Forty five years ago, in December 1960, King Mahendra dismissed Nepal's firstelected government and instituted a system of absolute monarchy that was onlydismantled in 1990. In its place came multi-party democracy and constitutionalmonarchy. But the Royal coup on 1 February 2005 by his son, King Gyanendra, hasonce again taken Nepal back to the days of absolute monarchy.
Though the king has not banned political parties as his father did 45 years ago,space for political activism is severely restricted. Tough emergency measuressince 1 February have curtailed not just the political parties but also civilsociety, the media and development agencies. Strong condemnation of the coupwithin and outside the country has done little to influence the regime'spolicies.
Two and half months later, with emergency still in force, there is little signof improvement. Of course, two and half months are a short time to judge theperformance of a new government. But available evidence suggests that the lengthof time is immaterial for the simple reason that most of the present regime'spolicy assumptions are flawed and, consequently, point towards a continuedfuture of violence and conflict.
Flawed assumptions
Politically, Nepal has never been as polarized as it is now. While thetraditional ruling elite and the business and industrial lobby support the king's actions and point to the relative quiet of Kathmandu streets, the coupand the emergency have not gone down well among the majority. Recent polls havefound that most Nepalis prefer multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchyrather than a dictatorship imposed from the Palace. For instance, a publicopinion survey sponsored by the US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) andconducted by AC Nielson / ORG MARG and Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Research found"no significant support for an absolute monarchy and instead showed a greatcommitment to multi-party democracy and the rights it accords to the citizens ofNepal." Though the poll was conducted well before the coup, the NDI saysits findings are relevant even after the coup. Another recent poll bysociologists Sudhindra Sharma and Pawan Kumar Sen, which was published in the Kantipurnewspaper on March 26, found that 54 per cent of respondents supported fullconstitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy. Only 5 per cent supported aRoyal dictatorship.
Militarily, the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and the other security services arestill in a defensive mode, allowing the Maoists to seize the initiative at will.Recent military 'successes', therefore, are nothing more than a repulsion ofMaoist attacks, and are not offensive operations in their true sense.
These flawed policies stem from flawed thinking and a serious mis-reading ofconditions prior to February 1. The Palace acted on the assumption that thepolitical parties, which had made a mess of democracy since 1990, are unpopularand have little support base. Palace actions were also justified on grounds thatbickering between political parties was allowing the Maoists to gain the upperhand. And there seems to have been a strong belief that international criticismcould be nullified by getting Nepal's other big neighbour, China, on its side.All these assumptions have been proven faulty.
Political trends
It is true that Nepal's political parties have little popular appeal at thispoint in time. Support for the parties is practically confined to theiractivists and partisan civil society groups. The population at large remainsindifferent to their plight. Attempts by the parties to start a 1990-stylePeople's Movement have consequently yielded no results. This may have given thePalace a window of opportunity to act. But windows of opportunity, bydefinition, are temporary. If the Royal regime makes serious missteps and failsto provide a general impression of progress, that window will close fast. Thatcan be seen to be happening now.
The king's appointment of hardline Panchayat elements in his cabinet, thedecision to revive hated Panchayat-era zonal commissioners, the campaign againstdemocratic politicians through selective use of the Royal Corruption ControlCommission, and efforts to constrict the role of the National Human RightsCommission by creating another parallel human rights body are all indicative ofa vindictive approach towards political parties and civil society. Nepal'shapless citizens may not love the parties at this moment, but they definitely donot want a return to the past either. But reviving Panchayat era politicians andinstitutions has inevitably created the impression that the king is movingbeyond his stated aim of establishing peace and strengthening democracy. WhatNepal is witnessing today is the gradual dismantling of democratic institutionsin favour of a Panchayat-style system. Even the king's announcement of municipalelections in his Nepali New Year's message on April 14 is being seen as littlemore than a diversionary tactics. This will inevitably erode whatever publicsupport the monarchy may have had in the immediate days after the coup.
Even in their current dismal state, the parties are well placed to takeadvantage of these missteps. By constraining the political parties, the king hasalready wiped out the buffer between the monarchy and the people, betweenhimself and the Maoists. And since the Palace is mistrusted by a large sectionof Nepalis, it is only a matter of time before perceptions about the partieschange. The parties can hasten this process by instituting much-needed internalparty reforms that deals effectively with corruption and allow for a newrejuvenated leadership to emerge. At the moment though, such tendencies havebeen pushed to the backburner as the parties rally to face the threat of anactive monarchy. But in the short to medium term, as public support for theirprotests remain lacklustre, the parties will be forced to re-think strategy andcome up with reforms that help them win public support again. Ironically, King Gyanendra could prove to be the biggest catalyst for this rejuvenation of theparties.
