Apocalypse Now!

A metaphorical "nuclear option" -- the cutoff of debate in theSenate on judicial nominees -- has just been defused, but a literal nuclearoption, called "global strike," has been created in its place. In ashocking innovation in American nuclear policy, recently disclosed in the WashingtonPost by military analyst William Arkin, the administration has created andplaced on continuous high alert a force whereby the President can launch apinpoint strike, including a nuclear strike, anywhere on earth with a few hours'notice. The senatorial "nuclear option" was covered extensively, butsomehow this actual nuclear option -- a "full-spectrum" capability (inthe words of the presidential order) with "precision kinetic (nuclear andconventional) and non-kinetic (elements of space and informationoperations)" -- was almost entirely ignored.

The order to enable the force, Arkin writes, was given by George W. Bush inJanuary 2003. In July 2004, Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, stated to Adm. James Ellis Jr., then-commander of Stratcom, "thePresident charged you to ‘be ready to strike at any moment's notice in anydark corner of the world' [and] that's exactly what you've done." And lastfall, Lieut. Gen. Bruce Carlson, commander of the 8th Air Force, stated,"We have the capacity to plan and execute global strikes."

These actions make operational a revolution in US nuclear policy. It wasforeshadowed by the Nuclear Posture Review Report of 2002, also widely ignored,which announced nuclear targeting of, among others, China, North Korea, Iraq,Iran, Syria and Libya. The review also recommended new facilities for themanufacture of nuclear bombs and the study of an array of new delivery vehicles,including a new ICBM in 2020, a new submarine-launched ballistic missile in2029, and a new heavy bomber in 2040. The review, in turn, grew out of Bush'sbroader new military strategy of pre-emptive war, articulated in the 2002 WhiteHouse document, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America,which states, "We cannot let our enemies strike first." Theextraordinary ambition of the Bush policy is suggested by a comment made in aSenate hearing in April by Linton Brooks, head of the National Nuclear SecurityAdministration, who explained that the Defense Secretary wanted "bunkerbuster" nuclear bombs because "it is unwise for there to be anythingthat's beyond the reach of US power."

The incorporation of nuclear weapons into the global strike option, casting anew shadow of nuclear danger over the entire planet, raises fundamentalquestions. Perhaps the most important is why the United States, which nowpossesses the strongest conventional military forces in the world, feels theneed to add to them a new global nuclear threat. The mystery deepens when youreflect that nothing could be more calculated to goad other nations into nuclearproliferation. Could it be that the United States, now routinely called thegreatest empire since Rome, simply feels the need to assert its dominance in thenuclear sphere?

History suggests a different explanation. In the past, reliance on nucleararms has in fact varied inversely with reliance on conventional arms. In thevery first weeks of the nuclear age, when the American public was demandingdemobilization of US forces in Europe after World War II, the U.S. monopoly onthe bomb gave it the confidence to adopt a bold stance in postwar negotiationswith the Soviet Union over Europe. The practice of offsetting conventionalweakness with nuclear strength was soon embodied in the policy of "firstuse" of nuclear weapons, which has remained in effect to this day. Thethreat of first use under the auspices of the global strike option is indeed thelatest incarnation of a policy born at that time.

This compensatory role for nuclear weapons emerged in a new context when,after the protracted, unpopular conventional war in Korea, President Eisenhoweradopted the doctrine of nuclear "massive retaliation," intended toprevent limited Communist challenges from ever arising. And it was in reactionto the imbalance between local "peripheral" threats and theworld-menacing "massive" nuclear threats designed to contain themthat, in the Kennedy years, the pendulum swung back in the direction ofconventional arms and a theory of "limited war" to go with them.Meanwhile, nuclear arms were officially assigned the more restricted role ofdeterring attacks by other nuclear weapons -- the posture of "mutualassured destruction."

Today, though the Cold War is over, the riddle of the relationship betweennuclear and conventional force still vexes official minds. Once again, theUnited States has assigned itself global ambitions. (Then it was containingCommunism, now it is stopping "terrorism" and proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction.) Once again, the United States is fighting a limited war --the war in Iraq -- and other limited wars are under discussion (against Iran,North Korea, Syria, etc.). And once again, nuclear arms appear to offer an alltoo tempting alternative. Arkin comments that a prime virtue of the globalstrike option in the eyes of the Pentagon is that it requires no "boots onthe ground." And Everett Dolman, a professor at the Air Force School atMaxwell Air Force Base, recently commented to the San Francisco Chroniclethat without space weaponry, "we'd face a Vietnam-style buildup if wewanted to remain a force in the world."

For just as in the 1950s, the boots on the ground are running low. The globalNew Rome turns out to have exhausted its conventional power holding down justone country, Iraq. But the 2000s are not the 1950s. Eisenhower's overall goalwas mainly defensive. He wanted no war, nuclear or conventional, and never cameclose to ordering a nuclear strike. By contrast, Bush's policy of preventive waris inherently activist and aggressive: The global strike option is not only fordeterrence; it is for use.

A clash between the triumphal rhetoric of global domination and the sordidreality of failure in practice lies ahead. The Senate, on the brink of itsmetaphorical Armageddon, backed down. Would the President, facing defeat of hispolicies somewhere in the world, do likewise? Or might he actually reach for hisnuclear option?

Jonathan Schell, author of TheUnconquerable World, is the Nation Institute's Harold Willens Peace Fellow. TheJonathan Schell Reader was recently published by Nation Books. Courtesy, TomDipatch.com