Interview | Whether India & China Remain Adversaries Is a Matter of Political Choice, Says Former Diplomat Bala Bhaskar

The fundamental problem is the unresolved boundary and the absence of a mutually delineated Line of Actual Control (LAC). In certain sectors, competing territorial perceptions differ by hundreds of metres to several kilometres. Difficult terrain, extreme weather and surveillance limitations complicate patrolling, while expanding military infrastructure on both sides has increased access to previously remote areas. In a sense, India and China are still discovering the operational contours of their disputed frontier, as improved accessibility and intensified patrolling bring competing territorial perceptions into sharper confrontation. 

Border confrontations must therefore be understood at four interconnected levels: ground-level patrolling encounters, military-operational calculations, differing perceptions of the LAC, and broader political-strategic objectives rooted in competing territorial claims. While geographical ambiguities can trigger confrontations, deliberate attempts to assert territorial claims, test India's responses, or strengthen negotiating positions cannot be ruled out. Local military assessments and operational decisions may influence how confrontations develop. 

There have been striking coincidences. The 2013 Depsang confrontation preceded Premier Li Keqiang's visit to India, while the Chumar standoff coincided with President Xi Jinping's September 2014 visit. Such timing raises legitimate questions about the interplay between China's political leadership and the People's Liberation Army, deliberate political signalling, operational initiatives by military commanders, or differing assessments within the decision-making establishment. However, given the opacity of China's political and military decision-making, it is difficult to establish whether these confrontations were centrally orchestrated or reflected internal differences. 

India needs to judge strategic intent by the totality of evidence and patterns of behaviour, not timing alone: intelligence, troop mobilisation, logistical preparations, diplomatic signalling and subsequent Chinese demands. 

The 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement was a landmark diplomatic achievement, building on the political understanding reached during then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's historic 1988 visit to China: the unresolved boundary dispute need not prevent the development of bilateral relations in other areas. The 1988 visit also established a joint working group to pursue a boundary settlement. Rao translated this political understanding into a formal framework for maintaining peace along the LAC while continuing boundary negotiations. Subsequent agreements in 1996, 2005 and 2013 further strengthened this framework. 

India's China policy must balance credible deterrence, sustained diplomacy and selective economic cooperation, with border peace as its foundation. Complete decoupling is neither realistic nor desirable. India must distinguish beneficial economic interdependence from strategic dependence, diversify critical supply chains, and strengthen domestic industrial and technological capabilities. Strategic autonomy must remain paramount. India must pursue its national interests independently, without becoming an instrument of another power's geopolitical rivalry. Engagement must not become dependence, deterrence must not become confrontation, and strategic competition must not foreclose diplomacy. 

National security extends far beyond military strength and territorial defence. It encompasses economic resilience, technological and industrial capabilities, manufacturing scale, environmental and climate security, and societal cohesion. These interconnected dimensions demand a whole-of-nation approach that integrates diplomacy, defence, economic policy, technology and industry into comprehensive national power. 

China seeks to retain India as a major economic market while constraining its emergence as a formidable strategic counterweight in Asia. Beijing is particularly wary of India's growing partnerships with the US and other Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) members, which it perceives as potentially challenging its global ambitions. 

China's principal geopolitical rivalry, however, is with the US, extending across the Indo-Pacific, technology, trade, finance and the global economic order. Its expanding industrial, technological and military capabilities have strengthened its strategic influence. Beijing's approach to India must therefore be understood within this larger contest for global power, reflecting a familiar tendency among established and aspiring great powers to resist emerging strategic challengers. But the more fundamental question is what India seeks from China. India's approach has too often been reactive. Even the US, Japan and Australia continue engaging Beijing despite strategic differences, guided by their national interests. India must likewise pursue a proactive, pragmatic and independent China policy—cooperating where interests converge, resisting coercion and strengthening comprehensive national power to negotiate on more equitable terms. 

India's dependence reflects inadequate industrial depth. China has built integrated ecosystems spanning minerals, processing, technology, logistics, and manufacturing at scale, turning economic strength into strategic leverage. India must similarly transform its resources, talent and market into competitive industrial capabilities. Trade can encourage cooperation and reduce tensions, but it cannot prevent strategic competition or guarantee peace.  

India's trade imbalance with China reflects structural dependence on Chinese machinery, components and technology, compounded by weak domestic manufacturing competitiveness and limited technical skills. Import restrictions alone cannot address this imbalance. India must build integrated industrial ecosystems that link infrastructure, mineral processing, technology, and manufacturing at scale. Creating intellectual property, diversifying supply chains, increasing domestic value addition and strengthening exports must go hand in hand with continued access to essential imports. The objective is not merely to reduce Chinese imports, but to build a globally competitive industrial and technological economy. 

India's diplomacy with China cannot be dismissed as a failure. Agreements since 1993 maintained relative border peace for nearly three decades, facilitating trade and political engagement. However, the nature of border confrontations changed over time. 

Depsang (2013) and Chumar (2014) exposed weaknesses in border management; Doklam (2017), eastern Ladakh (2020), Tawang in 2022 and renewed confrontations in Arunachal Pradesh in 2026 reflected persistent border tensions amid China's growing strategic assertiveness backed by rapidly expanding economic, technological, and military capabilities. Beyond Beijing's objections to India's 2019 reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir, particularly the creation of the Union Territory of Ladakh, China's concerns over India's growing strategic partnerships with the US and Japan, and the revival of the Quad in 2017, may also have influenced its calculations. 

