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Lessons from recent conflicts have reinforced the need for integrated and tech-driven warfare: Gen Upendra Dwivedi

Outgoing Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi who will be retiring at the end of this month talked to Saurabh Sharma in an exclusive interview about the key operational lessons from Operation Sindoor, the push towards jointness and theaterisation, the growing role of drones and artificial intelligence (AI) in warfare, counter-insurgency challenges, security along the Indo-Myanmar border and the Army’s preparations for a rapidly evolving battlefield shaped by technological disruption and multi-domain conflict. Edited excerpts:

Speaking of Preparedness: Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi Photo: Special Arrangement
Q

Over the last few years, what are some of the key operational reforms, technological initiatives and infrastructure projects undertaken by the Indian Army that have enhanced combat preparedness and operational effectiveness, particularly along the northern and western borders? What operational gaps and challenges still remain?

A

The Indian Army has undertaken a major transformation to build a future-ready, agile and technology-enabled force capable of addressing the evolving security challenges along both the northern and western borders. Lessons from recent conflicts, particularly Operation Sindoor, have reinforced the need for integrated, multi-domain and technology-driven warfare. A key reform has been the shift towards integrated operations with enhanced jointness and interoperability among the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. Integrated planning, real-time intelligence fusion, rapid mobilisation and compressed decision-making cycles are now central to operational philosophy. Operation Sindoor demonstrated that future conflicts are likely to be intense and fought simultaneously across land, air, cyber, information and electronic warfare domains.

To meet these challenges, the Army has operationalised agile and specialised formations such as Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs), Rudra All Arms Brigades, Bhairav Battalions, Ashni Platoons, Shaktibaan Regiments and Divyastra Batteries. Significant emphasis has also been placed on technology absorption, including drones, loitering munitions, counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASes), AI-enabled surveillance, electronic warfare and battlefield automation tools. The effective employment of indigenous drones and loitering munitions during Operation Sindoor reinforced confidence in home-grown technologies and highlighted the importance of atmanirbharta. Simultaneously, efforts are underway to transform every soldier into a technology-aware and drone-capable warrior.

Infrastructure development along the northern borders has also accelerated significantly through border roads, tunnels, bridges, advanced landing grounds and enhanced logistics infrastructure, improving operational mobility and sustainment capability in high-altitude areas. Similar strengthening has taken place along the western front through integrated surveillance grids and enhanced firepower deployment.

However, challenges remain. Warfare technologies are evolving rapidly, particularly in cyber and electronic warfare, AI and counter-drone systems, requiring continuous adaptation and faster integration. Strengthening indigenous research and development, accelerating procurement and maintaining readiness across a potential 'two-and-a-half front' scenario while addressing hybrid and grey-zone threats remain key priorities for the future.

Q

India has been discussing military theatre commands and jointness for years and the process now appears to be in its final stages. Why did theaterisation take so long, what were the major institutional or operational disagreements, and how confident are you that the final structure will improve war-fighting efficiency?

A

The move towards theatre commands and greater jointness is one of the most significant defence reforms being undertaken in India since Independence. However, such a transformation is naturally complex because it involves not merely restructuring organisations, but also harmonising operational philosophies, command responsibilities, resource allocation and service-specific doctrines across three distinct armed forces.

The process has taken time because India’s security environment is unique. Unlike many countries that implemented theatre commands after prolonged expeditionary wars, India simultaneously faces active continental challenges along the northern borders, persistent threats along the Western Front and increasing maritime responsibilities in the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, any restructuring had to ensure that operational effectiveness is enhanced without creating transitional vulnerabilities.

Another important factor was that jointness cannot be achieved merely through structural changes. It requires evolution in mindset, training, interoperability, communications architecture and integrated operational planning. Over the years, the three Services have developed highly specialised operational capabilities suited to their respective domains. Naturally, discussions emerged regarding command-and-control structures, prioritisation of resources, air asset allocation, operational responsibilities and the degree of centralisation required under theatre commands. These discussions were not disagreements in a negative sense, but rather part of a mature institutional process aimed at arriving at the most effective and balanced model for India’s unique operational requirements.

