AS scandals go, this one was a shocker. Rs 2,500 crore had been squandered by the nation's nuclear nabobs under the cavernous noses of four prime ministers and as many finance ministers. A Parliament panel had even demanded a detailed probe to nail the culprits. And yet, minus the Sukh Rams of the world, all it got in the newspapers was a few column centimeters and nary a mention in the nightly newscasts.
Whodunit? In 1984, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) had a dream of generating 10,000 MW of electricity by the year 2000. (Never mind that Homi Bhabha had dreamt of 20,000 MW by 1987.) So the DAE went on a purchase binge. It procured critical long-delivery equipment in advance at a cost of Rs 1,366 crore after borrowing nearly half that sum. Seven years later, it discovered that it would not be able to use the items because the "10,000 by 2000" plans had gone awry.
Meantime, it had done something more stupid. It had placed orders for material worth another Rs 950 crore for the same "10,000 by 2000" scheme. All the while, interest was accumulating and escalating on its earlier borrowing, and in March 1995 that burden alone weighed Rs 262 crore, i.e. a total burden of Rs 2,578 crore. Then, Parliament woke up and the Standing Committee on Energy last month called for a detailed and urgent probe to fix responsibilities.
The DAE blames it on the pruning of the nuclear power programme in the wake of liberalisation. It says the equipment was ordered with "10,000 by 2000" in mind. That involved the setting up of 12 units of 220 MW capacity and ten of 500 MW to supplement the half-fit, half-unfit fleet it now has. Rut, it says, the government revised the target to 5,700 MW by the turn of the century, and then further scaled it down to 3,320 MW to be achieved by the new deadline: 2004.
The DAE says it wanted Rs 15,125 crore during the Eight Plan (Rs 4,998 crore through budgetary support and Rs. 10,127 crore from internal and external budgetary resources of Rs. 3,500 crore. This, the DAE maintains, was grossly insufficient for commencing work on the new projects in Kaiga, Tarapur and Kota for which it had ordered the equipment. In other words, it had the parts but not the plants to use them in!
Significantly, as the Parliament panel observed, the DAE kept mum on the financial sanction of Rs 1,511 crore that had been accorded as per envisaged requirements of the "10,000 by 2000" programme for advance procurement of critical long delivery equipment. The goof-ups were glaring, which is why the 44-member committee, chaired by the BJP's Jagmohan, pounced on what it called the "irresponsible handling of a programme of such critical and strategic importance"
As scams go, Rs 2,500 crore is probably chickenfeed. But it wouldn't have been half as funny were it not for the fact that the DAE is directly supervised by the prime minister, and such North Block heads as the finance secretary and expenditure secretary are members of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which sits in judgement over all matters nuclear.
In rejecting the DAE'S reply to the committee's observations and demanding a probe, the Parliament panel is asking the basic questions: who in the DAE, then and now, okayed the shopping spree on taxpayers' money and why did the PMO and North Block look the other way:' And now, what can be done about it:, Precious little, as it turns out. The DAE is protected by the Atomic Energy Act and its chairman is answerable only to the prime minister. Even Parliament cannot question its dealings, not even if it involves Rs 2,500 crore.
As the standing committee's report said: "it's obvious from the successive downgrade revisions that unacceptable ad-hocism has ruled the nuclear power programmes." "Nuclear energy requires long gestation periods, and when planning goes haywire, the economics cannot remain sound," says Karnataka-based activist B.M. Kumaraswamy.
Poor planning is the DAE's middle name and the scaling down of the "10,0()0 by 2000" programme which the DAE says is a responsible for the Rs 2,500 crore loss is not the first nor will it be the last. In the early'60s, Bhabha had hoped that India would generate 20,000 MW by 1987. In 1965, the energy survey committee pegged it down to 5,000 MW by the early '80s. The Fifth Plan scaled it further down to 1,285 Anti what was finally achieved by was an awesome 600 MW.
The DAE says that when it learnt over a period of seven, probably 11, years that it wasn't going to get the money it wanted for the new plants, mid-course, corrective action was taken to the extent possible. The "10,000 by 2000" plan was rephased. A review of the advance procurement in progress was made and it was decided to store equipment for use when the projects are eventually taken up, and cancel/shortclose pending orders. But efforts to divert/dispose of equipment which had already arrived came to nought. The equipment attracted only scrap value because much of it was specific to nuclear power plants and of not much use anywhere else.
Despite such glaring foul-ups, atomic energy bosses around the country continue to tom-tom the new mantra: funds crunch. Former Bhabha Atomic Research Centre BARC chairman A.N. Prasad insists the paucity of funds alone has affected the ambitious nuclear power programme: "We have to depend solely on internal generation of funds by the Nuclear Power Corporation NPC and government funding as no institution is willing to finance nuclear power projects."
THE, two units at Tarapur are on their last legs, the two units in Kota are heading for long shutdowns, the two, units at Kaiga will be delayed, and the two units in Chennai and Narora will have to go in for en masse pressure tubing later if not sooner. Then, there is the finance required for the Kodankulam project and the two new units in Tarapur. In short, it's quite a dismal scene and unless the viewpoints of the Planning Commission and the Finance Ministry change, the NPC as a solution to the power ills plaguing the country and a viable business proposition is headed for tough times.
AEC sources say the government and the Planning Commission are not convinced that increased budgetary allocations for nuclear energy in the current setting are bound to bring tangible returns. The performance of the existing stations and the high cost of nuclear power generation have reportedly come in for scrutiny. As former NPC chairman S.K. Chatterjee once noted: "it's necessary for the NPC and the DAE to formulate a strategy and action plan to enhance governmental and public confidence in nuclear power." No such moves have been in two years since Chatterjee made the call.
Given the country's grim power situation, many believe there are ways, simple ones, for the nuclear nabobs to win the government's trust (and money). Former Atomic Energy Board chairman Dr A. Gopalakrishnan suggests that NPC could start by setting a reasonably high target on a two-year capacity factor to be demonstrated at its newest units in Narora and Kakrapar and deliver what it promised. It could also go in for en masse retubing at Kota to bring the second unit in Rajasthan back on line.
For that adequate technology will have to be made available to the NPC Unfortunately, the NPC is not self-sufficient in all the required engineering and technological areas since the intention has always been that the NPC should be provided assistance from research institutions like the BARC. But Gopalakrishnan says the interaction between NPC and the R & D institutions of the DAE leaves a lot to be desired.
The gameplan to put the DAE back on track and prevent more Rs 2,500 crore losses is clear: get the players to sit together and talk, let them do some serious project planning, commit them to realistic targets and get them to deliver on schedule even if the deadlines are unattractive.
But what do we have? On the very day news trickled of Rs 2,500 crore going down the drain, Minister of State for Panning Prof. Y.K. Alagh was telling Rajya Sabha that the third and fourth units of the Kota plant would be commissioned next year. And this, while the second unit is gasping for breath and the controversy over the inner containment dome is still to be resolved following its collapse in Kaiga. Similar domes will be used in Kota's new units.
Prof Alagh is a good man and means well. But what promises like his do is encourage more advance placement and procurements of equipment, more revisions of unrealistic targets, more delays, more scandal of the Rs 2,500 crore sort. Verily, as Forbes magazine once said: "it was not technology that doomed nuclear energy nor anti-nuclear forces. The truth is nuclear power was killed not by its enemies hut by its friends."