Advantage to the Maoists
The present schism between the monarchy and parties has predictably given theMaoists a huge advantage. The Maoists have also been boosted politically sincethe coup because, as some western diplomats in Kathmandu note, "they haveactually come off better than the Palace in the eyes of the internationalcommunity." Maoist attempts to lure the mainstream parties after February 1speaks of the opportunities they see in the current situation. But the partiesare not about to fall into that trap, despite increasing calls from within byvocal student and other groups. Nepali Congress (NC) president Girija PrasadKoirala, Nepali Congress - Democratic (NC-D) president Sher Bahadur Deuba andseveral CPN (UML) leaders have already ruled out that possibility. Almost allthe party leaders realise that striking an operational deal with the Maoistscould spell doom since that will mean the Maoists will have hijacked thepolitical opposition to the Royal regime from the parties' hands. Such a dealwill also give the regime a pretext to violently suppress the parties. None ofthe parties want that.
The parties' reluctance to join hands with the Maoists has not constrainedMaoist activities. After February 1, the Maoists have been very active both inthe military and political sphere. Imposition of repeated blockades and strikes,attacks on district headquarters and heavily defended military bases, speak oftheir continued capability to inflict damage at will. They have also managed tolure the government into instituting policies that attracts more internationalcondemnation, such as the village militia policy. But internal pressures withinthe rebel outfit also appear to be growing. There seems to be a policy tussle atthe top rungs of the leadership which appear to have affected party morale to adegree. Recruitment and financial resources, already drying up before the coup,may have worsened in recent months. Interviews in the field indicate thatMaoists have to rely more on threats and coercion than genuine public support tokeep up recruitment in their ranks. For instance, there have been crediblereports about how the Maoists coerced villagers in Rukum to participate in thedeadly Khara attacks on April 8-9.
There is also indication that the Maoists do want a peace interregnum to shoreup their organization and finances, but are caught in their own rhetoric. Apeace dialogue with the current autocratic regime will likely harm the Maoists'image by providing legitimacy to the Royal coup. The reading therefore is thatno peace talks are likely in the near term. The government also seems to havereached the same conclusions, and has, accordingly, ratcheted up the rhetoricagainst the Maoists. But its military policy has failed to match its rhetoric.
Flawed counter-insurgency
The regime's flawed assumptions in the military sphere are obvious in thedefensive nature of the war it is fighting. Before the coup, the RNA, the ArmedPolice Force and Nepal Police were all deployed in defensive positions. For anycasual observer who has travelled through Nepal's districts, the most obviousaspect of security forces deployment was that they were guarding their own basesand perimeters. Offensive operations are rare, if any. And even those offensiveactions which have been reported were no more than retaliatory or mopping upoperations after a Maoist attack. The coup has not changed this dynamic. Nepal'ssecurity forces still remain in defensive formations, guarding their own bases.Of course foot patrols are sent out regularly, but they rarely venture intoMaoist-controlled areas and mostly stay on or near highways and popular foottrails. The defensive posture of the security forces, coupled with theill-thought out withdrawal of police posts from rural areas under the UnifiedCommand concept, has given the Maoists an opportunity to extend influence beyondtheir traditional strongholds. The result is that, aside from urban areas anddistrict headquarters, the government's writ rarely runs in Nepal.
If the authorities gambled that this will change after the coup, it has nothappened. The RNA leadership inevitably talks of military offensives just roundthe corner, but that corner keeps moving away. There are several reasons forthis. One is that the RNA simply lacks the manpower and training to tackle aninsurgency of this kind. Force numbers are too inadequate to have any meaningfulimpact, much less undertake offensive actions. And now, with the Maoistsfrequently using blockades and strikes to disrupt daily life, the RNA has beenstretched thin to defend the highways while at the same time securing theirbases and towns. Besides, the strategy is also handicapped by the lack of ahearts and minds campaign as well as a political component. In early April,during a briefing to diplomats and development agency heads in Kathmandu, theRNA "talked much about how they plan to win the war, but did not even say aword about the political components that must be a part of any suchstrategy," says a western development agency head. The usual military modusoperandi is to use helicopter gunship with dumb bombs that cause morecollateral damage than Maoist kills.
The flawed counter-insurgency strategy has been further exacerbated as the RNAgrapples with the international arms embargo after the coup. Reliable militarysources say that RNA has ammunition stocks to last just four months. If Indiaand the West continue with the embargo, the RNA will be forced to seek militarysupplies elsewhere or begin manufacturing ammunition at home. RNA BrigadierGeneral Deepak Gurung spoke bravely last month of manufacturing ammunition athome, but he did not specify whether the RNA had the capability to manufacture5.56 mm bullets for both the Indian-made INSAS and US-made M-16 rifles.
