Interview | ‘Tech Alone Doesn’t Create Military Advantage’: IAF Chief AP Singh On Future Warfare

The character of warfare is undoubtedly undergoing a significant transformation and recent conflicts, from the war in Ukraine to the tensions in West Asia, have offered valuable lessons. Drones, loitering munitions, electronic warfare, precision strikes and space-based capabilities have each shown how decisive they can be.

However, I would not characterise this as a departure from the fundamentals of air power. Speed, reach, flexibility and precision remain as relevant as ever. What we are witnessing is a rapid evolution in the way air power is conceived, generated and employed. The IAF has always placed a premium on technological and operational relevance, and our thinking has evolved accordingly.

The most important lesson is that the battlespace no longer divides neatly into separate domains. Air power must now operate across the entire spectrum, from the traditional air domain to the electromagnetic, cyber and space domains, with far greater integration. This is why we now think in terms of aerospace power rather than air power alone.

Our understanding of air superiority has evolved in the same way. It is no longer only about fighter aircraft engaging other fighter aircraft. It is about achieving the degree of control over the air and aerospace environment that our operations need, while denying the adversary the freedom to interfere. Increasingly, it depends on information and decision superiority: the ability to sense earlier, understand faster and act before the adversary.

Recent conflicts have also sharpened specific lessons. Drones have evolved from eyes in the sky to claws in the sky. Attacking forces now use saturation attacks, sending waves of inexpensive drones to exhaust interceptors. Using an expensive missile against a cheap drone is unsustainable, so air defence is being reshaped around cost-efficiency as well as altitude.

We are building low-cost hard-kill layers, soft-kill measures and directed-energy options, and moving from single, large radars towards distributed networks of sensors. We have also learnt that a modern force must be able to fight even when communications, navigation and space-based services are degraded or denied.

Our own experience in Operation Sindoor reinforced every one of these lessons. The adversary’s drones and stand-off weapons were defeated by our home-grown, networked air defence. Our success came not from any single platform, but from the combined effect of ISR, combat aircraft, precision weapons, electronic warfare, unmanned systems and networked command and control.

As for doctrine, the IAF has not waited for these lessons to be imposed on us. We have studied them closely, and their essence is already built into our operational thinking. Information superiority, decision superiority and the effects-based employment of air power are now central to how we plan and fight, while the fundamentals of air power remain firmly intact. This approach is reflected at the national level in the Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations, released by the Raksha Mantri in August 2025. It is also visible in concrete steps.

The IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System is connected with the Army’s Akashteer and the Navy’s Trigun to create a common, real-time air picture. Exercises such as Antariksha Abhyas examine the consequences of losing access to space.

At Dronathon-2026, we demonstrated our indigenous unmanned traffic management system, Vayu UTtaM, and released ‘The Indian Air Force Unmanned & Autonomous Roadmap’. Meanwhile, our AI Centre of Excellence, UDAAN, is developing decision-support capabilities in-house.

Above all, we recognise that technology by itself does not confer an advantage unless our operators, processes and doctrine are able to exploit it. That is why we are placing greater emphasis on realistic training in contested and degraded environments, so that our air warriors are prepared to fight and win in conditions that will be anything but ideal.

Warfare will continue to evolve, and the IAF will continue to evolve with it: learning continuously, adapting rapidly and integrating across domains. Our aim is to stay ahead of the changing character of war, so that the IAF remains ready to deliver decisive effect whenever and wherever the nation calls.

Our approach to future force structure is therefore not about choosing between manned and unmanned platforms, or between aircraft and missiles. It is about building the right mix of complementary capabilities that together generate the desired operational effect. The IAF is moving towards a more integrated, networked and multi-layered air power architecture.

Manned platforms will remain the core of our combat power. They provide command, adaptability and the judgement needed for complex missions, and the pilot is increasingly evolving into a mission commander who directs other assets.

Unmanned systems add persistence, mass and risk tolerance at lower cost. They are taking on ISR, decoy, electronic warfare and strike roles, and, as collaborative combat aircraft, they will increasingly fly alongside our fighters.

Long-range precision missiles allow us to hold targets at risk deep in hostile territory without exposing the launch platform. But they are consumables, and a sustained conflict demands a force that can generate effects repeatedly over time. That is why reusable, re-taskable aircraft remain indispensable.

Electronic warfare is the thread that runs through every mission. It protects our own platforms and degrades the adversary’s sensors, networks and weapons. Integrated air defence, layered as much by cost as by range, protects our bases and critical assets against drones, missiles and aircraft alike. Space-based capabilities provide the persistence, reach and connectivity that bind all of this together.

