How justified is India’s perception that the US support during and after the hijacking crisis was lukewarm?
Michael Krepon: The US knows about hijacking, as we have taken many hits. So we are sensitive to the problem and the issue of how to resolve these terrible occurrences. This is not like Kargil, where you go public and indicate to the world how you stand. You don’t resolve hijackings with shouts and press releases.
Stephen Cohen: In these matters, it is dangerous to draw conclusions based on public perceptions. Often, states cooperate intimately in intelligence matters, but keep this cooperation secret. I know the US and India have cooperated very closely on intelligence issues in the past, and I do not have any basis to conclude that US "support" has been lukewarm or less than enthusiastic. So, as the Scots would say, "Not proven."
Teresita Schaffer: As I understand it, there were quite frequent high-level contacts between India and the US during the crisis. The US government deliberately adopted a low profile because, among other reasons, it thought that accentuating US interest would complicate the resolving of the crisis. For example, while there were references in the press to the presence of an American among the passengers, the US government did not give great public attention to this fact, fearing that it might make things more difficult both for India and the passenger involved.
Sumit Ganguly: I believe the Indian perception is entirely accurate. The US position on terrorism is inconsistent and disingenuous. American official spokespersons could have been far more forthright in their condemnation of this dastardly and cowardly behavior. This posture is most unfortunate not only for India but indeed for the United States itself because it undermines American credibility on these matters.
To what would you attribute Washington’s reluctance to brand Pakistan a terrorist state? Particularly when home minister L.K. Advani has announced the capture of four of the hijacker’s ‘accomplices’ and positively identified the hijackers as Pakistanis? The Indian defence minister has also publicly accused the US of having double standards in dealing with terrorist acts directed against itself and other nations.
MK :There may well come a time when Pakistan joins this list, but we are working to prevent it. But why isn't India also working to prevent it? Can India succeed in weaning away Pakistan from spreading terror by branding it a terrorist state? How does India plan to reduce nuclear dangers with its neighbor by branding it a terrorist state?
SC: Is there direct evidence of Pakistani sponsorship of terrorist groups? The Pakistanis deny this but freely admit to private, political and moral support for "Kashmiri freedom fighters". The problem is one country’s freedom fighter is another’s terrorist. Ask the Indian government about its tacit and explicit support of LTTE groups in the past, or allowing LTTE and Indian Tamil groups to openly function in Tamil Nadu. I certainly agree that India has been subject to the most awful kinds of terrorism, from both Kashmiri separatists but especially from pan-Islamic extremists (who are interested in the larger Indian Muslim population, and hence are a real threat). India needs to disentangle its home-grown terrorists from the foreign ones, and attempt a strategy that tries to co-opt India’s own Kashmiri citizens.
As for Mr Fernandes, he’s well known here, from his Coca Cola and ibm days, which I’m sure really advanced India economically and technologically (pardon the sarcasm). If he is minister of a nuclear weapons state, with Dr Kalam and others producing the most "sophisticated" missiles, and so forth, then the direct option is
open to him. Does minister Fernandes know whether or not there was any US assistance (during the hijacking) "in any way"? If there was not, then clearly the US was negligent. If there was, will Mr Fernandes apologise? As for Advani’s report, which I have read, I note that some of the people were identified as Indians and Nepalis, and Indian citizens living in Mumbai were arrested. Does this implicate the Indian state in the hijacking, or Nepal? He seems to have introduced the principle that a state is culpable if its citizens commit a crime. If they have evidence of the Pakistan government’s involvement, or even awareness that a crime was going to be committed, then they have a real case. I agree with several Indian commentators, who have said, in effect, "Show me the tapes."
TS: I assume you saw the US statement that it "would not rest" until the hijackers were brought to justice. The US government is not likely to comment on Mr Advani’s statement about the identity of the hijackers and their support from Pakistan until they’ve been briefed in greater detail on the evidence behind those statements. If true, they paint a highly disturbing picture. I assume the US
government would be sympathetic to an extradition request, and will be continuing its discussions with Pakistan on terrorists who may be using or abusing their hospitality. But pinning the blame on Pakistan seems to have become the centre of India’s preoccupations (just as deflecting the blame back to India has become a key objective in Islamabad). The US government feels that this focus is distracting both governments from bigger bilateral issues.
However, I also believe that India and Pakistan need to make policy based on their circumstances, not on false analogies with the US response to the attack on its embassies. As you know, the designation of state supporter of terrorism is governed by legal criteria. Thus far, the US administration has concluded that the legal criteria do not require it to designate Pakistan. They also believe that formally declaring Pakistan to be a state supporter of terrorism would not serve any useful policy purpose and the impact of public branding would do nothing for reducing the potential dangers in Indo-Pak confrontations.
SG: The Indian defence minister has his own agenda which he pursues regardless of the facts of the case! However, on this occasion, perhaps for very different reasons, I happen to agree with him. I firmly believe that it’s important for the US to take a clear, consistent and unyielding stance on global terrorism. The home minister’s claim will only cut ice with Washington if the Indian government manages to present evidence in a credible, transparent and cogent fashion. The Indian government did a good job during and after Kargil. A press operation should be mounted on a similar war footing.
Given that the US stand has been never to negotiate with terrorists, how do you react to the release of three top militants in exchange for the hostages?
MK We will not react in a highly public way, but the misgivings expressed in India about this are widely shared here.
SC: The first proposition is not true. The US has negotiated with terrorists, as have the Israelis. The Indian behaviour at Kandahar was correct, but no state, especially one with claims to be a great state, or one that simply wants to protect its citizens, should have ignored the air safety issue for so many years. When I fly PIA or Air Lanka, there’s certainly a tough security check, as is the case with El Al. The best way to stop a hijacking is at the earliest stage. Later on, at Amritsar, there also seems to have been a breakdown of the "system", not unlike the failure of the Orissa government to comprehend what was going on during the cyclone. It is clear that the Indian government (and the states) can perform admirably, and professionally, but the system tends to get lazy and sloppy, and over-bureaucratised. It is, as many have written, a state with a hard face but a flabby interior.
TS: I think there were some misgivings in Washington about the way the crisis was handled. In particular, there is a feeling that the government of India was relatively slow to organise itself for crisis management-contributing, perhaps, to its own inability to keep the plane in Amritsar. But certainly there was a clear understanding that this was primarily the Indian government’s crisis to manage, and that the US should not say anything while the crisis was going on which would make that task more difficult. I’m sure there are concerns about the impact of releasing the three terrorists, but in fact there have been similar deals made elsewhere, and indeed the precedent of the Rubaiya Sayeed case a decade ago limited the Indian government’s options.
SG: Frankly, I believe Washington is pleased that the crisis came to a close without any significant loss of life or an overt spillover into a violent confrontation between India and Pakistan.
Do you think this successful hijacking will inspire more such attempts?
MK I think the question answers itself. But the US and other countries must send very strong, private messages to Pakistan about how this episode hurts Pakistan and how further episodes will compound the damage.
SC: Sure, but you can look for other terrorist acts as well.
SG: Yes, I fear this deal combined with the ridiculous behavior of the Janata Dal regime in December 1989 (the Rubaiya case) sends a clear message to terrorists of every stripe that when the chips are down the Indian state caves in to varying degrees.
Did the Indian government have much choice?
SC: At Kandahar, no. Earlier, yes.
SG: Yes, for once the government could have taken an unyielding stance. Such a position would have entailed both political and human risks. However, if the Indian government is serious about combating terrorism and is not simply interested in racheting up propaganda against Pakistan it will have to make some tough choices. For all its bluster, the BJP-led regime in New Delhi blinked and swerved in this game of chicken.
