With the pullout of the Marxist coalition partner, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna(JVP, the People's Liberation Front) from Sri Lankan President ChandrikaKumaratunga's United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) Government, the countryhas once again been plunged into uncertainty.
The JVP pulled out of the coalition midnight June 15 when Kumaratunga refused torescind her willingness to sign the Joint Mechanism (JM) with the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to handle Tsunami related aid in areas under thelatter's control.
JVP leader Somawansha Amarasinghe said that the JM was an open invitation to theTigers to eliminate rivals. "By establishing the Tsunami relief structure,the Government of Sri Lanka is attempting to hand over part of the power legallyvested in it by the people to a group (the LTTE)," the JVP central commandsaid when it issued an ultimatum to Kumaratunga to reject the mechanismproposals.
As soon as the pullout was made official, stories appeared on websites andpapers aligned with the Front that, in the event the JM became functional, theKaruna faction would intensify attacks on the main Vanni faction of the LTTE. Infact, two days before the pullout, on the night of June 13, the regional officeof Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) in the eastern town of Batticaloacame under attack by suspected Karuna loyalists. TRO has been the main agencyworking in Tigers held areas, coordinating all reconstruction efforts includingthose connected with the Tsunami rebuilding programme. The TRO has come underheavy criticism as a mere Tiger front, despite being registered as aninternational non-governmental organisation.
Some observers took the attack as a signal from the Karuna faction that it willincrease similar targeting of Tiger fronts working on humanitarian projects, ifthe JM is operationalised. Military sources in Batticaloa however said that itwas too early to assess the consequences. "It will not be very good PR whenyou go around disrupting civilian reconstruction work," said a high rankingofficer at the Batticaloa Brigade Command.
In the capital, Colombo, military spokesperson Brigadier Daya Rathnayake saidthat the military was prepared to meet an escalation of attacks following thesigning of the mechanism. He, however, added that he was not aware of anyintelligence warnings about an escalation of attacks.
The Karuna faction, which broke ranks in April 2004, has been successful ineliminating key LTTE figures in the East, including Kaushalyan, the former LTTEeastern political wing leader in February 2005. Kaushalyan has been the highestranking LTTE leader to be killed in the internecine violence since the ceasefireand his murder unleashed a fresh bout of killings.
Against such a backdrop, the possibility of an escalation in violence cannot becompletely ruled out. The killings had stopped for about one and half monthsafter the Tsunami, but took off in earnest with the Kaushalyan murder and nowthere are reports of attacks in the East every day.
The Karuna faction has also said that it was not supportive of the JM. Lankaa pro-JVP Sinhala newspaper reported last week, quoting anonymous Karunasources, that the faction welcomed the pullout and said that the JVP stancewould be helpful to its operations in the East.
The JVP has been very vociferous in its support of the Karuna faction. Whenrecent press reports in Colombo established the presence of armed Karuna cadreswithin Government-controlled areas in the East, JVP stalwart Wimal Weeravanshabranded the reporting as a threat to national security. The JVP also shared aplatform with T. Rajarathnam, the former General Secretary of the anti-LTTEEelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) last year, after he returnedto Colombo from India late last year to assist the Karuna faction in setting upa political party. Rajarathnam was abducted by the LTTE soon afterwards.
In any event, the JM would be a big blow to the Karuna faction, since it wouldbe the first time that the Kumaratunga administration would enter into anagreement with the LTTE. It would be a big boost towards thawing icyrelationships between the LTTE and the Government. President Kumaratunga herselfhas said that the JM could be the prelude to the resumption of negotiations.When the idea of the JM was first mooted, the Norwegians were quick to point outthat it was a God-sent chance.
On the flip side, Jehan Perera of the National Peace Council, a non-governmentalorganisation campaigning for the JM, notes, "If the mechanism fails, theLTTE and the Government will feel more estranged, the drift towards war rhetoricwill be accelerated."
Despite a three-year ceasefire, peace talks between the LTTE and Colombo havestalled since April 2003. The ceasefire agreement was signed between the Tigersand an administration headed by present opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe.Wickremasinghe's United National Party (UNP) was defeated by the Kumaratunga-JVPalliance in April 2004. The alliance campaigned on a platform that projected theCeasefire Agreement as a sell-out to the LTTE.
Despite the rhetoric, in recent days Kumaratunga has appeared more and moreaccommodative of the Tigers. Last week, she gave orders to transfer Rear AdmiralSarath Weerasekera from a restive Trincomalee in the East. Weerasekera headedthe Eastern Naval Headquarters and had extended his support to the erection of aBuddha statue in the city.
Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen is also due in the island thisweek. He will hold talks with both Colombo and Kilinochchi in an attempt tobolster the rapprochement efforts. On June 13, Sri Lanka's main donors endorsedthe JM at Washington DC. "We urge the immediate signing of the agreement inorder to ensure proper flow of reconstruction aid to Tsunami victims in theNorth East," the Co-chairs of the Sri Lanka Donor Group, the US, Japan,Norway and the European Union said, in what was seen as a massive boost toKumaratunga. The donors also gave subtle indications that the aid flow might bedisrupted without a proper mechanism for implementation. "We believe such astructure will facilitate effectiveness and equity in Tsunami assistance,"they added. Kumaratunga desperately needs the foreign funds not only for themassive reconstruction effort but to stem double digit inflation and pooreconomic indicators.
However, Kumaratunga is gearing up to face a torrid time in the south if shegoes ahead with the JM. The JVP has already brought 10,000 protestors toColombo. Two Buddhist monks have gone on hunger strikes in the last two weeks,while hundreds have braved teargas and water canons and marched to her officialresidence in Colombo.
JVP general secretary Tilvin Silva said that the party would be mobilisingsupporters against the JM and would forge a new alliance with other politicalparties opposed to the mechanism. Amarasinghe's parting shot was, "We leavewith the mission to return soon, stronger in purpose and greater innumbers."
The JVP pullout has reduced Kumaratunga to leading an 81 seat Government in SriLanka's 225-member Parliament. She is now dependent on the support of the mainopposition party, the UNP and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). The TNA hasbeen very much pro-Tiger in its approach. Both parties have, however, comeforward with conditional support for Kumaratunga.
This has left Kumaratunga supporters talking of a fresh coalition with the JVPalmost as soon as the party pulled out of the coalition. Thus, deputy ministerDilan Perera, who has been working closely with the President on the JM,declared, "The UNP and some sections of the media would want to believethat the partnership is over. This is not the end of SLFP-JVP cooperation. Wehave an on going dialogue and we will be talking, and we will worktogether."
All this manoeuvring has left Colombo a hive of confusion even before the Tigersannounced their final decision on the joint mechanism. Without a fresh mandate,Kumaratunga would be a weak leader and will find it hard to proceed with peacenegotiations. But in any coming election, the JVP would stand to gain thenationalist vote-base at the expense of Kumaratunga's own Sri Lanka FreedomParty (SLFP), weakening her hand even further. The only chance she has atconsolidation would be if she can revive the peace process, a dead-beat Tsunamireconstruction effort and a lagging economy, all at the same time.
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Amantha Perera is a regular contributor to the Inter Press Service andThe Sunday Leader, Colombo and Lecturer in Journalism, Sri Lanka Collegeof Journalism. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South AsiaTerrorism Portal