Operation Sindoor showed what this balance looks like in practice. Success came, offensively and defensively, not from any single platform but from the system as a whole.

What holds these elements together is the network. The common, real-time air picture is the foundation, and AI-enabled decision support will increasingly help commanders turn vast volumes of data into timely decisions. And because networks will be contested, we are building resilience into every layer.

Our objective remains unchanged: to ensure that the IAF can achieve the required degree of air control across the spectrum of conflict, with every element operating as one interconnected system. That is the force the IAF is building, one capable of prevailing in the contested skies of the future.

The IAF has graduated from a platform-centric approach to a capability-centric one. This means we are building an ecosystem in which the strength of each individual system and aircraft is maximised by integrating it with sensors, weapons, electronic warfare, airborne warning, aerial refuelling and networks. The combined effect is far greater than the sum of the individual parts.

Let me therefore assure the nation that the Indian Air Force is more than capable of meeting its requirements today. At the same time, we are progressing steadily towards our required numbers. We are addressing this through a phased roadmap that builds squadron strength progressively, ensuring that the nation’s deterrence is never compromised along the way.

The first element of that roadmap is to make the most of the fleet we have. The IAF has inducted the Rafale and the indigenously developed Light Combat Aircraft. The upgrade of the Su-30MKI fleet, the backbone of our combat force, is being progressed as a design and development project with significant indigenous equipment. A contract for 12 additional Su-30MKI aircraft, signed in December 2024, is under execution.

The second element is rebuilding numbers through the LCA Mk-1A, which will be central to restoring squadron strength. The IAF has signed two contracts with HAL for 83 and 97 aircraft, respectively. Deliveries are yet to commence, and we are working in close coordination with all stakeholders to ensure they proceed expeditiously. The supporting industrial base is being put in place.

In November 2025, HAL concluded an agreement for the supply of engines and a support package for the 97-aircraft programme. In parallel, the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft will bring a contemporary fighter into service in an early timeframe.

The Defence Acquisition Council accorded Acceptance of Necessity for the MRFA in February 2026, with the majority of the aircraft to be manufactured in India. We are pursuing the programme so as to maximise technology transfer for local manufacturing and the use of indigenously developed weapons.

The third element is the development of the LCA Mk-II and the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, our fifth-generation fighter. The IAF is actively involved in both programmes, and together they will boost our capability significantly in the coming decade.

Some global players, including our adversaries, have already made progress in fifth-generation programmes, which makes the timely progress of ours all the more important.

We are also preparing for what comes next. The IAF is closely monitoring the emergence and evolution of sixth-generation combat aircraft technologies across the globe, with a view to assessing their operational relevance and potential integration into its future capability development roadmap.

Looking ahead, the LCA, the Su-30MKI, the MRFA and the AMCA will form the core of the IAF’s combat potential. A majority of these will be of indigenous design, and the rest will carry a significant indigenous contribution and be made in India. The direction is clear and the momentum is building. The IAF will restore its squadron strength progressively, and every squadron we add will make the whole force stronger than before.

Timely delivery of capability is an operational concern for the Air Force. Every year a critical platform arrives late is a year in which our planned capability is not in the hands of the warfighter. I will not pretend the delays have not occurred. But it is more useful to understand why they occur, because the causes are structural, and so must be the solutions.

In my assessment, three structural factors lie at the root of these delays. The first is inadequate core research and development capability in niche technologies. Military aviation projects are among the most complex in the world, and design and development timelines inevitably stretch. The second is our limited exposure to airworthiness compliance, quality assurance and certification requirements.

These processes are rightly stringent, but when industry and developers are still building experience with them, they become a source of delay rather than assurance.

The third, and perhaps the most consequential, is foreign dependence on aero-engines, base platforms and the modifications needed to integrate indigenous systems. When a critical component sits outside our control, so does the timeline. The engine-related delays we have experienced are a clear example of this vulnerability.

Addressing these factors requires fundamental change on several fronts. The defence ecosystem must first build the capacity to absorb critical and niche technologies, which means investing in infrastructure and a skilled workforce. Research and development expenditure must rise significantly, both in specific critical technology domains and in emerging areas such as artificial intelligence, machine learning and quantum systems, as well as their defence applications.

