The Great Nicobar Project is an investment for India’s security, economy and the country’s place in the Indo-Pacific

The merits or otherwise of the Great Nicobar Project (GNP) can be examined in four domains—strategic, economic, environmental and aspirational. With China expanding its naval presence and port footprints, the Indo-Pacific region is now the world’s most contested maritime space. The Strait of Hormuz reiterates the deterrent value of geography. Something we too are blessed with at the Great Nicobar. It strengthens India’s position in three ways:

Maritime domain awareness: In the region and across the chokepoint of the 6-degree channel;

Dual-use infrastructure: Ports and airports bestow dual-use, enhance disaster response, logistics and operational reach; and,

Strategic redundancy: As China deepens its presence in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, India needs sovereign infrastructure that cannot be compromised by external political shifts.

Critics call this “militarisation”. But the project does not convert the island into a military base. It simply ensures that India finally uses its geography to secure its interests—something every major maritime nation does. And in the bargain, it makes our deterrence credible. Giving us reverse pressure capability for pressure that may get exerted in the Himalayas or elsewhere. And thence the perception that the Chinese are sponsoring some of the protests against the project—aka their well-published doctrine of “lawfare”—using a country’s own systems against it.

The most persistent criticism is economic: Why build a transshipment hub so far from the Indian mainland when Colombo, Trincomalee or Vizhinjam can do it cheaper? This argument misinterprets how transshipment economics work. Transshipment hubs don’t depend on hinterlands—they depend on shipping lanes. The Great Nicobar sits directly on the east-west maritime trunk route, the busiest container corridor in the world. Mega vessels already pass within a few nautical miles of Galathea Bay, a coastal area located on the Great Nicobar Island. In contrast, Colombo, Trincomalee and Vizhinjam require significant deviation from this trunk line—a deviation that increases fuel consumption, turnaround time and carbon emissions. For a 20,000+ TEU (20-foot equivalent unit), even a 40-60 nautical mile deviation is expensive. The Great Nicobar eliminates that deviation. And in the ultimate analysis, this is not a state-sponsored project, but a commercial project which anyone bidding will analyse for their commercial viability.

The Natural Draught Advantage: At the heart of the project is a deep-water transshipment port at Galathea Bay, which offers a natural draught of 20-22 metres. This means minimal dredging, lower maintenance costs and faster berthing for ultra-large ships. This is among the deepest anywhere in the Indian Ocean and allows the world’s largest container ships (18,000-24,000 TEU) to berth easily. Colombo (18-20), Singapore (16-18) or Klang in Malaysia (17) do not have this natural advantage. In maritime economics, depth is destiny. And the Great Nicobar has it.

Colombo requires continuous dredging. Trincomalee lacks comparable depth. Vizhinjam is deep but not on the trunk route. The “distance from mainland” argument is not relevant. Transshipment cargo is ship-to-ship, not ship-to-rail or ship-to-truck. Singapore, Tanjung in Indonesia, Pelepas in Malaysia and Salalah in Oman—three of the world’s largest hubs—have minimal hinterland. Their value lies in location, not hinterland. Comparing Vizhinjam is like comparing Dubai International Airport (a global hub) with Delhi airport (a national gateway). Both are essential, but they serve different functions. Their success comes from location, not proximity to domestic markets. The Great Nicobar fits this model perfectly. India needs multiple hubs. The project will dominate east-bound and the Bay of Bengal traffic. Also, 75 per cent of India’s transshipment cargo is handled abroad. The Great Nicobar will help India reclaim this traffic and the revenue.

Environmental Concerns

These are real, but manageable and often misunderstood. Environmental objections must be seen in context, with accurate numbers rather than heightened fears. Forest Diversion: This is significant locally, but tiny regionally. The approved diversion for the project is 130.75 sq km (13,075 hectares). This is about 14-15 per cent of the island’s 910 sq km. However, the correct ecological comparison is not the island area but the forest area. The Great Nicobar is roughly 85 per cent forested—about 773 sq km (77,350 hectares). The project will divert 13,075 hectares, which is about 17 per cent of the Great Nicobar’s forest cover. However, another crucial context needs flagging. The entire Andaman and Nicobar archipelago has 6,740 sq km of forest (674,000 hectares). The project’s 13,075 hectares represent less than two per cent of the total forest cover across all 836 islands. Thus, over 98 per cent of the archipelago’s forests will thus remain untouched.

