Nuclear Friends In Need

The continuing uncertainty overthe implementation of the historic civil-nuclear cooperation agreement betweenIndia and the US casts a pall over a fledgling strategic relationship betweenthe world’s two largest democracies. It was India’s nuclear weapons test in1998 that thrust India into the US strategic agenda and started a dialogue thathas blossomed into a closer relationship. It would be ironic if disagreementover the implementation of the treaty now set back relations.

Since the early 1990s, thecenter of gravity in US foreign and security policy shifted from Europe to Asia,especially with the rise of Chinese power. The values-based partnership betweenIndia and the US is derived from the increasing importance of Asia and aconvergence of interests that took shape in the decade after the collapse of theSoviet Union.

India’s world-view after itbecame independent in 1947 was shaped by its anti-colonial history, nonalignmentbetween the world’s two major blocs, determination to remain preeminent in itsimmediate neighborhood, and poverty, which in practice limited India’sinternational impact.

India today sees itself as amajor regional power on its way to becoming a major world power and the US asthe key external friend who can help it realize its global ambitions. Economics– expanding India’s trade and investment and securing its energy supplies– has become a major driver of its foreign policy. Over the past 15 years, thechange in both tone and substance of US-India relations has been revolutionary.

Once India and the USinternalized the significance of the end of the Cold War, both sides set aboutbuilding a bilateral infrastructure for a working partnership in a changedworld, largely built on the economic foundations of trade and foreign directinvestment: Two-way trade rose from $11.6 billion in 2001 to $27 billion in2005. Foreign direct investment rose from $1.7 billion in 2000 to $6.6 billionin 2005.

With such common interests, itis a priority for both the US and India that Asia develop in peace and that nosingle power dominate the continent. Though this argument is seldom articulatedby either government, India and the US have quietly worked to integrate Asiapolitically and economically. Both obviously think of China in this context, butneither is interested in creating an anti-Chinese alliance: For both, theobjective is to encourage peaceful relations between China and the rest of theregion.

Historically, the US and Indiahad radically different perspectives on security. The US opposed India’snuclear policy, especially after the 1998 test of an explicitly military nucleardevice. India saw the Indian Ocean as its own "security space," and lookedwith a jaundiced eye on other powers, including the US, maintaining a regularmilitary presence there.

Ironically, the nuclear testprovided the occasion for India and the US to have their first seriousdiscussion about respective strategic perspectives and what would make the worlda safer place. This dialogue ultimately did not change either country’sfundamental approach to nuclear proliferation. But it did lead the US to acceptthat it must deal with India as a nuclear power.

It also led both countries torecognize a common interest in preventing the spread of nuclear-weaponstechnology. The test set the stage for changes during the 21st century: thesimplification of US procedures for exports of non-nuclear high technology thatIndia wanted to buy and the agreement making possible India-US civil-nuclearcooperation, which had been off limits for nearly 30 years. The US Congresspassed legislation authorizing the agreement, and the understanding now makesits way through a multi-layered implementation process.

This agreement has causedheartburn both in the US and India and, if implemented, will lead to majoradjustments in the nonproliferation institutions that the US painstakingly builtover the last 40 years.

Still, the agreement should besupported for two reasons: First, removing India from the list of "nuclearoutlaws" is an essential step in securing India’s energetic participation inpreventing the spread of nuclear-weapons technology. Second, the US could nothave developed a real partnership with India – one that could stabilize Asiaand strengthen the region’s democratic orientation – without breaking thenuclear taboo.

Indian objections to the nuclearagreement stem from political opposition of "left parties," allied with thegovernment but historically suspicious of the US, as well as the nuclear-powerestablishment, who reject any constraints on India’s freedom of action on thenuclear front.

Ironically, one of the strongfoundations of the US-India partnership – their adherence to a democraticsystem – also brought complications, none clearer than in the implementationprocess of the nuclear agreement. Neither nation understands the workings of theother’s institutions particularly well. The US is caught off balance byvehement debate in India’s parliament. The separation of powers under the USConstitution, not to speak of the dynamics of divided government, is equallymysterious to Indian politicians. There was ample opportunity to observe thiswhen Congress considered the nuclear legislation: The Indian government andIndia’s op-ed writers grappled with the fact that a Republican president couldnot simply invoke parliamentary discipline and convince congressionalRepublicans to pass the legislation as the White House wanted it written.

Both nations have differentviews about how their common democratic heritage should affect foreign policy.For Americans, it is natural to want to advance democracy. For India, however,democracy is not necessarily a product suitable for export. Democraticinstitutions are a source of great pride, deeply ingrained in how Indiangovernment, politics and society work, yet one aspect of India’s anti-colonialhistory that remains strong is its passionate commitment to maintaining andrespecting national sovereignty. India not only resists external interference,but is reluctant to make a public issue of other countries’ systems ofgovernment.

Still, after decades of littlecommon ground on security issues, India and the US have begun to developmilitary-to-military relations that are routine with other countries. Theysigned framework agreements on defense relations in 1995 and 2005. Theyregularly carry out military exercises of increasing complexity. India’smilitary-supply arrangements are also shifting: Israel is now its second largestforeign supplier, and US suppliers bid to supply combat aircraft and other majormilitary systems.

The US and India have plenty ofwork to do expanding trade and ensuring security cooperation, as well asimplementing agreements on high-technology and civil-nuclear cooperation. Bothnations need to develop the institutions to integrate Asia and the world. Candiddialogue is needed as both deal with a rising China, diplomacy with Pakistan andchallenges posed by Iran. Differences in knee-jerk reactions demand extra effortfrom both countries to understand each other’s sensitivities.

Meanwhile, the two societies arelikely to become increasingly interconnected, with more business ties andstudent exchanges. This connectedness and a common commitment to democracy willbecome a force multiplier. This may not create foreign policy, but makes theclimate in which policy is made.

Teresita Schaffer isdirector for the South Asia Program with the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies. She is the former US deputy assistant secretary of statefor South Asia and former ambassador to Sri Lanka. Rights:© 2007 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. YaleGlobalOnline