We must also reform the way capability moves from idea to induction. Design, trials, quality assurance and contracting should run concurrently rather than strictly in sequence. Testing and certification capacity should be expanded and digitised, with a risk-based approach that does not subject a low-risk modification to the same pathway as an entirely new, safety-critical system. Every stage should have clear accountability and time limits. Production capacity must keep pace as well. DPSUs and major private players need to invest in it so that both scheduled deliveries and surge requirements can be met.

Encouragingly, important steps are already under way. The AMCA Programme Execution Model, approved in May 2025, gives private and public sector companies an equal opportunity to compete, widening the industrial base behind our most important future programme.

The engine supply agreement for the 97-aircraft LCA Mk-1A programme, which I mentioned earlier, is intended to put engine supply for that programme on a firmer footing. Policy reforms under consideration through the Defence Acquisition Procedure review, including a faster route for the low-cost acquisition of indigenous equipment, are aimed at reducing lead times.

In the near term, certain key capabilities, including advanced propulsion, are being pursued through collaboration with strategic partners. In the long term, however, the capabilities that matter most must be developed by our own industrial ecosystem if we are to have sovereign control and flexibility.

That will require a Whole-of-Nation approach: focused R&D funding, time-bound outcomes and innovative policy provisions. The IAF will play its full part, working closely with DRDO, DPSUs, private industry and academia, so that the capabilities the nation needs reach our air warriors on time and remain relevant when they arrive.

The IAF follows a capability-driven approach to inductions, based on threat assessment, operational gaps and long-term strategic needs. Our long-term focus is firmly on self-reliance, especially in critical technology areas. But the nation’s deterrence must remain credible at every stage, including while indigenous programmes mature. The real question, therefore, is not whether to buy or to make, but where to draw the line, and the IAF draws it with clarity.

In my view, that line falls between operational necessity and strategic irreversibility. Where a capability gap is immediate and mission-critical, and no short-term indigenous solution can cover it, a time-bound foreign acquisition is justified. Even then, it must be linked to technology absorption, domestic workshare or a defined transition to an Indian solution.

Where a requirement lies in a core technology area, and repeated imports would lock India into long-term dependence, the IAF will hold the line and back indigenous development, even if it takes longer. Engines, advanced sensors, mission software, autonomous systems and combat electronics fall firmly in this category. They will shape the nation’s future sovereignty, not just today’s inventory.

Our programmes reflect exactly this balance. The IAF is committed to the Tejas programme and awaits the induction of the LCA Mk-1A, while remaining closely involved in the development of the Tejas Mk-II and the AMCA.

To bridge the capability gap, we are pursuing a highly capable 4.5-generation Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft, the majority of which will be manufactured in India. We are also closely monitoring the evolution of sixth-generation technologies worldwide. In essence, we acquire proven, technology-intensive capability to meet urgent needs, while scaling up indigenous production and absorbing cutting-edge technology.

The same line must be drawn in maintenance, because a fleet is only as sovereign as its ability to stay serviceable. A system that depends on its foreign manufacturer for spares, repairs, software updates and technical support can be grounded by a supply disruption at the very moment it is needed most. Sustainment will therefore be an integral part of every acquisition.

Any foreign purchase must come with maintenance, repair and overhaul capability established in India, technology transfer for repair and overhaul, access to technical data and test equipment, the right to upgrade and a plan to progressively localise spares.

The IAF is preparing to operate in a battlespace where machines process information and execute tasks at speeds no human can match. For us, however, the issue is not simply introducing AI but to use it to process information faster, support better decisions, raise operational tempo and generate greater combat effectiveness. The fundamental advantage will lie in the ability to take vast volumes of information and turn them into actionable decisions far faster than the adversary.

We are applying AI across the spectrum: intelligence and surveillance, sensor fusion and mission planning, electronic warfare, autonomous systems and logistics. We are developing AI indigenously through our AI Centre of Excellence, UDAAN, and building secure high-performance computing infrastructure and operational datasets. We are experimenting with autonomous systems and swarming drone concepts, developing AI-enabled electronic warfare and ISR, and investing in advanced simulation environments.

Alongside the technology, we are developing the human–machine teaming doctrines needed to use it well. Critically, we are determined not to treat these technologies as separate verticals. They must converge through a common digital and data architecture, so that sensors, decision systems and weapons operate as a single integrated network. Electronic warfare will become increasingly software-defined and adaptive. Quantum technologies may open new opportunities in sensing, timing, communications and computing.

