Opening Another Front?

As the people of Pakistan celebrated Id-ul-Azha, there was an unexpected anduncertain lull in violence in the province of Balochistan. In the days beforethe annual Muslim 'festival of sacrifice', the Pakistan Army had moved nearly adivision into the Sui and Bugti areas, following crippling attacks on the Suigas purification plants and pipelines. There were heightened anxieties that thiswas the beginning of a new and brutal crackdown in this sprawling, restive andbackward province.

Balochistan has been simmering for decades, but temperatures have risendrastically over the past year. 103 people died and over 300were wounded in insurgency-related violence in 2004. Things were broughtabruptly to a boil in Sui after the Army sought to cover up the brutal gang-rapeof a woman doctor at the Sui Refinery in the night of January 2-3, allegedly byan officer and personnel of the Army's Defense Security Guards (DSG) who arecharged with the protection of the sprawling gas installation. While the statusof women leaves much to be desired in Balochistan, the incidence of rape isextraordinarily low, and tribesmen react with extreme violence to thisparticular crime.

Nevertheless, the ferocity of the attacks on the critical gas infrastructure wassymptomatic of a wider and more intense anger than the reaction provoked by therape incident. Just between January 7 and January 12, for instance, InteriorMinister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao disclosed that as much as 14,000 rounds ofsmall arms, 435 rounds of rocket and mortars, and 50 to 60 rounds ofmulti-barrel rocket launchers had been fired by the rebels. At least 15 personshad been killed in these attacks and there was extensive damage to the mainpurification plant and pipelines. 

The pipeline has been frequently attacked inthe past, but supplies have seldom been disrupted for more than a couple ofdays. This time around, however, it is estimated that a complete restoration ofsupplies would take nearly a month. Sherpao also disclosed that gas supply to 22per cent of total consumers in the country had been stopped. According toanalyst Rashed Rahman, moreover, the power and fertilizer sectors, almost theentire industrial sector in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), someindustries in Punjab and Sindh, and even commercial and domestic consumers havebeen deprived of gas supply either completely or at certain peak hours. 

Aspokesman for the Sui Southern Gas Pipelines Ltd. disclosed thatgas-distribution company had been "forced to implement a 14-hour loadmanagement schedule for gas consumers in Sindh province". The Punjabprovince was also facing a shortage of 460 million cubic feet in its dailyrequirement of 1,650 million cubic feet according to the Sui Northern GasPipeline Ltd, which is responsible for the distribution of gas to 2.25 millionconsumers in about 430 cities, towns and villages in the provinces of Punjab,the NWFP and the Federal capital, Islamabad.

Stung, President General Pervez Musharraf had warned the rebels, "Don'tpush us… It is not the '70s. We will not climb mountains behind them, theywill not even know what and from where something has come and hit them."

By January 17, Nawab Akbar Bugti, the sardar (chieftain) of the Bugtitribe that dominates the Sui region, was complaining, "There are activitiesin the area which suggest that they intend only a war against us. For the lasttwo days there has been a full military build-up in the area. According to myinformation, 36 trucks loaded with army men have reached [the area] and more arecoming from different [army] cantonments. At Sibi air base, six gunshiphelicopters have landed. Today [Thursday] aircraft and helicopters have beenflying in our skies for ground checks. They have also brought tanks and 12artillery pieces." 

It was Nawab Bugti who had widely publicized the rapeincident, and had publicly named the alleged perpetrator, one Captain Emad andthree soldiers of the DSG, and intelligence sources indicate that the bulk ofthe subsequent attacks on the Sui infrastructure had been executed by members ofthe Kalpar sub-tribe of the Bugti tribe. During combing operations in and aroundDera Bugti, some 80 persons were reported to have been arrested and anunspecified number of weapons seized. On January 20, troops demolished housesallegedly used by the tribesmen to launch the rocket attacks and secure areasnear the gas field. 

Apart from beefing up its forces in the Bugti-Sui areas,ostensibly to guard oil installations, the Army has expanded its base ofoperations and efforts to consolidate operational capacities are visible,including the buildup of focused intelligence on specific targets that are to betaken up in the next and potentially intensive phase of operations. Sourcesindicate, moreover, that a Cabinet meeting held on January 17, 2005, had securednear-unanimity on the intensification of military operations against the Balochrebels, though a 'consensus' on securing a 'negotiated settlement' with Balochleaders was projected in the Press.