Clearly, international condemnation of the royal coup and the effective armsembargo are having an effect on the RNA. While it is premature to say that suchstrains have forced the RNA to seek other means of fighting the Maoists, the RNAand the government have shown a willingness to use unconventional methods ofwarfare. The foremost is the use of village militias, which could have seriouslong-term security repercussions. Though portrayed as a spontaneous uprising bycommon villagers against Maoists, village vigilante groups in Kapilvastudistrict have wrought carnage that can only invite Maoist retribution. A fieldstudy by a group of human rights organisations found that at least 42 villagershave died there, 31 of them killed by the vigilantes on suspicion of beingMaoist sympathizers. What has gone underreported is that most of these killings,which occurred in the last half of February, have taken an ethnic/communalcolour, as most of the victims are said to belong to hill tribes, who hadsettled in the fertile Terai plains over the last few years. One observer whotravelled to Kapilvastu recently said that the carnage also appears to be aresult of resource conflicts, particularly between the landlords and settlers.In any case, encouragement of village militias appears to be the government's'secret weapon' against the Maoists. The Minister for Information andCommunication, Tanka Dhakal, has announced that the government will implementdevelopment packages in those areas where the people take "courageousretaliatory action" against the Maoists. Such inducements are likely tofurther fan the violence in many more villages across Nepal.
In recent weeks, the RNA has used two strategies to counter growing perceptionsof its failure: it has made strong attempts to fan rumours of an imminent splitin the Maoist ranks, and it has also portrayed recent Maoist attacks as'victories' for the RNA. Both are misleading. While credible reports haveemerged about some sort of disciplinary action against top Maoist leader Dr.Baburam Bhattarai and his wife Hisila Yami, there is no concrete evidencesuggesting that Bhattarai and Maoist 'supreme leader' Prachanda are on the vergeof a split. Knowledgeable sources note that disciplinary action within theMaoist ranks is nothing new and point to the fact that Maoist eastern commanderRam Bahadur Thapa (Badal) himself was disciplined by the party a few years ago,but was again rehabilitated. In a statement issued on April 12, Prachandahimself alluded to this fact. Bhattarai too recently clarified, "debatesand differences on policy are natural in a scientific party."
As for the RNA's second strategy, the Maoists did suffer heavy losses in theApril 8-9 battle in Khara. RNA says that they recovered more than 150 Maoistbodies in the days after the fighting. But the operation at Khara was more asuccessful repulsion of a Maoist attack than an outright military victory. Froma tactical perspective, this is unsurprising since the RNA has strengthened itsbase defences since 2003. The Maoists are no longer in a position to over-runRNA bases as was the case in 2001 and 2002. But the Khara operation highlightedthat it is the Maoists who still hold the initiative. They choose the place andtiming of battle rather than the RNA. And despite being unable to overrun theRNA base in Khara, the Maoists did have the satisfaction of knowing that theysuccessfully probed and tested the RNA's defensive capabilities and tactics.Prachanda himself made this clear. Acknowledging losses on the Maoist side, hesaid on April 12, "the two-day Khara campaign has provided valuableexperiences and lessons and will help in taking the war to a new level."Even the blockades imposed by the Maoists provide a glimpse of theircapabilities. Only 10 percent of normal traffic runs on highways duringblockades, and that too under heavy RNA security cover.
Misreading geo-strategic trends
The international community's response after the coup has highlighted the newgeo-strategic realities in South Asia: no important power is willing toantagonize India over a marginal country like Nepal. The United States andUnited kingdom have resolutely stood beside India in condemning the coup. Anyindications that the US is willing to go it alone in Nepal was put to rest by USSecretary of State Condoleeza Rice during her visit to Delhi in March. Similarthough subtle signals have come from Beijing. The Chinese Foreign Minister'svisit to Kathmandu in late March and early April did nothing to realize theregime's hopes of material support from China. While China is content to lendmoral and political support, its relations with India are too important topublicly dare Delhi by supplying military assistance to Nepal. Thejoint-statement issued by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Chinesecounterpart on April 11 in Delhi is indicative of the tightening relationshipdynamics between the two giants.
But the royal regime failed to read these signals correctly prior to and afterthe coup. Blatant efforts to play the 'China card' against India were based moreon wishful thinking than current geo-political trends. China's interests inNepal lie in a peaceful stable border and a firm check on the pro-Tibetactivities in Kathmandu. These interests were, by and large, protected even bythe party-based democratic governments in the past. The king's coup does notchange that reality on the ground except in one sense: the closing down of theDalai Lama's office in Kathmandu four days before the coup to cultivate China.Besides this, and the reward of the "this is Nepal's internal affair"comment from China, the regime has failed to secure any material support.Misplaced hopes that the Chinese would supply arms and ammunition have come acropper. Similar is the case of Pakistani efforts to help the regime with armssupplies. Without China's approval, the Pakistanis are not in a position to goahead, which became awfully clear during the Kathmandu visit by a Pakistanieconomic delegation in late March.
Nepal's three-sided conflict is clearly worsening as an active monarchy steadilywipes out the political middle ground represented by the democratic parties andcivil society. A flawed counterinsurgency model, made worse by resourceconstraints and a lack of political initiatives, has provided advantage to theMaoists. Failure to correctly read domestic and international trends meanspolicy is being formulated in a vacuum, devoid of a pragmatic base in groundrealities. Worse, by directly governing the country and dismantling democraticinstitutions in favour of an authoritarian system, the Royal Government is risking a popular backlash.
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Suman Pradhan is a Kathmandu-based journalist and analyst. Courtesy, the SouthAsia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.