We are also moving towards greater autonomy in combat systems, but deliberately and with clear guardrails. Autonomy will first appear in the sensor-to-shooter loop, for specific, well-defined tasks such as target recognition, threat prioritisation and time-critical engagement support. Swarming drone operations will require a degree of autonomy that cannot be achieved with a human directing every individual unit. But the strategic and tactical decisions that matter most will remain firmly in human hands: the decision to commit forces, to select targets and to define the rules of engagement. Autonomy will be task-specific, not blanket, and human oversight will remain paramount.

Over the next 10 to 15 years, the role will evolve from that of a manual flyer to that of a battle manager. The pilot will no longer be primarily a stick-and-rudder operator. Instead, he or she will lead a network of manned aircraft, unmanned systems, sensors and weapons, supervising a team of autonomous assets, including loyal wingmen, and managing the tempo of the engagement. The pilot will become the orchestrator: AI handles the tempo and machines handle the execution, while the human provides the intent, the judgement and the moral authority.

However, as the speed of warfare increases, human judgement, accountability and the ability to decide under uncertainty become more vital than ever.

Some global players, including our adversaries, have made progress in fifth-generation combat programmes. We take that development seriously and factor it fully into our planning. But I would not measure the air balance only by comparing generations of aircraft.

Our capability-centric approach means that what determines outcomes in the air is not any single aircraft. It is the combined effect of sensors, weapons, electronic warfare, networks and trained air warriors operating as one system. That is the lens through which we approach both questions: when we will field our own fifth-generation fighter, and how we will hold our edge until then.

Our fifth-generation capability will come through the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, being developed by DRDO with the IAF actively involved. The Cabinet Committee on Security has sanctioned the programme’s milestones and timelines. The induction is slated for the next decade.

The programme’s industrial foundation has been widened through the industry-driven Execution Model. The IAF reviews the programme regularly with all stakeholders because we are clear that its timely progress is essential.

The first is the fleet roadmap I have already outlined: an upgraded Su-30MKI fleet, the MRFA in an early timeframe, and the LCA Mk-1A, with 180 aircraft contracted, to rebuild squadron strength.

The second is to deny an adversary’s stealth platforms the advantage they seek. Stealth is not invisibility. Extending the distributed sensor network I described earlier, we are building a networked counter-stealth capability. VHF and passive radars are being inducted, multi-static radars are under development, and ground-based and airborne sensors are being fused, so that a target detected by one sensor is correlated by another and tracked by the network.

The third is reach without exposure. Long-range precision and stand-off weapons, combined with electronic warfare and self-protection suites, allow us to hold targets at risk deep in hostile territory without exposing our platforms to the densest defences. Operation Sindoor demonstrated what this combination can achieve.

Also, the arrival of an aircraft is not the arrival of a capability. Turning new fighters into operationally meaningful squadrons takes pilot conversion, maintenance ecosystems, weapon integration, infrastructure, doctrine and years of hard flying. We watch these markers closely, and we judge capability on that basis rather than on headline numbers. And, as I mentioned, we are already looking beyond the fifth generation.

Until the AMCA joins the force, and long after, the IAF will remain a credible, networked and resilient force, fully capable of meeting the challenges the nation faces.

Let me first be clear about one thing: the IAF is fully committed to jointness and to the ongoing transformation. For us, jointness is not a new idea. It is an inherent part of our doctrine. Coordinated air operations with both the Indian Army and the Indian Navy have always been integral to how we plan and fight, and the IAF’s operations are therefore joint by their very nature. My point is about how we transform, not whether we do. Reform must build on what already works, rather than dismantling it for the sake of change. Its design must come from within: from India’s own security needs and experience, not from a template borrowed from elsewhere.

The reason is simple. Every nation operates within its own strategic, geographical, technological and operational environment, and military structures evolve to suit those conditions. A model that serves one country well may be poorly suited to another. India faces challenges on more than one front, along mountain ranges and plains alike, while also safeguarding vital interests across the Indian Ocean Region. Our force structure, our assets and the way we employ them have been shaped by these realities. Any future structure must therefore be evaluated against India’s specific requirements and designed to meet them.

Looking within also means recognising the strengths we already have. Operation Sindoor demonstrated that our existing joint mechanisms work. Under a joint architecture established by the Chief of Defence Staff and the three Service Chiefs, the Army, Navy and Air Force synergised their efforts, and the centralised allocation and timely reallocation of critical resources proved decisive in the outcome. The common, real-time air picture shared across all three Services, which I described earlier, was another such strength. These are proven foundations, and any new structure should be built on them, not built all over again by dismantling existing structures.