Recent conflicts and Operation Sindoor have further reinforced the importance of integrated and multi-domain operations. Modern warfare no longer remains confined to individual domains. Land, air, maritime, cyber, space, information and electronic warfare capabilities must function in synchrony to achieve decisive outcomes in compressed timelines. Operation Sindoor demonstrated the operational advantages of real-time intelligence fusion, integrated planning and coordinated execution across domains.

I am confident that the final theatre command structure will significantly enhance war-fighting efficiency by enabling faster decision-making, better resource optimisation, unified operational responses and seamless jointness among the Services. More importantly, it will improve preparedness for future conflicts that are likely to be short, intense and technology-driven. Theaterisation is therefore not merely an organisational reform; it is an operational necessity for the future battlefield.

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Jointness cannot be achieved merely through structural changes. It requires evolution in mindset, training, interoperability.
Q

The Indian Army is rapidly integrating drones and counter-drone systems under concepts such as 'eagle in the arm'. Where do we stand in terms of drone warfare capabilities vis-à-vis the China-Pakistan axis? What kinds of drones and autonomous systems are the Army prioritising, and what are the biggest technological or procurement challenges?

A

The concept of 'eagle in the arm' reflects a larger shift in the Indian Army’s approach to the future battlefield, where drones are no longer seen merely as surveillance assets but as an integral extension of the soldier, commander and formation. Against the China-Pakistan axis, we have to recognise that both adversaries have invested heavily in unmanned systems, drones, loitering munitions, surveillance platforms and counter-drone capabilities. Therefore, our response cannot be incremental; it has to be comprehensive, indigenous and rapidly scalable.

The Indian Army has made significant progress in integrating drones at multiple levels--from tactical surveillance and target acquisition to logistics, precision engagement, loitering munitions, swarm concepts, counter-UAS grids and electronic warfare. Operation Sindoor gave us important validation of the operational utility of drones and loitering munitions in real battlefield conditions. It showed that unmanned systems can compress the sensor-to-shooter cycle, reduce risk to soldiers and deliver precise effects in short-duration, high-intensity operations.

Our priorities include high-altitude surveillance drones for the northern borders, tactical quadcopters and micro-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for infantry units, logistics drones for difficult terrain, loitering munitions for precision strikes, swarm drones, AI-enabled autonomous platforms, counter-drone systems, electronic warfare solutions and secure communication links. The aim is to make every soldier more technology-aware and eventually drone-capable, so that unmanned systems become a routine part of battlefield functioning.

However, the challenge is that drone warfare is evolving at a very fast pace. Endurance, payload capacity, survivability, jamming resistance, secure datalinks, autonomy, AI-enabled targeting, swarm coordination and performance in high-altitude conditions require continuous improvement. Procurement cycles must become faster because technology can become obsolete very quickly. At the same time, indigenous R&D, quality assurance, production scale and timely delivery need further strengthening. It reinforces the importance of atmanirbharta. Our focus is to build a drone ecosystem that is not only operationally effective today, but adaptable enough for tomorrow’s battlefield.

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Q

Ukraine, despite being in an active war zone, has managed to scale up production of drones and counter-drone systems at an extraordinary pace. What lessons has the Indian Army drawn from the Ukraine conflict, where are India’s current limitations in scaling drone production, and how important is private industry participation in bridging this gap?

A

Ukraine’s experience has one clear lesson: drone warfare is not only about possessing technology; it is about scaling innovation at wartime speed. Ukraine increased UAV output from very small numbers in 2022 to around 2.2 million drones in 2024, with estimates of over 4.5 million in 2025, including more than two million first-person view (FPV) drones. Some reports indicate that Ukraine is aiming for over seven million drones in 2026.

For the Indian Army, the first lesson is that drones are now consumables as much as platforms. They will be lost in large numbers due to jamming, air defence, electronic warfare and battlefield attrition. Therefore, we need depth in inventory, modular designs, rapid repair chains and assured component supply. The second lesson is that the sensor-to-shooter cycle must be compressed. Ukraine has shown that small drones, FPV systems, loitering munitions and counter-drone measures can produce tactical effects disproportionate to their cost.