It was the dissent of the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM)leaders in the Cabinet that has, however, imposed a measure of caution in thisprocess. The exiled MQM leader (currently in London) Altaf Hussain had alsothreatened that his party would pull out of the government if there is acrackdown in Balochistan, and another prominent Sindhi leader, the NationalPeople's Party (NPP) Chief, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, had turned Musharraf's threaton its head, declaring that the Sindhis would not abandon the Baloch and that"It is no more an era of the 1970s, everyone now possesses lethalweapons."

While the government at the centre would not be affected by an MQM pull-out, thecoalition government in Sindh could collapse, and the sectarian violence thatlong dominated the province could revive. With Sindh and Balochistandestabilized, an opportunistic escalation in NWFP would be a distinctpossibility, and the whole situation in Pakistan could acquire a 'house ofcards' profile. As commentator Ayaz Amir expressed it, "The Pakistan Armycannot afford another operation against its own people."

There is, however, a strong constituency, particularly within the Army andintelligence, who believe that the 'low-intensity' approach to the Balochinsurgency has failed and that a change in tactics is now necessary.

Nevertheless, attempts at political management have gone side by side with thebeefing up of forces in the province. There have been unsuccessful efforts toneutralize the MQM's sway in Sindh by reviving the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)and sources indicate that Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief, Lt. Gen.Pervez Kiani, and National Security Advisor, Tariq Aziz had flown to meet theexiled PPP Chief, Benazir Bhutto, in Dubai to try and work out a deal. A dealwith the PPP at this stage is, however, impossible, since Bhutto can hardlyafford to be seen as bailing out the military regime and supporting a militarycrackdown.

At the same time, a Parliamentary sub-committee on Balochistan headed byMushahid Hussain has recommended a 15 to 20 per cent increase in gas royalties(a long-standing grievance has been the pittance Balochistan receives ascompensation for its natural resources; Sindh, according to one report, receivesRs. 140 as royalty per million BTU (British Thermal Unit), Punjab, Rs. 80 to190; Balochistan receives just Rs. 36); 20 to 30 per cent resource allocationfor local development; and constitutional changes for greater provincialautonomy. The Committee has emphasized a political solution to the problems ofthe Baloch.

All this may, however, be too little, too late. Earlier, on December 17, 2004,Ataullah Mengal, a Baloch nationalist leader, Chairman of the Pakistan OppressedNations Movement (PONM), and chief of the Mengal tribe, had walked out of theParliamentary sub-committee declaring that 'nothing could come of it.' NawabBugti has also declared that "Military operation and negotiations could notcontinue side by side."

Underlying the entire conflict is a crisis of faith. Islamabad has never trustedthe Baloch. And the Baloch find little reason in their history to trustIslamabad. Worse, recent developments in the province have immensely intensifiedtheir apprehensions. One of their greatest fears, as articulated by Nawab Bugti,is that "they are trying to change the Baloch majority into a minority byaccommodating more than five million non-locals in Gwadar and other developedareas." 

Another is that the power of the Sardars and the relative autonomylong enjoyed in wide areas of the province is being destroyed by Musharraf'splans to transformall 'B areas' into 'A areas', and to bring them undercentralized systems of policing and administration. The sheer distance thesituation in Balochistan has traversed is reflected in the irony of the factthat Nawab Bugti, one of the most vehement voices of opposition to Islamabadtoday, was, in fact, the Governor of Balochistan during the rebellion of the1970s, and sided with the Army in the widespread repression that crushed thatmovement.

The truth is, Musharraf's plans for Balochistan - whether military, economic orpolitical - stand in irreducible opposition to perceptions of local interestamong the people of the province. That puts Islamabad squarely between a rockand a hard place in this strategic and resource-rich land that has long remainedon the periphery of Pakistan's projects and perceptions.

Kanchan Lakshman isResearch Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines:Writings on Conflict & Resolution. Courtesy, the South Asia IntelligenceReview of the South Asia Terrorism Portal