An Indian model must also respect the nature of each Service’s power and domain expertise. Jointness should never be confused with the subordination of one form of military power to another. In a genuinely joint force, each Service is valued for the unique effects it brings and is employed where it can make the greatest difference. For air power, this means preserving its defining strengths: speed, reach, flexibility, precision and the ability to concentrate and redistribute combat power rapidly. A future structure must allow air power to be massed where it is needed most and shifted between sectors as the situation demands.

Finally, a transformation of this scale must be implemented in phases. Each step should be tested, validated and refined before the next is taken, so that operational readiness is never compromised during the transition. We must also avoid designing structures around a fixed prediction of what the next war will look like. They should be adaptable enough to evolve as warfare itself evolves.

Supported by resilient networks, integrated surveillance and common operational pictures, such a model will give commanders decision superiority, so that they can employ the right capability at the right time. The IAF will continue to contribute wholeheartedly to this national effort, working with our sister Services to build a structure that is distinctly Indian, proven in its foundations and ready for the future, so that India fights its future wars as one.

I think it is important to see theatreisation not simply as an exercise in allocating assets, but as an exercise in integrating capabilities to achieve an operational objective. The real test of any structure is not how neatly it divides resources on paper. It is how effectively it brings the right capability to bear, at the right place and the right time, when the nation needs it.

This is where the defining strengths of air power I spoke of a moment ago become decisive. An aircraft is not relevant only to the geographical area from which it happens to operate. With aerial refuelling, long-range weapons, networked sensors and appropriate basing, air power can be concentrated from considerable distances and shifted between sectors within hours as the threat evolves. This is equally true of our strategic and high-value assets, such as airborne early warning and control aircraft, in-flight refuellers and ISR platforms, whose effect extends well beyond any single sector. A structure that fixes such assets permanently to one geography risks giving up the very flexibility that makes air power decisive.

Operation Sindoor bears this out. The centralised allocation and timely reallocation of critical resources proved decisive in its outcome. The ability to move combat power quickly to where it was most needed was not incidental to success. It was central to it.

Our aim is a structure in which every Service’s capabilities are integrated so that each is employed where it can make the greatest difference, and in which air power retains the flexibility to be massed wherever it is needed. That is how we will ensure that India’s air power continues to deliver decisive effect across every front, as one.

The next decade will test the Indian Air Force as much by the speed of change as by the strength of any adversary. A high-intensity conflict against a technologically advanced opponent will be faster, more contested and more complex than anything we have known. As I look ahead, I see three challenges, and each defines a priority for today.

The first is integration at the speed of modern war. The side that senses, decides and acts first will prevail, and that demands a common, resilient network architecture binding every element together. Its foundation already exists in the tri-Service air picture I described earlier. It must now be steadily extended to integrate ground, air and spaceborne sensors, with AI-enabled decision support turning that data into decisions faster than the adversary can.

The second is resilience in a high-intensity, highly contested environment. We must assume that an advanced adversary will try to disrupt our air bases, communications, navigation, logistics, sensors and command-and-control systems from the very beginning of a conflict. Survivability, therefore, cannot be limited to the aircraft. We need resilient command-and-control structures, dispersed and redundant operating arrangements, hardened infrastructure, assured logistics and cyber resilience. Above all, we need the ability to keep generating combat power even when parts of the force or the network are degraded or denied. Inventory depth is part of that resilience. It means assured weapons stocking, diversified sourcing and, as I emphasised earlier, domestic production capacity able to meet surge requirements. Multi-layered, mobile air defence with gap-free surveillance, which has emerged as a critical priority, is equally central to it.

The third is the pace and depth of transformation. Technology alone does not create military advantage. We need the right doctrine, organisation, training, human resources and acquisition processes to exploit it. The traditional cycle of identifying a requirement, developing a system and inducting it over many years is increasingly at odds with technologies that evolve every few years. We must therefore place far greater emphasis on rapid capability development, experimentation and indigenous innovation, and on closer integration with industry, start-ups and academia. The process reforms I outlined earlier, from concurrent development to a clear pathway from prototype to induction, are central to this. So is the realistic training in contested and degraded environments that I spoke of at the outset, so that people, processes and doctrine keep pace with the technology.

These challenges are significant, but they are not beyond us. The IAF has already begun to address each of them through its integrated networks, its focus on resilience, its partnership with Indian industry and its commitment to continuous adaptation. With sustained national support and a whole-of-nation approach, I am confident the Indian Air Force will be ready to meet and prevail in any high-intensity conflict the future may bring.