Hindutva And Caste

WITH THE appointment of M. Venkaiah Naidu as party president, Vinay Katiyar as president of the UttarPradesh unit and Uma Bharti being asked to take over as chief of the Madhya Pradesh unit, an opinion has beencreated that there is a shift in the social position of the Bharatiya Janata Party. There have beenindications, over a period of time, that the Sudra/OBC forces in the party have begun fighting for theirshare. In Gujarat, the Patels and OBCs under the leadership of Narendra Modi, himself an OBC, used theirmuscle power in the recent riots and gained an upper hand against the "dwija" forces that werecontrolling the organisational network in that State.

At the time of the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the Sangh Parivar mobilised youth from among the Sudra/OBCsand the Dalits for muscle power. During this period, L. K. Advani was projected as the organisationalinspiration. Most of those who participated in the demolition came from a non-Brahminical background as theywere, and still are, seen as being most useful for physical energy-related activities.

When the BJP came to power at the Centre, the Brahminical forces got more power. Since then, the Sudra/OBCforces on the one hand and the Dalits on the other, within the organisation, have been getting bitter: theyplayed a key role in the demolition of the Babri Masjid but had no major share in the power structure. Thisposed a challenge to Mr. Advani's authority as those who provided the muscle power had to be rewarded.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was the brainchild of Savarkar and Golwalkar, two Maharashtrian Brahminideologues. When it began to aspire for political power it was headed by Deen Dayal Upadhyay, a BengaliBrahmin. Now, several branches of the RSS such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Bajrang Dal have come up.The parent organisation and its branches were quite consciously controlled by Brahmin leaders/intellectuals.When the RSS began working out militant strategies, initially Brahmin youth were mobilised.

When the ideological congruence between the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS began to take place in the face ofthe contentious Partition question, the RSS began to transform itself into a mass militant organisation. Totake up rioting campaigns and to defend its cadre from Muslim attacks it needed a large number of strongyouth. At that stage it had to go beyond the "dwija" social base and recruit Sudra/OBCs and Dalityouth. Given the nature of the Baniyas, they could hardly be recruited into the RSS' militant wings. There arevery few Kshatriyas in the Parivar outfits.

After the Jan Sangh was started, a section of Baniyas moved away from the Congress and the Jan Sangh beganto emerge as a Brahmin-Baniya party in terms of spiritual ideology. Its social base was basically urban,supported as it was by these two castes which had urbanised themselves in the post-Independence period. Theparty mobilised enough money from the economy of temples and from the Baniya market and worked as a pressuregroup for traditional Brahmins and Baniyas. During that period the Congress expanded its social base intoagrarian Sudra social forces and for a long time it came to be identified as a "kulak" party. TheJan Sangh never had such a social base.

There is a close nexus between the emergence of Sudra landlordism and the kulak class in rural India. Asthe Nehruvian state provided large-scale employment opportunities for feudal Brahmins they sold off theirproperties and moved into the urban economy. Most of the urban Brahmins were with the Congress as it providedthem state patronage and urban luxury. At the same time, they were with the Sangh Parivar spiritually andideologically. Many were not comfortable with Nehruvian secularism.

The Emergency gave a new life to the Jan Sangh. The RSS changed the party's name and tried to expand itssocial base in the larger towns, mobilising some service castes around it. Its strategy was two-fold: tomobilise the Sudra castes without invoking the caste discourse and to handle the Dalit question quitecarefully because a lot of people within its fold still believed in untouchability and casteism. After the BJPwas established, its resolve to overthrow the Congress and enter the power structure became stronger. In orderto do so it had only one way before it — it had to mobilise the Sudra social forces that had acquired aconsiderable amount of landed property, and thereby control over labour castes and control over local andregional political power.

Unlike the Gandhian Congress, the BJP did not have any language of social reform because it went againstthe historical interests of the Brahminical forces that started the Hindutva movement. When a political partywithout a social reform agenda wants to come to power in a casteised country such as India, Kautilyanism isthe only course available. In the context of Mandal social reform, the BJP worked out the Mandir agenda forwhich it needed a lot of muscle power. This was required for two purposes: to mobilise Sudra/OBC social forcesas vote mobilisers and to intensify the rioting campaigns against the Muslims. A lot of Sudra/OBC elementsinvolved in rioting activity get entangled in legal litigations; and after they are discharged in the cases,show their "gratitude" by remaining with the Hindutva organisations. All organisations that believein rioting as a vote and money-mobilisation activity expand their cadre base like this.

The Sangh Parivar had to handle the peculiar problem of using the Sudra/OBC and Dalit forces for communalactivities without allowing them to aspire for spiritual power in the Hindu temple system and also in the"real power" of the Parivar organisations. In an unreformed Hindu social structure even a man suchas Mr. Advani, a non-Brahmin, will not easily be allowed to become the Prime Minister. Perhaps to overcomethis problem, efforts are now on to link Mr. Advani's heritage with that of Lord Rama.

As part of the process of its so-called social engineering, the BJP tried to establish credibility amongthe Dalits by making Bangaru Laxman party president. That experiment failed for internal and external reasons.Now, it is making a show of empowering the Sudra/OBC forces within. That is, perhaps, the reason why a Kammakulak, Mr. Venkaiah Naidu, is its president. If Mr. Advani becomes the Prime Minister the share of Sudra/OBCsin the Government might also increase. But how will the Sangh Parivar resolve the caste contradiction withinHindu religion? The priestly class in Hinduism does not want any reform.

After the massive deployment of muscle power in Gujarat, the Sudra/OBC forces seem to have gained the upperhand. If the Ram temple is built with more deployment of muscle power the Sudra/OBCs may ask for a biggerplace in Hinduism. But the priestly class will not allow it.

Organised religions survived and expanded only by establishing spiritual democracy within themselves. Thereare no indications that Hinduism will allow spiritual democracy within its structure. The Hindutva forces maypretend that the agenda is being Sudraised but Hinduism shall remain Brahminical. This is where Hinduism as areligion, because of the religious civil war conditions the Hindutva forces are creating, may meet itsWaterloo.