Leatherback Turtles: Yes, Galathea Bay is a nesting site. But the port is located outside the core nesting zones. Secondly, strict lighting, noise and seasonal restrictions are mandated. And thirdly, India’s first Leatherback Conservation Programme is being established. The decline in turtle numbers predates the project and is linked to natural predation and climate factors. Mitigation is globally validated. Florida, Costa Rica, Australia, Oman, and Malaysia operate ports near nesting beaches. Lightshielding, noise buffers and seasonal restrictions are standard practice.

Seismic Risks: These have been addressed in the planning. Ports and airports operate safely in seismic zones worldwide. The project uses Zone V-compliant engineering; tsunami modelling and coastal resilience planning. Seismic risk is thus mitigated through design and has not been ignored. Yokosuka (Japan), Sasebo (Japan), Surabaya (Indonesia) and Valparaíso (Chile) are all in similar or higher seismic zones and host major naval bases. Seismicity is a design challenge, not a strategic veto.

Aspirational Considerations

While protection of habitat and tribal rights is important, other than the 229 Shompen, we also need to consider the aspirations of the remaining 8,138 residents—many came here in the 1960s and the 1970s, and children of these residents are returning to the mainland due to lack of jobs and livelihood opportunities. The Shompen, a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group, are central to the debate. And at 229, they are 0.067 per cent of the Andaman and Nicobar population. Critics fear cultural erosion and loss of autonomy. But the project’s design shows respect for their way of life. The project does not enter the Shompen habitation zones; it does not relocate Shompen families; and it does not open tribal areas for tourism. On the contrary, it strengthens health-care access; improves emergency evacuation capability; and enhances forest-based livelihood support and creates buffers between development and tribal areas. The Shompen have historically chosen isolation. The project respects this choice while ensuring essential services reach them without intrusion.

Moreover, the Great Nicobar’s residents, including Nicobarese settlers and post-tsunami rehabilitated families, face limited connectivity, high logistics costs, restricted economic opportunities and are dependent on government employment. For them the project promises a few lakh direct and indirect jobs over two decades, growth in logistics, aviation, tourism, services, improved health care, education and connectivity. For many locals, the project is not a threat. It is an opportunity.

Some critics argue that the project was “fast-tracked”. In reality, it underwent a review by the Union environment ministry, scrutiny by the National Board for Wildlife, an assessment by the Union ministry for tribal affairs, an evaluation by NITI Aayog and a review by the Supreme Court’s Central Empowered Committee. Clearances are conditional and monitored.

India handles about 17 million TEUs today. By 2047, that number may reach 60-70 million TEUs. Yet, India still sends about 75 per cent of its transshipment cargo to foreign ports—mainly Colombo, Singapore and Klang. This dependence is costly and strategically limiting. The Great Nicobar Project offsets this. By 2050, 60 per cent of global container traffic will originate in Asia. India will be the world’s third-largest economy and the Bay of Bengal will be a major manufacturing and consumption zone.

While evaluating large projects, nations must balance environmental concerns, social impact, economic viability and strategic imperatives. In the case of the Great Nicobar, the strategic and economic benefits are longterm, structural and transformative, while the objections, though important, are manageable through safeguards. India has waited too long to leverage its geography. The Indo-Pacific will define the 21st century. The Great Nicobar positions India at the centre of that future. The project may not be perfect. No project of this scale ever is. But it is necessary, strategic and future-oriented. It strengthens India’s maritime position, boosts economic growth, enhances national security and respects ecological and tribal sensitivities through structured safeguards. The Great Nicobar is not a gamble. It is a national investment for India’s security, economy and country’s place in the Indo-Pacific.

(Views expressed are personal)

Lt Gen Ajai Singh (Retd) is a former Commander-In-Chief of the Andaman And Nicobar Command