'Mole ... It's A Four-Letter Word, A Media Preoccupation'

Is the mole controversy a cheap and shabby publicity stunt for sellingyour book?

I reject that. The notion itself is so absurd and, frankly, so insulting itbelittles the work. This particular book is from my innards, a baring of mysoul. My innards are not engaged with cheap publicity stunts. It is a matter ofgreat regret to me that more than 95 per cent of those commenting on this bookhave not even read the book.

So to what do you attribute this controversy over this mole?

It is really not my word at all. This is a word that is a creation of themedia's preoccupation with, if I might put it, four letter words. But otherwiseit is conceptually, in description, in commitment, an issue of very seriousimport, which impinges on the country's national security, deals with thenation's nuclear programme and is not deflected by "moles". In a bookjust short of 400 pages, the entire description relating to the nuclearprogramme barely is of one page. It is spread over three pages -- a part of page125, 126 in which I had quoted a particular note but I abridged it. So I havenot engaged in -- I am not given to -- and I will not engage and I have nointention whatsoever to indulge in -- sensationalism, and, certainly, please, tocall it a cheap publicity stunt ... what an absurd jibe!

Towards the bottom of page 124-125, there is mention of a letter writtento an American senator which is at variance with the evidence you presented inthe parliament. How do you explain this?

It is partly an editorial oversight. Partly, because factually I was veryconstrained by space. To give you an example, even if I have to make a slightdigression, I had a whole chapter -- if not a chapter, certainly a subchapter --on Bangladesh. I had to take it out because the book was already running to 426pages on account of index and everything. And my US publishers were saying,"Please limit it to, say, not more than a 1,20,000 words". So in thatrush, the oversight occurred. After a bit, the author stops reading his ownwork. 

An oversight, but factually it is correct. In that sense, it is not anoversight. A letter did get written to Senator (Dianne) Fienstein. This iswritten by a friend of mine -- Stephen Cohen -- along with that was attached anumber of other things. One of them was this note -- Tom Graham's to HarryBarnes -- Ambassador Barnes. They were attached. So that was partly anoversight, an editorial mistake, it should not confuse the essential issue. Ifyou throw your mind back to the the latter half of 94-95, certainly parts of 96-- periods of very intense debate about the test ban treaty -- the US was fullypre-occupied with and committed to somehow forcing a test ban treaty downIndia's throat. Countries like France and others were -- with a great speed --conducting their nuclear tests in the oceans because they wanted to beat thedeadline of the CTBT. That was the persuasion that was perhaps behind PrimeMinister Narasimha Rao's deciding to have a nuclear test - that is a fact.

It is not really clear whether the letter written by Tom Graham to HarryBarnes is authentic in any sense of the word. When you got the letter, did youmanage to verify its authenticity?

Of course, the authenticity is not diminished by what Ambassador Barnes hassaid. Just as Steve is a friend of mine, so is Ambassador Barnes. Not for amoment do I doubt the impeccable integrity and commitment that Ambassador Barneshas to the issues that he holds dear. He does work for the Carter Foundation,and he has worked there for a very long time. He is a very eminent and, I think,a distinguished representative of the US foreign service. He had come here fromChile, where again he had done some remarkable work. I think his tenure here wasa successful tenure. It was a turbulent period in India because it was a periodthat was transitional from the late Mrs Gandhi to her son late Rajiv. I spentquite a good deal of time those years with Ambassador Barnes. He has acommitment to non-proliferation and other issues, and to peace between India andPakistan. I had no reasons whatsoever that what I am in possession of is in anysense incorrect on that account.

You are not telling me what steps precisely you took to verify theauthenticity of the letter when it came into your possession ten years ago.

Any and every step that was needed by me -- because when I got it, I wasalready leader of the opposition -- and I could not likely consider it adocument that comes my way -- and secondly because it involves people that Iknow so very well I couldn't likely use their names out there before I verifiedit in all the possible manners -- some of which I cannot really share in public-- but only after I was satisfied that it was verified, I kept it with me. Ikept it with me for years because our objective was different. Our objective wasto somehow, anyhow prevent the United States of America from cottoning on to howor when we were going to conduct the nuclear tests.

It looks as though you are doing a solo run on this, that you did notshare this piece of information in the letter with other people in the party.

You are absolutely free to judge how you judge. There is a very establishedand a time tested principle of intelligence sharing which was dinned into me inmy army years and subsequently -- the categories being: 'must not know', 'couldknow', 'must know'. This kind of information which related to an issue of verygreat importance to us was shared only with those who 'must know' and nobodyelse.

If that was the case and after ten years you have written all this - whatwas the purpose?

I will tell you very frankly and I think that if one reads Page Numbers125-126-127 -- I believe, and it is quite clearly stated by me, and if I failedto communicate that then it is my failure as an author -- the purpose was to saythat as a part of the function and preservation of their national interest, theUnited States of America always continues to investigate, to snoop, no matterhow close their relationship with that country is. The latest example is, ofcourse, the little fracas that has occurred between United Kingdon and theUnited States of America. We have to grow up and accept that this kind oflooking into what the country is doing is not a value judgement. It isrecognition of a reality. 

And what I was trying to, and what I had tried to project, is that, first,there was in the Narasimha Rao government an attempt made to conduct a nucleartest, second, that the present Prime Minister as finance minister was opposed tothat test, and, thirdly, that that test had to be abandoned. Amongst the variousfactors that could have caused the abandonment was the factor of somebody fromamongst the establishment -- that supported, aided, advised the then PrimeMinister -- was sharing the essential details in fact of when the decision waslikely to be made etc. That is the point. 

