were not dictated by a bail-out package, what was thepressing need to convert a non-issue into a prestigious issue and provide anexit channel for the General? The actions have further alienated the Kashmiripopulation and bailed out the General. Its actions seem to be driven by the age-old hackneyed theme, that there is no internal problem and if there is one, itis driven by external forces. The thrust on the externals in quest for asolution is absolute. As of today, Indian policy-makers are banking heavily onexternal factors for a solution to the Kashmir problem, viz., the internationalcommunity and Pakistan. Every action of the Indian policy-makers is taken withan eye on the international community. The idea is that the world community willdiscipline Pakistan, which in turn will discipline the militants.

The idea may not be bad per se. But the local Kashmiri population does count.And every Indian action invariably ends up antagonising the Kashmiris. The rigidhostile stance of the Indian Government vis-a-vis the tea party has not exactlywon them friends in Kashmir. Any benefit accruing to India on account of theiropposition to the invitation to the Hurriyat for tea is not visible, but it mayhave to pay heavy political costs in the future in terms of alienation of theKashmiris.

The Hurriyat has once again shown its predilection for Pakistan at the costof the interests of the Kashmiris. The initial announcement of the exclusionevoked no harsh reaction from the Hurriyat. There were some token murmurs ofprotest. The leaders were not willing to agree that they had been left out andinstead dashed off a letter to Gen. Musharraf and Mr. Vajpayee, staking theirclaim for a seat at the negotiating table. Mr. Vajpayee did not respond, whilethe General invited them for tea. The receipt of the invitation saw anoverexcited chairman of the Hurriyat gesticulating with the invitation in hishands, unable to hide his glee. The reasons for his joy are a mystery. But, thehue and cry created by the Hurriyat over the receipt of the invitation did helpthe General in his bailout efforts. The Hurriyat is excited and will be going tothe tea party, eager to shake hands and have tea with the General. It may begranted a 15-minutes causeric with the General. Translated into political terms,it does not mean a lot. The Kashmiris have come out as losers.

(The writer is the son of Mr. Abdul Gani Lone, Chairman of the J&KPeople's Conference, and son-in-law of the JKLF leader, Mr. Amanullah Khan)