Why The Next US-Iran ‘Economic War’ Could Involve Third Countries

Iran has warned that countries joining Washington’s economic campaign could themselves face retaliation as the United States expands financial pressure on Tehran.

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei warned that countries supporting new US economic restrictions could be treated as enemies and that Iran could retaliate against their interests.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has also dismissed the measures as a repeat of previous sanctions campaigns, saying the new package was like watching the “same movie playing over and over again” and that the “bullying” under President Donald Trump was no different from previous US administrations.

The question is not whether Iran has announced a specific retaliation against a particular country. It has not. The bigger question is whether Tehran has enough economic and regional leverage to make countries think twice about joining Washington’s campaign.

Is Iran Just Facing Another Round Of Sanctions?

Araghchi’s “same movie” remark reflects Iran’s longstanding argument that US sanctions have imposed economic costs without producing the political concessions Washington seeks.

The latest measures follow years of American efforts to restrict Iran’s access to international finance, oil revenue and sanctions-evasion networks. Treasury says recent actions have targeted networks moving hundreds of millions of dollars through Iran’s shadow-banking system, including exchange houses, banks, importers and exporters involved in moving and repatriating revenue. Treasury has also targeted cryptocurrency exchanges it says facilitated financing for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and illicit financial activity.

For Tehran, the repeated use of sanctions reinforces its argument that Washington is relying on an established pressure strategy. But that does not mean the measures have been ineffective. They have constrained Iran’s access to international finance and complicated its ability to move revenue through the global financial system.

What Is Washington Trying To Do?

The US campaign goes beyond sanctioning individual Iranian officials or companies.

Treasury’s action earlier this month targeted networks across several countries that it said helped Iran’s banking system move hundreds of millions of dollars and described it as the eighth US action in 2026 against Iran’s shadow-banking apparatus. A separate action targeted cryptocurrency exchanges Washington says have helped fund Iran’s IRGC and facilitate illicit finance.

OFAC’s Iran sanctions framework also allows Washington to restrict transactions involving designated Iranian entities and sectors. Under certain programmes, foreign financial institutions can face sanctions exposure for specified dealings with sanctioned Iranian actors.

That turns a US-Iran dispute into a third-country issue. A foreign company does not necessarily have to be Iranian or American to face US sanctions exposure.

Why Is Iran Talking About Retaliation?

The effectiveness of US sanctions partly depends on whether foreign banks, companies, traders and governments continue facilitating Iran’s access to money and markets. The more countries cooperate with Washington, the harder it becomes for Tehran to find alternative channels.

Rezaei’s warning is therefore aimed at deterrence. He said countries supporting US economic restrictions could be considered enemies and warned that Iran could retaliate against their interests. But that remains a warning of possible retaliation, not evidence that Tehran has decided on a particular response.

Iran’s leverage is also different from Washington’s. The US has a dominant international financial system and a broad sanctions architecture. Iran’s leverage is concentrated in geography, regional trade, energy infrastructure and major maritime routes.

What Leverage Does Iran Have?

Iran sits on the northern side of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints, and maintains extensive economic and political links across the Gulf.

That means Tehran can potentially impose costs not by matching US financial sanctions, but by increasing uncertainty around trade and transportation. For businesses operating around the Gulf, even the possibility of disruption can raise shipping, insurance and energy costs.

The Strait is Iran’s most consequential geographical source of leverage as about one-fifth of global Crude and LNG trade passes through the strait.

A serious disruption could affect countries dependent on Gulf energy supplies, but using that leverage would also carry major costs for Iran, including damage to its own exports and a risk of wider confrontation.

Which Countries Could Be Most Exposed?

Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman are particularly exposed because of their proximity to Iran and their dependence on regional energy and shipping infrastructure.

Their vulnerability therefore comes from geography as much as foreign policy. A disruption around Hormuz could affect ports, energy exports, shipping routes and insurance costs even if these countries tried to remain outside the US-Iran confrontation.

What About China?

China is particularly important because it is a major economy and a key variable in enforcing US sanctions on Iran.

Beijing has rejected unilateral sanctions that it says lack a basis in international law or a UN Security Council mandate. Earlier last week, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said sanctions and pressure tactics were not the solution and called for a political and diplomatic approach.

That creates an enforcement challenge for Washington. The effectiveness of US sanctions can increase when major economies cooperate, but China’s position means Washington cannot assume that every major trading power will impose the same restrictions on Tehran.

How Has Iran Tried To Resist Sanctions?

Iran has spent years reducing its dependence on Western financial systems and maintaining trade through regional and non-Western partners.

That includes stronger trade with neighbouring countries, alternative financial channels and efforts to protect oil and other export revenues. Such measures do not eliminate the effects of sanctions, but they can help Tehran adapt by making transactions more difficult rather than impossible.

That is why Araghchi’s argument is better understood as one of adaptation rather than immunity.

Can Iran Actually Retaliate Against Third Countries?

Iran can potentially impose costs on third countries, but its options are less symmetrical than Washington’s.

Economically, Tehran could disrupt bilateral trade or pressure commercial interests associated with countries cooperating with the US campaign. Strategically, it has greater leverage over regional transport and energy routes.

The credibility of the threat therefore depends on whether Tehran believes the cost of retaliation would be lower than the cost of allowing US sanctions to expand unchecked.

What Happens If Countries Choose?

Governments caught between the two sides could face competing pressures.

A country cooperating with Washington can reduce its exposure to US sanctions and preserve access to the American financial system, but may lose commercial opportunities with Iran or face retaliation.

A country continuing significant trade with Iran may preserve access to Iranian energy and markets, but expose its banks and companies to US sanctions.