Extract from my article dated October 11, 2008, SevenYears Later
The US and other NATO forces may want a political face-saving because theyare not doing well in the fighting, but why should the Taliban Commanders wantone when they think they are winning? The same is the situation on the Pakistanside of the border. The TTP thinks it is doing well against the Pakistanisecurity forces. Why should it agree to a compromise without achieving itsobjective?
Gen David Petraeus, who was till recently the Commander of the US forces inIraq, is shortly taking over as the Commander of the US Central Command (hassince taken over). In that capacity, he will be responsible for the strategy inthe Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In Iraq, he successfully drove a wedge betweenthe secular Iraqi resistance fighters and the Wahabised Arab terrorists of AlQaeda. There is a talk that he might try a similar approach in theAfghanistan-Pakistan region by driving a wedge between the Taliban on both sidesof the border and the Al Qaeda remnants. He succeeded in Iraq because the formerBaathists of Saddam Hussein's Army, who constituted the resistance fighters,were secular and did not like the Wahabised Al Qaeda. But, in theAfghanistan-Pakistan region, Wahabism provides the binding ties which stronglyunite the Talibans with Al Qaeda. They all feel that the future of Islam isgoing to be decided in the fight against the US-led NATO forces. They have twocommon objectives-- the defeat and withdrawal of the NATO forces and theproclamation of an Islamic sharia-based rule in the entire region. So long asthese objectives unite them, the Talibans are unlikely to agree to separatepeace with the NATO forces. Media reports of a split between the Afghan Talibanand Al Qaeda have not been substantiated.
Unless and until the US is able to hunt down and kill at least bin Laden,Zawahiri and Mulla Omar, there is unlikely to be a change in the groundsituation. Instead of nursing illusions of engineering a split between Al Qaedaand the Taliban and negotiating a separate peace with the Taliban, the US shouldfocus on eliminating the Al Qaeda leadership. That was the main objective of OpEnduring Freedom and that should continue to be its main objective.
Extract from my article dated January 1, 2009, Terror2008: Pakistan-Afghanistan
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The success of the new policy will depend upon the neutralisation of thesanctuaries in Pakistani territory which keep the Taliban and Al Qaeda fightingagainst the US. The neutralisation of the sanctuaries of the Taliban isnecessary for the success of the US-led forces and the ANA (Afghan NationalArmy) in Afghanistan. Without the neutralisation of the Al Qaeda sanctuaries inPakistani territory, the US cannot be free of fears of another 9/11 in the UShomeland. Military and intelligence officers of the US realise that the USobjectives vis-a-vis Al Qaeda and the Taliban cannot be met unless thesesanctuaries are wiped out and the surviving leadership of Al Qaeda isneutralised. They also realise that missile and Predator strikes alone (over 30during 2008 as compared to 10 during the previous two years) cannot achievetheir objective unless combined with clandestine strikes by land-based stealthforces. They did attempt one such strike in September in South Waziristan. Itwas not successful and the furore in Pakistan over it led to their abandoningany more land-based strikes in Pakistani territory.
The US finds itself in the same position as the USSR found itself in Afghanistanbefore it decided to quit in 1988. The Soviet troops avoided land-based actionagainst the sanctuaries of the Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistani territory. Theyconfined their retaliatory strikes to Scud missiles fired at the suspectedhide-outs of the Mujahideen in Pakistani territory. The civilian deaths causedby the Scuds added to the anger among the Afghan refugees and strengthened theirdetermination to step up their attacks on the Soviet troops in Afghan territoryand on Soviet convoys taking logistics supplies to the far-flung Soviet posts.The Mujahideen's success in disrupting the logistics supplies was one of thefactors, which contributed to the Soviet decision to quit.
The Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, advised by retired officers of theInter-Services Intelligence (ISI) such as Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, are followingagainst the US-led forces the same strategy which the Mujahideen had followedagainst the Soviet troops--keeping them bleeding and trying to starve them ofessential supplies. In addition to keeping up a high level of suicide and otherterrorism in Afghan territory to disrupt road movements of troops and suppliesand weaken the control of the ANA in towns, they have stepped up their attackson road movement of supplies for the NATO forces from Karachi. The US is tryingto work out alternate routes through Russia, Georgia and the Central AsianRepublics (CARs). It remains to be seen how satisfactory the proposed new supplyroutes will be.
When Obama's advisers talk of a regional strategy, they mean being responsive toPakistan's perceived unhappiness and concerns. If they do it, they can exercisemore pressure on the Pakistan Army to deal with the sanctuaries and if and whenPakistan does it, it will benefit not only the US, but also India. So theirargument goes. This is pure wishful thinking and betrays a failure to comprehendthe Pakistani mind-set. Pakistan looks upon the various terrorist groupsoperating from its territory --whether against India or Afghanistan or the US--as strategic assets to limit the power of India and its influence in Afghanistanand the CARs. It is not going to voluntarily give up these perceived assets,unless forced to do so.
The inaction or inability or both of successive Pakistan Governments has enabledAl Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, the anti-India terroristorganisations, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Group( (IJG) and radicalised members of the Pakistani diaspora in Europe and NorthAmerica acquire a strategic depth in the tribal belt of Pakistan from where theycan operate wherever they want all over the world--whether against India orAfghanistan or the West or Russia or even against Pakistan if it co-operates tooclosely with the US.
What the Obama administration would need is a regional strategy to eliminate theterrorist sanctuaries in Pakistani territory and to deprive the jihaditerrorists of the world of the strategic depth which they presently enjoy inPakistani territory. This is a strategy on which the US and India can closelycollaborate as and when Obama and his advisers come out of their present mode ofwishful thinking.
