Bhojshala–Kamal Maula Verdict: Why the Madhya Pradesh High Court Held the Places of Worship Act Freeze Inapplicable

The Bhojshala complex in Dhar, Madhya Pradesh, is an 11th-century structure built during the reign of Raja Bhoj of the Paramara dynasty in 1034 AD. Hindus regard it as a temple of Goddess Vagdevi (Saraswati) and a Sanskrit learning centre; the Muslim community calls it the Kamal Maula Mosque. Under an Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) administrative arrangement dated April 7, 2003, the site was divided by days—Hindus were restricted to Tuesday worship while Muslims offered namaz on Friday. This arrangement stood unchallenged for nearly two decades until 2022 when the Hindu Front for Justice, through its president Ranjana Agnihotri filed a writ petition before the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the 2003 order and seeking enforcement of their fundamental right of worship. Five connected matters were tagged along.

The Supreme Court (SC) direction and ASI survey: On March 11, 2024, the High Court—acting on directions from a SC Bench led by Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant—ordered the ASI to conduct a comprehensive scientific survey of the one-acre complex to determine its true religious character. The ASI carried out the survey over 98 days—from March 22 to June 30, 2024—submitting a 2,000-page report that recorded 94 sculptures, more than 150 Sanskrit inscriptions, and a Havan Kund consistent with Hindu temple architecture. After 36 days of continuous hearings from April 6, 2026, the court reserved the matter on May 12, 2026, and pronounced the 242-page judgement on May 15, 2026.

What Section 4 of the 1991 Act says

The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, was enacted by Parliament to prevent the conversion of the religious character of any place of worship and to promote communal harmony. Section 4 is the operative freeze provision and reads—the mosque committee raised a formidable objection: as on August 15, 1947, the site was officially recorded and functioning as the Kamal Maula Mosque. Section 4(1), they argued, froze that character permanently. Section 4(2) then barred any judicial proceeding to alter it. Therefore, the very petitions filed by the Hindu community were non-maintainable in law.

The high court rejected this argument entirely. It did so on three independent grounds, each sufficient on its own to exclude the operation of Section 4.

This is the most direct and textually unambiguous ground. The court held that Section 4(3)(a) of the 1991 Act itself carves out an explicit exception—the freeze imposed by Sections 4(1) and 4(2) does not apply to any place of worship that qualifies as an ancient and historical monument or archaeological site under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (AMASR Act, 1958).

The court’s reasoning was that the Bhojshala-Kamal Maula complex is a centrally protected monument under the AMASR Act, 1958. It is listed as a protected site by the ASI and has been under ASI’s custody and management for decades. The moment a place of worship falls within the definition of a protected ancient monument under the 1958 Act, the legislature itself, by enacting Section 4(3)(a), excluded it from the operation of the 1991 Act’s character-freeze.

In the court’s words: “Under Section 4(3) of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, monuments governed by the 1958 Act are excluded from its operation. Hence, the 1991 Act does not apply to this monument and cannot be used to claim fixed religious status.”

This ground operates entirely within the text of the 1991 Act itself. The legislature consciously excluded AMASR-protected sites. The court is not bypassing the Act—it is applying the Act as written, including its own stated exceptions. The regime governing centrally protected ancient monuments is the AMASR Act, 1958—a special statute—and it prevails over the general provisions of the 1991 Act on the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali (a special law overrides a general one).

Section 4(2) Bars ‘Suits’, not Writ Petitions

The second ground is rooted in the distinction between a civil suit and a Constitutional writ petition. Section 4(2) of the 1991 Act explicitly uses the language: “No suit or legal proceeding shall lie in any court...” The question the court examined was whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India falls within the meaning of a “suit” under Section 4(2).

A writ petition filed under Article 226 is not a ‘suit’ in the technical legal sense. A suit is a civil proceeding initiated under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for adjudication of a civil dispute between parties. A writ petition is a Constitutional remedy invoked before a high court for the enforcement of fundamental rights or for testing the legality of executive/administrative action. These are categorically distinct proceedings.

The petitioners were not seeking to alter the religious character of a place of worship through a civil proceeding. They were approaching the high court in exercise of their fundamental right under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, challenging an administrative order of the ASI. The bar under Section 4(2), which applies to suits and civil proceedings, cannot be extended to Constitutional writ proceedings without express legislative language to that effect—which the 1991 Act does not contain.

Therefore, Section 4(2)’s bar on suits was held to have no application to writ petitions invoking fundamental rights and the petitions were fully maintainable.

The third and Constitutionally most significant ground is that even if the 1991 Act were interpreted to bar the present proceedings—which the court held it did not—such a bar would be ineffective because the Constitutional powers of the high court under Article 226 cannot be ousted or curtailed by an ordinary act of Parliament.

Article 226 of the Constitution confers power to every high court to issue directions, orders or writs, including habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari to any person or authority within its territorial jurisdiction for enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other purpose.

This power flows directly from the Constitution—the supreme law of the land. It is not a statutory power granted by Parliament. Parliament can regulate the exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction to a degree, but it cannot extinguish or nullify it. Any ordinary legislation that purports to exclude the high court’s writ jurisdiction in matters involving alleged violations of fundamental rights would itself be constitutionally suspect.

The court held that where citizens approach the high court alleging violation of their fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26—the right to practice religion and manage religious affairs—the high court is both competent and duty-bound to examine the claim. The 1991 Act, being an ordinary statute, cannot shut the Constitutional court’s doors on citizens seeking enforcement of rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.

(Views expressed are personal)

Ashuutosh Srivastava is a Supreme Court Lawyer