"I Am Sorry"

"I am sorry Mumbai," said a subdued P. Chidambaram, India’s new homeminister three days back, after inspecting terror attack sites and meeting someof the survivors of the Nov 26 attack. Chidambaram further said: "I agreethere has been a failure on the part of security forces…undoubtedly there havebeen some lapses. I will be less than truthful if I say there were no lapses…Iwill strain every nerve to overcome the causes of these lapses". At least,Chidambaram had the grace -- perhaps also the political wisdom -- to apologiseand admit to lapses.  

If he is serious about "overcoming the causes", he will have to identifythe people, mainly bureaucrats, who did not or could not tally intelligenceinputs, adopt strategies to take action on the basis of such inputs, and demandthat counter measures be put in place. Once identified, he will have to overcomepossible political pressure to show these gentlemen that not getting it rightmeans the end of the road. Chidambaram, many in Mumbai hope, will be able tocarry his assurances through. But there are some men and women in Mumbai who toomust be asked tough questions. 

To begin with, there’s the Director General of Police AN Roy, who satstone-faced, next to Chidambaram, as he offered the apology. Roy, as the head ofthe force in Maharashtra has chosen not to speak to people, either to apologiseor to reassure. Apologies cannot undo 26/11, but it can offer hope that thegross blunders may not be repeated. An angry citizenry demands answers toquestions such as: Why didn’t the Maharashtra police and Mumbai police act,with due diligence, on the intelligence inputs that came from the Centre inSeptember and November? Why didn’t the DGP coordinate sufficiently with theCoast Guard and the Indian Navy to thwart terror attempts? Why didn’t the DGPfunction as a DGP ought to? And many more. Mumbaikars are waiting to hearfrom you, Mr Roy.  

Not far behind is the Mumbai police commissioner Hassan Gafoor. A genial,self-effacing officer, known for his integrity and commitment, Gafoor could havechosen to be the face of the administration in those terrible 60 hours of theattack. He did not. Both Roy and Gafoor had lost some of their best men inuniform at the very start of the terror attack, including the chief of AntiTerrorist Squad Hemant Karkare, but the commissioner could have filled in thevacuum left by directionless politicians at the helm of affairs. Gafoor couldhave, and should have, addressed Mumbaikars in the first few hours, reassuredthem, kept them abreast of the counter-terrorism operations, and scotchedrumours. As the late AS Samra, then police commissioner, had done so valiantlyin March 1993 after the serial bomb blasts, with due permission from the thenchief minister Sharad Pawar. Why didn’t you talk to us, Mr Gafoor? 

Before that, why didn’t you make a fuss about the poor counter-terrormechanism -- both men and material -- for the city, knowing well that a singlelapse would have meant a heinous attack and many hundreds or thousands of liveslost? Gafoor was aware of the heightened threat perception to the city, abreastof the specific intelligence inputs, and had called special meetings inSeptember and through October to put some measures in place. Why didn’t you,Mr Gafoor, keep them going after mid-November? Why didn’t you coordinatebetter with the Uttar Pradesh police on the Faheem Ansari case? Ansari, a Mumbairesident and alleged LeT operative, had reportedly done reccees of the Taj Mahalhotel, the Oberoi-Trident, the Chhatrapati Shivaji Railway Terminus amongstother high-profile locations about a year ago and his hand-drawn maps form partof the chargesheet filed by the UP police. Why didn’t you coordinate betterbetween your Crime Branch, which has consistently kept track of such operativesand the ATS which has a more specific responsibility but not the sweep of itscounterpart? Why didn’t you insist that the CST and hotel managements kept uptheir vigil? Mumbaikars are waiting to hear from you, Mr Gafoor. 