India has made significant progress, particularly after Operation Sindoor, which validated indigenous drones and loitering munitions in operational conditions. However, our limitations remain in scale, speed and standardisation. We still need stronger domestic capability in motors, batteries, seekers, sensors, encrypted datalinks, anti-jam navigation, payloads and AI-enabled autonomy. Procurement cycles must also keep pace with technology cycles because in drone warfare, a system can become outdated within months.

Private industry is absolutely central to bridging this gap. Ukraine’s model shows the value of a wide ecosystem—over 500 drone manufacturers and more than 1,000 models were reported in 2025, with 96 per cent of government drone purchases in 2023-24 going to domestic manufacturers. India must similarly harness start-ups, micro, small and medium enterprises, academia, the Defence Research and Development Organisation and large industry through faster trials, assured orders and spiral development.

As highlighted by Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh, increasing the private sector’s contribution in defence manufacturing from nearly 30 per cent to 50 per cent is a critical national objective. For the Indian Army, atmanirbharta in drone and counter-drone technologies is far more than an economic or industrial aspiration; it is a strategic and operational imperative for future warfare preparedness.

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Warfare technologies are evolving rapidly, particularly in cyber and electronic warfare, AI and counter-drone systems.
Q

It is often said that human intelligence (Humint) remains central to counter-insurgency operations. Given the recent terror incidents in the Poonch-Rajouri belt in Jammu, which likely involved local support networks, how is the Army working to strengthen intelligence gathering, rebuild local trust and counter radicalisation in vulnerable regions?

A

Humint remains central to counter-insurgency because terrorism is defeated not only by surveillance, but by people’s trust. In areas like Poonch-Rajouri, the challenge is complex: dense forests, difficult terrain, proximity to the Line of Control, cross-border support and the possibility of local facilitation. Therefore, our approach to counter these challenges is three-fold.

First, we are strengthening the intelligence grid through closer coordination among the Army, Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) Police, the Central Armed Police Forces and Central intelligence agencies. Recent operations including Operation Sheruwali in Rajouri have been intelligence-based and jointly conducted by the Army, J&K Police and the Central Reserve Police Force, which reflects this integrated approach. Humint inputs are now being fused with drones, technical surveillance, electronic intelligence and area domination patrols so that information is acted upon faster.

Second, we are rebuilding and deepening local trust. In counter-insurgency, people are not just a source of information; they are the centre of gravity. Operation Sadbhavana, launched in 1998, was designed precisely to address alienation, restore confidence and support development in terrorism-affected areas through education, infrastructure, welfare and community engagement. This remains important because good intelligence flows only when the local population feels secure, respected and confident that the State will protect them from intimidation.

Third, counter-radicalisation is being addressed through youth engagement, sports, education, skill development and community interaction. The objective is to prevent terrorist groups and their overground networks from exploiting unemployment, fear, misinformation or religious radicalisation. The larger national approach is also to dismantle the terror ecosystem, not merely neutralise individual terrorists.

There are positive indicators. The government has stated that terrorist incidents in Kashmir have reduced by over 70 per cent after the abrogation of Article 370, and that stone-pelting incidents fell from 2,100 in 2018 to zero since 2023. At the same time, the shift of terrorist activity towards the Jammu region shows that the terrorists are losing local support from the Kashmir Valley and hence, the adversary is trying to revive violence south of the Pir Panjal.

Therefore, the Army’s effort is to combine firmness with outreach: precise intelligence-based operations against terrorists and their support networks, while ensuring that ordinary citizens remain partners in peace. Ultimately, Humint is built on trust, and trust is cultivated through fairness, professionalism and sustained engagement.

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Q

With instability continuing in Myanmar, how is the Indian Army managing security along the Indo-Myanmar border while safeguarding strategic projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway? Beyond the Myanmar military, which stakeholders or local groups are India engaging with to maintain stability in the region?

A

India’s approach along the Indo-Myanmar border is guided by three priorities: securing the frontier, preventing spillover of instability into the North East and safeguarding long-term connectivity interests under the Act East policy. The challenge is significant because India shares a 1,643-km border with Myanmar across Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. The post-2021 instability in Myanmar has affected border management, insurgent movement, arms trafficking and refugee flows.