An equally neglected dimension is the sharp divide in public perceptions between the two countries. Buddhism and ancient civilisational ties sustain spiritual and cultural affinity towards India among large sections of Chinese society. However, Indian public perceptions of China remain largely negative, shaped by the legacy of the 1962 war, recurring border disputes and Beijing's strategic partnership with Pakistan.  

Recognising this deficit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during his first China visit in May 2015, brought chief ministers, mayors and other local political leaders to launch the India-China State/Provincial Leaders' Forum with Premier Li Keqiang. It sought to extend engagement beyond national capitals to states, cities and citizens. Unfortunately, the initiative did not develop into sustained engagement. Relations between great civilisations require more than summit diplomacy, military deterrence and trade; they demand deeper societal connections and mutual understanding. 

The China-Pakistan strategic partnership now extends beyond defence to technology, infrastructure and regional connectivity. The Iran conflict adds a new geopolitical dimension, linking South Asian security with West Asia's evolving security architecture. China's expanding engagement with Iran and the Gulf, alongside Pakistan's deepening defence ties with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, could reshape regional strategic alignments. 

Any substantial reduction in America's security role in West Asia could enhance Pakistan's strategic significance as a nuclear-armed Muslim-majority state and create opportunities for greater Chinese influence. These developments carry implications for India's energy security, maritime interests, the international north-south transport corridor and diplomatic influence. 

However, China's global economic and geopolitical interests do not necessarily coincide with Pakistan's predominantly India-centric security priorities. India must recognise and leverage these divergences rather than regard the partnership as a monolithic anti-India bloc. India must also avoid being drawn into emerging rivalries within West Asia, preserving its longstanding ability to engage competing regional powers independently. India must prepare for a possible two-front military challenge while ensuring that the China-Pakistan partnership neither constrains its diplomatic options nor compromises its strategic autonomy.  

As long as the boundary remains unresolved and the Line of Actual Control is not mutually delineated, border confrontations are likely to recur. However, not every confrontation can be attributed solely to differing territorial perceptions. Incursions may serve different objectives: securing geographically or militarily advantageous positions, asserting territorial claims, testing India's military and political responses, or strengthening Beijing's negotiating position. They may also convey broader political and strategic messages, although China's precise intentions are not always discernible. India must therefore combine credible military deterrence with sustained political and military dialogue. Each confrontation should also allow India to clarify competing perceptions of the LAC, narrow differences and advance the longer-term objective of a boundary settlement, without compromising India's territorial claims or accepting unilateral changes to the status quo. 

India's China policy must be anchored in building comprehensive national power and preserving strategic autonomy. China's industrial and technological strength, dominance in critical supply chains, military capabilities and global economic influence give it a substantial strategic advantage over India, with disparities approaching fivefold in several economic and industrial indicators besides gross domestic product. No truly equitable relationship exists between unequal partners in international relations. 

The greatest strategic mistake would be to frame India's China policy primarily through America's rivalry with Beijing or the boundary dispute. China's dominance in rare-earth processing, critical mineral technologies and strategic supply chains gives it formidable leverage across defence, energy, space, transportation, communications and advanced manufacturing. This leverage extends even to major powers such as the US, potentially influencing their strategic calculations and, beyond a point, limiting the reliability of external partnerships.  

The scale of China's strategic leverage is staggering. The International Energy Agency, in its July 2026 Global Critical Minerals Outlook, estimated that full implementation of China's expanded rare-earth export restrictions could put approximately $6.5 trillion in annual downstream production outside China at risk, spanning the automotive, high-technology, defence and energy sectors. This illustrates how control over relatively small quantities of critical minerals can translate into extraordinary leverage over the global industrial and technological economy. 

Nevertheless, India also possesses distinctive diplomatic advantages—its democratic credentials, pluralism, strategic autonomy, diverse international partnerships and ability to engage competing powers without exclusive alignment. India must preserve and leverage these strengths to deepen international partnerships, strengthen its negotiating position and maintain independent engagement with Beijing. 

Geography makes cooperation unavoidable. The Tibetan Plateau sustains major transboundary rivers, while glacial retreat, upstream dams and climate change demand hydrological cooperation and early-warning mechanisms. India and China may contest territorial sovereignty, but neither can escape their shared ecological geography. 

India's overarching strategy must therefore be to buy time while building comprehensive national power and progressively narrowing the strategic asymmetry with China. Its China policy must rest on three mutually reinforcing pillars: credible deterrence, economic and technological competitiveness, and sustained diplomatic and societal engagement. 

In an increasingly fragmented world, both countries share an interest and responsibility to prevent strategic rivalry from escalating into conflict. Competition may be inevitable, but conflict is not. 

Nuclear deterrence cannot substitute for diplomacy or conventional military preparedness. Nuclear weapons deter major war, not limited territorial confrontations below the nuclear threshold. Both India and China profess no-first-use policies. India's response must combine credible conventional deterrence, robust border infrastructure, intelligence and sustained diplomacy, backed by comprehensive national power. Nuclear brinkmanship cannot resolve territorial disputes or replace political engagement. Geography has destined India and China to remain neighbours; whether they remain adversaries is a matter of political choice.