The blame must be shared, to an extent, by the managements of these placestoo. Gafoor, in late September, had instructed officers to issue terror warningsto managements of five-star hotels in Mumbai, asking them to adopt specificmeasures to enhance the security apparatus at each hotel. This is the warningthat Tata head honcho Ratan Tata referred to in his interviews. But Mr Tata hasto answer a few questions too. Police teams deputed to the Taj had, in fact, metwith the hotel’s senior management including general manager Karambir Kang todiscuss security measures, in late September and early October. This wasfollowed up with a 24-point to-do list that the Taj had to take care of. Amongthese: restriction on accepting Pakistani nationals as guests, regulating entryfrom the rear gates (which the terrorists were to use without fear of beingstopped), and regular sniffer dog searches. Some measures were put in place, butrelaxed when guests complained of inconvenience. But police sources say that themanagement would not ramp up security at all entrances or allows dog searches."When we suggested dog searches, we were told that the carpets would getsoiled," says a police official. The police team had also requested for a copyof the hotel layout in that meeting, which was reportedly denied. Mumbaikarsare waiting to hear from you on these issues, Mr Tata. 

The story for the Oberoi-Trident is not very different. The CST is no man’sterritory. Between the GRP, Railway Police Force and Mumbai police, they are incharge of different aspects of policing in this humungous terminus that seesclose to four million passengers every day. In many ways, the imposing CSTbuilding, immortalized in many Hindi films as the passage to the city of dreams,is they symbol of the city in ways that the Taj and the Oberoi cannot be. TheCST is Mumbai itself; the five-star hotels reflect the aspiration that the citystands for. After the coordinated bomb blasts in seven suburban trains oneevening on the Western Railway, the Central Railway headquarters at CST shouldhave been more careful. But what were the constables doing with non-functional303s and lathis? How did the two terrorists clear the metal detectors at theentrance? Why didn’t the GRP alert Mumbai police when they began gunfire onPlatform 13? Why didn’t the Mumbai Police react faster and seal entrance/exitpoints to trap the killer duo inside the terminus? Why did it take hours, andthe volunteerism of bystanders, to take the injured to nearby hospitals, onhandcarts that served as make-shift ambulances? Mumbaikars are waiting tohear from you, divisional manager, Central Railway, Mr JN Lal? 

Last but not the least, there were cross-connections in the governmentitself. The Congress and its ally Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) did not seeeye-to-eye on several issues. They partnered each other in the state governmentbut worked against each other at the party level, constantly indulging inone-upmanship. NCP’s RR Patil, as deputy chief minister and home minister,functioned independent of former chief minister Vilasrao Deshmukh.Traditionally, the home portfolio by virtue of its sensitive nature, vests withthe CM; that’s where the buck stops. But in October 2004, the NCP insisted onhaving it and the Congress gave in. So, the top man in Maharashtra governmentwas often in the dark about security concerns as well as law-order issues tillthey blew up in his face. Patil was known to consult his party chief SharadPawar more often than he spoke to Deshmukh.  

Add to this disorder, the clash of egos among bureaucrats and even policeofficers. That DGP AN Roy did not see eye-to-eye with key officers in the Mumbaipolice, especially those acknowledged having their own informer networks whichcould have helped counter-terror measures, is an open secret. The DGP talkedless often to home secretary Chitkala Zutshi -- who was in the Taj when it wasattacked and escaped through a window -- and more to chief secretary JohnyJoseph who was devoted to Deshmukh. Insiders have said that Zutshi -- from whomthe chain of command to the cops should begin -- was often the last in the loop.Is it any surprise then that the Quick Response Team, set up after the flurry ofminor blasts in 2002-03, is not yet functional? Or that the government dismissedas "unseaworthy" four patrol boats after spending Rs four crore from theCentre’s fund? Or that the government could not find the motivation andresources to put in place the slew of marine police stations that were promisedafter the Gateway blasts of 2003? Deshmukh and Patil had to resign, but theyhaven’t provided any answers to their lapses. But the questions should be putto their party chiefs too. Mumbaikars are waiting to hear from you, on allthese issues, Mr Sharad Pawar and Mrs Sonia Gandhi.  

Ashok Chavan and Chhagan Bhujbal, who replaced Deshmukh and Patil as CM anddeputy CM respectively have promised "stern action" against bureaucrats andofficers for dereliction of duty which led to lapses. Within hours of hisswearing-in on Monday evening, Chavan set up a "steering committee" toexamine the security lapses and evaluate current situation. Will he fixresponsibility and do in Mumbai what Chidambaram must do in Delhi? Mumbaikarsare waiting to hear from you, Mr Chief Minister.