The additional point that I made was that because I was armed with theknowledge, because Vajpayee's government knew that this is what the UnitedStates of America is doing, we took all the necessary and specific measures toensure that despite our prior announcement in the election manifesto, there wasno way the United States of America could know the dates or when or even theextent of our tests. That I say in my book subsequently, that is perhaps areason for the USA to be more riled than the fact that we conducted the test:how did India prevent USA from coming to know?

The Prime Minister in the Parliament said that you have not given asatisfactory answer to the fact that we are being snooped upon even now. How doyou respond to that?

I respond firstly by saying that I think the Prime Minister is being his characteristicself. Firstly, what he said inside the house -- he said some very kind thingsabout me then -- is part of the official records of the proceedings. Then hegoes outside of the house and in the protective cocoon of a private pressbriefing, he says all kinds of different things. I still hope and I repeat thatthe reason why I say we ought to be careful, not frightened, not thrown out ofour wits, but certainly careful -- again it is not a value judgement, it is onlya caution -- that every government will be looked at because it is part of thefunction of the respective government. Why otherwise was an American officerrecently asked to leave the US embassy and go back? Because of this. There arerecent reports of RAW officers (fleeing to the US). There are reports -- I amnot saying, the National Security Advisor says-- of entry of certain Islamicextremist elements into our armed forces. He is saying that our nuclearestablishments could get attacked. The nuclear establishments come directlyunder the Prime Minister. It does not lie in the mouth of the Prime Minister tosay that I have in any sense overstated -- and I am not overstating -- the case.I am perhaps being understating. Therefore, the Prime Minister's office has tobe doubly careful. That is an obvious enough conclusion.

You seem to have eliminated certain people from the mole list. How do youarrive at the conclusion of who are not the moles when you don't seem to knowwho the moles are?

Oh, if they are clearly outside the pale of what I would call suspicion, itthen becomes my responsibility to not let wild speculation keep going andinjuring the reputation of my citizen colleagues in the country. And the otherthing really was that he might not be in the country. Mr Graham, who is theauthor of this note, is not in the country. Thirdly, those that were workingthen with the Prime Minister, they are retired. I only hinted. It is not my job.I am not a spy-sweeper. I hinted because the entire prime ministerialorganisation changes with every successive prime minister. It is hischoice. 

Mr Narasimha Rao went out of office in the beginning of 96. We came intooffice for a short period of 13 days. And we exited and followed a couple ofyears of democratic disorder in which a number of prime ministers came and went.Each of them altered the arrangement. Besides, in 1995, when this occurred, the NewYork Times had already reported that satellite surveillance by the UnitedStates of America had found that India is digging bore holes. Things werehappening. In 1997, a newspaper in India writes considerably more detailedreports and hints at this. A note is sent to the then Prime Minister: this iswhat the United States will corner you into discussing, please be cautious. Whenwe came into office in 1998, our priority was going in for the test without theUnited States of America getting even the faintest hint of it.

After all this controversy you still don't have a clue as to who this"senior officia" is and who the "junior official" is who istalking to the Americans that Tom Graham mentions in his letter?

Why am I citing this? I am no longer in office, I have no resources, I do nothave the facilities, and, besides, I do not think that I am personally given tothis kind of spy-hunting. This is a function of the establishment around, andin, the Prime Minister's office and all the other organisations. I am writingwhat I did and have done, to point out that between 1998 when we conducted thetest, and now, firstly because intrusive and constant -- what I call -- lookinginto what India is doing contributes, and therefore I am worried because thepresent negotiations that we are having with the United States of America for mepersonally have echoes very similar to 1995. 

The United States is proposing a bilateral test ban treaty that becomeslegally binding, similar to what the CTBT was. Why? Be careful, the US issaying: 'Walk along with us down this path of fissile material control'. And wehave said, consistently, 'Yes, we will, provided that everybody walks, and theP-5 also commit themselves. We must demonstrate. There must be a proper methodof verification whether it is being done or not.' 

Now, these are some of the essentials that I am citing because I am worriedwe are headed down a path which the United States was forcing down us: theiragenda has remained the same. In 1995, this document says that we talked aboutputting certain plants under IAEA control. To me, now, the nuke-deal sounds sosimilar to what the US agenda was in 1995. The US agenda is the same. India mustbe cautious about it. Therefore: who it was, what it was --  they arefigures from the past. They are not so much relevant today as is the fact thatwe have to be awake to the dangers of today.

It appears from what I read in the papers that you are isolated in the BJPin this?

No my dear, no. Look, I didn't choose the title of the book in a fit ofamnesia. The title is 'A Call to Honour'. I am bound by the honour which wasdistilled in my from my very birth. There is a sentence there: if honour belost, what is left? You say that somebody is sharpening knives to put in theside of my back. I joined the armed forces as a soldier. I am a soldier. I willgive my life to protect my colleagues. Come on, I do not work on suspicions. Iam not a suspicious person and I am not isolated because I am standing for aprinciple.

The Prime Minister says that the BJP leadership has stooped to this level...

Frankly, I would be even ashamed to respond to that. I do not know what levelhe is stooping to. Because inside the House he says something totally contraryto what he says in the protective cocoon of a private press conference. It isvery disappointing. Now I begin to realise that perhaps this is the characteristicof Dr Manmohan singh. Why did he not say it in the house? Why did he say itoutside? I find it too low a blow to even react to it even with the dignity ofbeing dejected. Fine, if that's what he thinks we are as the principleopposition force, let him hold that view.

This is the full text of the interview excerpts from which appeared inprint.