The Threshold Of Violence

Contrary to what some commentators are describing as the'dramatic escalation' of violence in J&K, or the claims that troops"are barely able to contain the militants", the ground situation inthe state, measured largely by the loathsome body-count, indicates that the pastseven months have seen a relatively lower level of violence on point to pointcomparisons with the same period in previous years.

Indeed, figuresfor the period indicate that the secular decline of violence, which beganin 2001, is continuing. While 493 civilians were killed during the January-Julyperiod in year 2002, the corresponding figure was 399 in 2003, and 362 in 2004.313 civilians have succumbed to terrorist violence in the January-July period inthe current year. Further, 210 security force (SF) personnel were killed in2002, 194 in 2003, 203 in 2004 and 129 in the current year over the same period.Overall, total fatalities for the first seven months from 2002 onwards have alsoshown a decreasing trend: 1,694 in 2002 to 1,438 in 2003 to 1,166 in 2004 and1,087 in 2005.

Addressing a press conference in the capital, Srinagar, onAugust 5, Chief Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed disclosed that terrorist-relatedviolence had decreased by 25 percent in 2005. According to him, 1,217 incidentsof violence had occurred in the last seven months, compared to 1,611 during thecorresponding period last year. In first seven months of 2004, there were 41suicide attacks and this year only 22 such attacks have occurred, Muftidisclosed.

The more recent and rather inordinate focus on J&K hasprimarily been the result of a series of high-profile terrorist incidents inSrinagar, as also the continuing hype with regard to the peace process. Therehas, of course, been a spike in violence in Srinagar. 89 persons, including 35civilians and 30 SF personnel, have died thus far in 2005 (till July 31) asagainst 56 people in the corresponding period in 2004 in the Srinagar District.Among the major incidents of terrorist violence in the city during 2005 are:

July 29: In an attack at Budshah Chowk in the heart ofthe capital city, two SF personnel died and at least 18 civilians, including tenjournalists, sustained injuries.

July 20: A Major of the Indian Army and two soldierswere among five people who died and 17 persons were wounded when a suspectedsuicide bomber rammed an explosive-laden car into an Army vehicle near BurnhallSchool in the high-security civil lines area.

June 24: Nine soldiers were killed and 21 otherssustained injuries when their bus was blown up in an explosion caused by theterrorists on the banks of the Dal Lake.

May 12: Two women were killed and at least 60 persons,including 25 children, were wounded when terrorists lobbed a hand grenadetargeting a patrol party of the Border Security Force (BSF) at the main entranceof the Tyndale Biscoe School in the Lalchowk area.

May 11: At least two persons were killed and 50 otherssustained injuries when terrorists triggered a car bomb explosion in the JawaharNagar area of the capital. Over a dozen vehicles and approximately 40 shops,bank branches and residential houses were damaged in the blast.

April 6: A day before the bus from Srinagar toMuzaffarabad in Pakistan occupied Kashmir was to be flagged off, two Fidayeen(suicide squad) terrorists attack the Tourist Reception Centre which wasaccommodating 24 passengers. Both the terrorists were killed in the ensuinggun-battle and seven persons, including a policeman, were injured. 45 persons,including the passengers, were subsequently evacuated to safety

February 24: Three police personnel, a woman and twoterrorists were killed and four persons sustained injuries during a fidayeenattack at the Divisional Commissioner's office.

January 7: A Deputy Commandant of the BSF, twosoldiers, one policeman and a civilian were killed and four persons sustainedinjuries when two fidayeen attacked the Income Tax office. While one ofthe terrorists was killed on January 7, the other was shot dead the next day.

Being the capital city, Srinagar is, in a certain sense, anobvious target. In a city with a heavy security presence, inevitably, softtargets like schools, residential and busy commercial areas have borne the bruntof attacks in 2005. At the time of writing, official sources estimated that atleast 85 to 90 terrorists were present within Srinagar and its suburbs. Theirintent and capacities to target Srinagar is a consequence of the fact that thecapital has been, quite naturally, the more public face of the efforts underwayfor the state's return to normalcy.

There is dramatic evidence of a return to a measure ofnormalcy in civic life, and increasing business activity, particularly in thetourism industry, the mainstay of the local economy. Domestic tourist flows intothe Kashmir Valley, for instance, registered a record growth of 83 per centduring the first six months of 2005. More than 280,000 domestic tourists visitedSrinagar between January to June 2005 as against a total of 358,000 visitorsthrough 2004.

Another significant indicator of the levels of conflict isthe scale of terrorist ingress. 15 Corps Commander, Lt General S. S. Dhillonmaintains: "Until April this year, infiltration was below normal, perhapsdue to heavy snow and the ongoing peace process. Between May and June,infiltration picked up and was slightly above normal. But this month [July] theintensity has been high..."

