Hazratbal: Shrine, Politics And The Soul Of Kashmir

A mere 100 meters separate the 17th-century Hazratbal Shrine and the mausoleum of Sheikh Abdullah—Kashmir’s tallest 20th-century leader and its most prescient political barometer—both on the banks of Dal Lake. Perched gracefully on the northern shores of the Dal Lake in Srinagar, Hazratbal, arguably, overlooks one of the most picturesque views in South Asia. One can make ones’ way to the shrine on foot, navigating narrow alleys lined with food stalls, or via the water, savouring the pristine beauty of the lake. Its white façade, delicate domes and intricate wooden carvings reflect a timeless charm that stands out against its stunning backdrop of snow-capped Himalayas. 

The shrine and the mausoleum are closely linked to the modern history of Kashmir and the subcontinent, reflecting the deep interconnection between the spiritual heritage and political developments of the region. Though Sufi shrines are scattered across South and Central Asia, Hazratbal holds a unique and enduring historical place among them. It houses the Moi-e-Muqaddas, a relic believed to be a hair of the Prophet Muhammad, and it represents the distinct synthesis of Kashmiri Islam nurtured by Sufi tradition. The shrine came to symbolise inclusivity, spiritual depth and the cultural identity of Kashmir’s Muslims. In modern times, the shrine provided moral legitimacy to Sheikh Abdullah’s politics of dignity, autonomy and resistance. From this revered space, he challenged the two-nation theory in the 1940s, drawing upon ethnic Kashmiri sentiment and transforming his political movement into a broader assertion of cultural and religious belonging that transcended class divisions. Seen in perspective, this rare event in 1947 can be regarded as a miracle of sorts—one of the exceptional moments in world history where the appeal of religion was set aside in favour of a secular and pluralistic vision. 

But the recent controversies surrounding the shrine overlook the profound historical and cultural meanings of Hazratbal, instead, seeking to reduce it to simplistic binaries. Readers unaware of the nuances would see the issue framed as a contest between ‘respecting religious sentiment’ versus ‘reverence for national symbols’, such as the emblem. What they will never find out, unless the issue is unpacked, is that the Hazratbal shrine had played a central role in legitimising Kashmir’s popular accession to India, under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. It is also a symbol of Kashmir’s pluralistic ethos.

I vividly remember visiting with my mother, a practicing Hindu, the Hazratbal shrine in the 1980s, where we would sit for hours in a corner of the ladies’ section. It is common in shrines in the Kashmir Valley for devotees to sit in prayer for long periods, immersed in deeply spiritual experiences. I later lived in other parts of India and in the United States for three decades, but my early years of socialisation in the Valley instilled in me a profound love and respect for pluralism.

Seen in this light, the character of the Hazratbal shrine is no different from the national emblem. India’s national emblem is a powerful symbol that embodies the country’s identity, heritage and values. It is an adaptation of the Lion Capital from Sarnath, dating back to around 250 BCE, erected during the reign of Emperor Ashoka of the Maurya Dynasty. The abacus below the lions, featuring the bull, horse, elephant and lion, separated by wheels, represents justice, moral order and ethical governance. The emblem as a whole symbolises India’s unity in diversity, compassion and righteousness.

It’s not that Hazratbal hasn’t seen crisis. In December 1963, the Moi-e-Muqaddas disappeared from the shrine, causing public outrage. The relic was recovered after a tense week-long crisis that shook the Union government and forced Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda to intervene. The episode not only galvanised local protests but escalated into riots as far away as in Dhaka, Bangladesh, from where attacks on minorities were reported. The infamous hostage crisis of the 1990s also disturbed the peace at Hazratbal. In October 1993, militants occupied the shrine in Srinagar. The Army laid siege to the mosque, resulting in a 33-day standoff that concluded peacefully with the militants’ surrender.

Before 2004, many Muslim shrines in Jammu and Kashmir were overseen by the Auqaf Trust, and although some shrines were locally managed by caretakers or community elders, there was an institutional framework for managing properties. However, in 2004, the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Specified Wakfs and Specified Wakfs Properties Act, 2004 was passed, establishing a Waqf Board in the erstwhile state. This change in its governance structure was a consequence of decisions made in 2004 by the political executive, headed by Chief Minister and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)  founder, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed.

The decision itself resulted from a contestation between regional players. The Auqaf was regarded as having a strong presence of National Conference leaders in decision-making roles, which now the Wakf Board would control.

The Wakf Act of 2004 gave formal shape to new anxieties. I was present during assembly proceedings, reporting for The Hindu newspaper from J&K, when the legislation was cleared, watching the National Conference legislators from the opposition slowly begin to grasp the implications of the move. The issue continued to reverberate through Assembly proceedings during the remaining tenure of the PDP–Congress government till 2008. In the March 2006 assembly session, the National Conference legislators staged a walkout after moving a call-attention notice, alleging that the newly constituted board had virtually collapsed. They charged that the collapse had created confusion and chaos in the management of shrines across the state, and further alleged that the board’s funds had been misused ever since the new arrangement came into existence.

The Act brought specified Wakf properties, including Hazratbal, under a structured administrative framework. Importantly, the chair of the board was the Chief Minister, signalling a direct political role in the management of religious endowments. The Act provided for representation from various segments of society, but the centralisation of authority in the hands of the government stirred concerns over the erosion of local autonomy. Under the Wakf framework, the board assumed responsibility for the oversight, maintenance and financial administration of Wakf properties, including key shrines. In the earlier system, Mutawallis or local caretakers appointed by the community held substantial control over shrine affairs. This now stood curtailed. The National Conference viewed the move as a shift away from community-driven management towards bureaucratic oversight. Supporters of the reform argued that central oversight was necessary to ensure transparency, prevent mismanagement and safeguard the integrity of religious institutions.

After the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, the structure and functioning of the Jammu and Kashmir Waqf Board itself underwent significant changes. With the Chief Minister’s office dissolved, the Lieutenant Governor became the administrator of the board. The Central Wakf Act, 1995, was extended to Jammu and Kashmir. This brought the newly-created Union Territory of J&K under the purview of central Waqf management laws, in line with the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013, which had further clarified the powers of appointment of Waqf Board in the UTs.

In other words, the Union Ministry of Minority Affairs and Central Waqf Board gained oversight powers over religious institutions in Jammu and Kashmir. In other words, legally, the central government appoints Waqf Board members in Union Territories, but not in states, where the political executive holds the powers of appointment.