The Indian Army and Assam Rifles, in close coordination with CAPFs, state governments and central agencies, are maintaining a calibrated and intelligence-driven security posture along the border. All forms of surveillance mean, including drones, UAVs, technical intelligence and electronic surveillance systems, are being extensively employed to enhance situational awareness, monitor movement across difficult terrain and strengthen border domination. Simultaneously, border infrastructure and operational readiness have been enhanced to respond swiftly to emerging contingencies.

The Indian Army shares a cordial, professional and trust-based relationship with the Myanmar Army. Both forces remain committed to maintaining peace and stability in border areas and addressing security-related concerns through mutual consultation and established coordination mechanisms. This cooperation remains important for ensuring stability in such a sensitive and complex region.

As far as connectivity corridors and stakeholder-related issues inside Myanmar are concerned, particularly regarding projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, the best agency to comment in detail would be the Government of India and the Ministry of External Affairs, as these involve larger diplomatic, developmental and geopolitical considerations.

From the security perspective, the Army remains fully conscious of the strategic importance of these projects under India’s Act East policy. Our role is to ensure that instability along the border does not adversely affect India’s security interests or connectivity objectives. At the humanitarian level as well, refugees and displaced persons arriving due to instability in Myanmar are being looked after with sensitivity and professionalism in coordination with the civil administration and other agencies. India has always maintained a balanced and humane approach while safeguarding its national security interests. Overall, the Indian Army’s focus remains on maintaining stability, strengthening surveillance and intelligence capabilities, preserving local trust and ensuring that instability across the border does not spill over into India’s north-eastern region.

Q

What do you see as the single biggest operational challenge facing the Indian Army over the next decade and how is the Army preparing for it?

A

Over the next decade, the single biggest operational challenge for the Indian Army will not be any one isolated threat, but the convergence of multiple challenges simultaneously—a potential two-front scenario combined with rapid technological disruption, information warfare, cyber threats, unmanned systems and grey-zone conflict. Future wars are unlikely to follow traditional templates. They will be faster, more transparent, technology-driven and fought across multiple domains simultaneously.

The experience of recent conflicts and Operation Sindoor has reinforced our assessment that future battlefields will increasingly be shaped by artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, drones, electronic warfare, cyber capabilities and real-time information dominance. The side capable of faster decision-making, integrated intelligence fusion and seamless multi-domain operations will hold a decisive advantage. Therefore, while conventional military preparedness remains essential, the larger challenge lies in adapting continuously to the changing character of warfare.

For India, the complexity is even greater because we face active and evolving security challenges along both the northern and western borders, while also dealing with hybrid threats, proxy warfare and information manipulation. Adversaries are increasingly attempting to combine conventional pressure with cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, drone-enabled threats and psychological operations. This means that future conflicts may begin much before the first shot is fired.

The Indian Army is therefore preparing itself through a comprehensive transformation process. We are moving towards integrated and multi-domain operations with greater jointness among the three Services. New agile and technology-enabled structures are being operationalised to improve mobility, flexibility and rapid-response capability.

Technology absorption remains a major focus area. Drones, loitering munitions, counter-UAS systems, AI-enabled surveillance, secure communications, electronic warfare systems and battlefield automation tools are increasingly becoming part of routine operational planning. At the same time, there is a conscious effort to transform every soldier into a technology-aware and drone-capable warrior.

Another major pillar of our preparation is atmanirbharta. Future wars may involve disrupted global supply chains and compressed operational timelines. Therefore, self-reliance in critical technologies, indigenous manufacturing, secure networks and resilient logistics systems is becoming an operational necessity rather than merely an economic objective.

However, perhaps the most important challenge will be maintaining adaptability. Technology is evolving faster than traditional procurement and doctrinal cycles. The Army’s focus, therefore, is not only on acquiring platforms, but on building an institution that can learn, innovate and adapt continuously. Ultimately, the future battlefield will reward those militaries that can integrate technology, human capability, jointness and national resolve into a single coherent operational response. That is precisely the direction in which the Indian Army is preparing itself.

A shorter, edited version of this appears in print

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