According to sources, between April 22 and July 15, 2005,approximately 40 infiltration attempts were foiled by the troops and 112terrorists were killed during this period. In July 2005 alone, according to onereport, there were more than 15 infiltration attempts, with 58 terrorists beingkilled. But increased infiltration attempts at this time of the year are notunusual, primarily due to melting of snow along the border. The 16 CorpsCommander, Lt. Gen. Sudhir Sharma, underlined this 'routine aspect': "Thedesire to push in militants in large groups can only be explained on account ofa backlog due to heavy snows this year. My assessment is, infiltration attemptswill continue for at least the next two months. "

Border fencing and advanced detection devices, includingIsraeli ground sensors, have provided the troops an advantage in uncoveringinfiltration. However, as is their wont, the terrorists have chosen new andingenious methods to traverse this obstacle. Army sources indicate that theinfiltrators are now using difficult and inaccessible terrain as new routes. Forinstance, an Army patrol intercepted a group of infiltrators on July 12, 2005,in the Gurez mountains of Baramulla district in North Kashmir. The infiltratorshad reportedly crossed the Line of Control (LoC) through a mountain pass, intothe rocky and snow-covered region, at a height of approximately 16,000 feet. Inthe subsequent operations, at least 15-18 infiltrators were killed by thetroops.

Infiltration through the Gurez sector has been rare,primarily because of the harsh terrain and poor weather conditions. And entrypatterns have also reportedly changed. Infiltrators, conventionally, used tocross in small groups of four to five. In the current context, however, they areapproaching the border in larger groups to deceive the troops. Explaining this,Deputy Inspector General of the BSF, S. Srinivasan, said the group is dividedinto three, while one of them take a direct route selected by the guide, anothergoes back to Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) after giving firing cover to it(first group) and the third take another route to sneak into the Valley.

Furthermore, official sources said that terrorists are alsoattempting to enter India from Bangladesh and Nepal, to eventually travel toJ&K. Drastic improvement in border management and the completion of fencingalong the LoC has rendered ingress from Pakistan and PoK difficult, though notimpossible. Consequently, cadres now also use the route from Bangladesh andNepal, a route hitherto reserved for 'senior commanders' of the Jehad due to itsrelatively high cost.

Even as the number of terrorists killed has come downgradually (991 during January-July 2002; 845 in January-July 2003; 601 in 2004and 645 till July 30, 2005), one of the crucial elements in the SF's summeroperational strategy has been the number of terrorist leaders killed. Accordingto sources, at least 72 of them have been killed in 2005. And this is a seriousproblem that the terrorist groups active in J&K are now facing: it is stillnot difficult to find foot-soldiers for the jehad, but it takes much moreto replenish the loss of leadership on the ground.

While there has been a distinct reduction in the levels ofviolence, as reflected in most significant parameters, it is evident that theterrorists retain the capacities and potential to carry out major strikes inJ&K and elsewhere in India. Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee disclosed inParliament on August 3, 2005, that recent reports indicated that a large numberof launching camps along the LoC from Rajouri to Gurez Sector have beenactivated, where terrorists have been kept in readiness for infiltration. Healso reiterated a point that was made by the Prime Minister and Foreign Ministerearlier, that the logistic infrastructure of terrorist training camps insidePakistan and PoK remain intact.

The machinery that sustains such levels of infiltration andcontrols eventual targeting in terrorist operations is also well in place. Forinstance, top Army officers have disclosed that there are 28 control stationsfunctioning in PoK, in touch with approximately 1,113 radio sets in the Valleyalone. The total number of messages being generated is anywhere between13,000-15,000 intercepts every month. And, according to estimates, more thanRupees 53. 3 million passed through Hawala channels into terrorist coffersbetween January-July 2005, with the corresponding figure for 2004 estimated atRupees 40.9 million. In short, the infrastructure to wage jehad -training, communications and funding - has been maintained in full measureacross the LoC, despite Gen. Pervez Musharraf's repeated commitments to thecontrary.

Notwithstanding the deligitimisation of terror and Pakistan'spre-occupation with its own conflicts on multiple fronts, almost 2,000 peoplesuccumb to terrorism-related violence in J&K annually--high by anystandards, but appalling within a population of under eight million.

There are an increasing number of votaries, on both the sidesof the border, of the idea that violence and dialogue can take placeconcurrently; that the extremists can continue with terrorist activity withoutprejudice to the peace process. While the peace dividend is yet to crystallize,it is crucial to recognize - however discomforting this may be - that terrorismremains, within this context, a strategically useful tactic and strategy.

Kanchan Lakshman is Research Fellow, Institute for ConflictManagement; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict &Resolution. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the SouthAsia Terrorism Portal