Resurgent Sectarianism

With crackdowns continuing in the Pakistani tribal belt, a plan to root out the jehadinetwork in Pakistan is on the cards. The recent killings of Shiites in Karachi and the high profile murder ofMaulana Azam Tariq on October 6, 2003, are closely linked with likely developments in the near future. 

Themurder of Maulana Azam Tariq, Member of National Assembly and chief of the Millat-i-Islamia party [formerlythe now defunct Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)] and an ally of the country's ruling coalition, haspushed Pakistan towards deep turmoil. All the big cities of the country, especially the federal capital ofIslamabad, fell into the hands of violent crowds that took to the streets on Tuesday, October 7, 2003.

Maulana Azam Tariq was killed when his car was ambushed by unidentified gunmen at the Golra Mor in thevicinity of the high security zone of the federal capital. Although the Millat-i-Islamia party has registereda First Information Report in which mostly Shiite religious leaders as well as a Director of the IranianCultural Centre was named, the hawkish elements in the party - the inner circle - are convinced that themurder conspiracy emanated from Pakistan's corridors of power. 

Maulana Azam Tariq's widow was also heardsaying at the funeral that, a few days ago, Interior Minister Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat (who was also theMaulana's political rival in the Jhang area) had threatened Maulana Tariq, after which Azam Tariq alwaystravelled in disguise. His security escort had also been recently withdrawn by the Punjab Government, anotherexample that is being quoted by sympathizers in the context of allegations that the ruling establishment wasbehind the murder.

Apart from various subjective opinions, a closer analysis of the incident suggests several aspects that areinconsistent with the premise of a sectarian killing. According to reports, the assailants fired as many as 92bullets at the car and at least 30 bullets hit Maulana Tariq. Eyewitnesses stated that, as soon as theMaulana's car crossed a toll plaza, a Pajero jeep overtook his vehicle through the second lane and stopped.Three assailants came out of the Pajero and started spraying bullets at the car from two sides. They continuedfiring for about 20 seconds and escaped after confirming that Azam Tariq and his colleagues were dead. Thestaff at the toll plaza fled to save their own lives. One eyewitness mentioned that an assailant also firedthree bullets at one of the staffers at the toll plaza, but he managed to escape.

Later, the Police recovered the Pajero used in the attack from Mughal Market, Sector I-8, Islamabad. Witnessessaid that the terrorists had abandoned the vehicle along the road and had driven away towards Faizabad in awhite Toyota Corolla car.

Contrary to earlier patterns of terrorist attacks, this was not a sudden hit-and-run operation in whichkillers generally fire a few bullets in a haphazard way and flee. Three persons firing 92 bullets would beexpected to have stayed on the spot for some time, probably several minutes. This clearly indicates a highlevel of confidence among the assassins, and suggests the use of professional shooters. 

In most past sectariankillings, the attacks have generally lasted a little over a minute or a minute and a half, with the killersstaying in their vehicle and firing no more than 20 to 25 bullets, before they flee. In the present case,moreover, the killers travelled all through Islamabad, which is under extraordinarily high security thesedays, and left the car in the posh Sector I-8 area, where the private houses of top bureaucrats andbusinessmen are situated.

Another theory, however, is that Maulana Tariq became the victim of a revenge killing for an incident thattook place in Karachi on October 3, 2003, in which seven Shia employees of the Space and Upper AtmosphericResearch Commission (SUPARCO) were killed.

Whatever the case, the Maulana's killing has brought the activists of the banned SSP out of hiding, and theyhave taken to the streets in extreme anger. Even the dissident faction of the SSP, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) group, surfaced and joined in the protests. Most ofthese people were trained in Afghan training camps during the Taliban period, and are wanted by the PakistaniGovernment.

Well-placed sources indicate that the reaction to Maulana Tariq's murder and the subsequent street violencemay cause Shia-Sunni riots in parts of the country. If this happens, the government can be expected to conductsiege and search operations in areas such as Jhang, Chiniot, Sahiwal, Karachi, Hyderabad, Faisalabad andSargodha, arresting persons who have any manner of linkages with the SSP. 

Once such an operation commences, itis expected to take other sectarian and militant outfits into its ambit as well. US and other westernintelligence agencies are convinced that, of the two Lashkar-e-Jhangvi factions, one - the Asif Ramzi group(whose command is now in the hands of Qari Asad) - is behind many terrorist incidents in which Western targetswere involved, including the May 8, 2002, Sheraton bomb blast in which nine French workers were killed, theDaniel Pearl killing, and attacks on various churches, among others.

Though the LeJ and SSP are now separate organisations, US intelligence believes that there are strongsurviving linkages between the two. At the same time, organizations such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and the SSP are also linked. Both Maulana Azam Tariqand JeM chief Maulana Masood Azhar together received their education at the Binori Town Seminary in Karachi.Several workers of both formations frequently change hats and have, time and again, crossed over from the SSPto the JeM, and back. Consequently, if the Pakistani establishment takes action against the SSP, groups suchas the JeM would automatically attract similar action.

Understanding intelligence agency operations in Pakistan does not require any deep investigations. Suchoperations are conducted on set formulae, and intelligence bosses generally apply the same rules in allcomparable operations. Way back in the mid-1990s, the then Nawaz Sharief Government had decided to break thenetwork of ethnocentric parties in Karachi, which had brought extreme lawlessness and a gun culture to themetropolis. The task was assigned to the Intelligence Bureau's (IB) Deputy Director General, retired WingCommander Tariq Lodhi. The IB arranged special sharp shooters from its Simli Dam Training Center, whoconducted random killings in selected areas. In the following days, the city turned violent, giving the lawenforcers a reason to conduct their search and seizure operations that fixed on workers of ethnocentricparties, eventually breaking their networks. It now remains to be seen for how much time the street violence inresponse to Azam Tariq's murder will last, before it traps the reactionaries in their own net.

Syed Saleem Shahzad is  Correspondent, Asia Times. Courtesy, South AsiaIntelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal