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Sri Lanka's 2019 Easter Bombings: A Verdict On The Bombers, Silence On The Warnings

Seven years after the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka killed hundreds, a Colombo High Court has convicted 15 of 24 remaining defendants, while the Supreme Court had earlier found senior officials failed to act on intelligence warnings.

Sri Lanka Easter Sunday Bombings: What Happened In The 2019 Attacks And What The Court Has Ruled | File Photo
Summary
  • A Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar convicted 15 of the 24 defendants in the main criminal case linked to Sri Lanka’s 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, while nine were acquitted and released

  • The nearly five-year trial involved 23,270 charges and 2,309 prosecution witnesses, making the verdict one of the most significant judicial developments since the attacks

  • The verdict is separate from the Supreme Court’s 2023 findings that senior political and security officials violated fundamental rights through failures linked to intelligence warnings before the attacks, keeping the wider accountability question alive

On April 21, 2019, three churches and three luxury hotels were hit in a coordinated series of suicide bombings. Sri Lanka's Parliamentary Select Committee recorded around 277 deaths, including eight suicide bombers, and more than 400 injuries. The attacks targeted Easter worshippers in Colombo, Negombo and Batticaloa, as well as guests at hotels in Colombo.

The latest verdict brings the criminal case back into focus. On September 22, 2026, a three-member Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar found 15 of the 24 defendants guilty under 23,270 charges, while nine were acquitted and released. The court later imposed rigorous imprisonment terms ranging from 200 to 260 years on the 15 convicted defendants.

But the verdict addresses the accused in the criminal case, not the separate question of why the state failed to prevent an attack for which warnings had reached senior security officials.

What Happened On Easter Sunday?

The bombings were coordinated across three churches and three hotels, with attacks striking Easter services and hotel guests across several locations. The Parliamentary Select Committee identified eight suicide bombers and named Zahran Hashim, a former leader of the National Thowheed Jamaath, as the main suspect behind the attacks.

The scale of the operation raised a question beyond the identities of the bombers: how had a local extremist network assembled the people, explosives and logistical support needed to carry out coordinated attacks across several locations?

Who Planned The Attacks?

A July 2019 UN report attributed the bombings to two local groups, National Thowheed Jamaath (NTJ) and Jammiyathul Millathu Ibrahim (JMI). It said NTJ was established in 2014 and JMI in 2015. Some of the bombers had travelled to Syria and received weapons training from Islamic State, while explosives specialists were believed to have studied ISIL bomb-making methods online.

Islamic State claimed responsibility, but the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team said member-state investigations found that the ISIL core neither directed nor facilitated the attacks nor knew about them in advance. It described the bombings as locally instigated and led, but inspired by ISIL ideology.

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Sri Lankan authorities subsequently used DNA testing to identify the suicide bombers, including Zahran.

What Did Authorities Know?

The most consequential finding from the investigations was that intelligence warnings existed before the attacks.

The Parliamentary Select Committee found that information about an impending attack was first received by the Director of the State Intelligence Service on April 4, 2019 and received in writing on April 5. By April 7 and 8, it had reached the Chief of National Intelligence and the Defence Secretary. The warning identified Zahran Hashim and associates and pointed to possible attacks on churches. The committee also said the information was classified “Top Secret” and “Top Priority”.

The issue, therefore, was not simply whether intelligence existed. It was whether the warning moved through the security system in time to produce preventive action.

Why Did The Warning Fail?

The Parliamentary Select Committee identified failures in intelligence sharing and political oversight.

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An Intelligence Coordinating Meeting was held on April 9, but the Director of the State Intelligence Service did not brief participants on the warning despite being expected to provide an intelligence update. The committee also found failures to ensure that the information reached relevant military and political authorities.

No National Security Council meeting was called between the receipt of the warning and the attacks. The Prime Minister was not informed, while then-President Maithripala Sirisena was abroad from April 16. The committee criticised the functioning of the National Security Council and the failure of senior officials to ensure that the political leadership was properly briefed.

The failure was therefore not simply the absence of a warning. It was the breakdown between intelligence, decision-making and preventive action.

What Happened To The Suspects?

Arrests began within days of the attacks. By April 29, 2019, Sri Lankan authorities said 44 suspects were in Criminal Investigation Department custody and another 15 were being held by the Terrorist Investigation Division.

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The main prosecution was filed against 25 defendants in 2021 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, covering 23,270 charges including conspiracy, aiding and abetting, collecting arms and ammunition and attempted murder. One defendant, Yasin Bawa Abdul Rauf, died while the case was pending, leaving 24 defendants at trial.

The proceedings lasted nearly five years. The prosecution called 2,309 witnesses before evidence concluded on August 24, 2026.S

What Did The Supreme Court Decide?

The criminal prosecution is separate from the constitutional case over the state's failure to prevent the attacks.

In January 2023, Sri Lanka's Supreme Court found that former President Maithripala Sirisena, former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando, former Inspector General of Police Pujith Jayasundara, former Chief of National Intelligence Sisira Mendis and former State Intelligence Service Director Nilantha Jayawardena had violated the petitioners' fundamental rights through failures connected to the warnings before the attacks.

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The court ordered compensation from their personal funds: Rs 100 million from Sirisena, Rs 75 million each from Jayasundara and Jayawardena, Rs 50 million from Fernando and Rs 10 million from Mendis. The state was ordered to pay a further Rs 1 million, while disciplinary action was ordered against Jayawardena.

The ruling established judicial findings against senior officials over their failures before the attacks. It was not a criminal conviction for planning or carrying out the bombings.

What Did The High Court Rule?

The latest judgment concerns the 24 defendants who remained in the main criminal case.

On September 22, the three-member Trial-at-Bar found 15 defendants guilty under 23,270 charges, including conspiracy and aiding and abetting the Easter Sunday attacks. Nine defendants were acquitted and released.

The court subsequently sentenced the 15 convicted defendants to rigorous imprisonment terms ranging from 200 to 260 years and ordered the confiscation of their movable and immovable property.

The verdict therefore establishes criminal liability in the main prosecution. It does not replace the Supreme Court's separate findings concerning the conduct of senior public officials before the attacks.

Who Was Acquitted?

Nine of the 24 defendants were acquitted and released. They included Mohamed Zawahir Mohamed Hasan, Mohamed Iftikar Mohamed Insaf, Rasheed Mohamed Ibrahim, Razik Raza Hussain, Mohamed Mustapha Mohamed Rizwan, Meera Saheed Mohamed Nafli, Mohamed Ameen Ayanthullah, Mohamed Ansardeen Hilmi and Mohamed Akram Ahakkam.

The written High Court judgment will be important in showing how the court evaluated the evidence against each defendant. For a case involving 23,270 charges, an acquittal in this prosecution should not automatically be treated as a broader finding about every allegation made during the years of investigation.

Is The Accountability Process Over?

The latest verdict closes a major part of the criminal prosecution, but the wider accountability process continues.

The UN Human Rights Office reported in 2025 that more than 40 criminal and more than 280 civil cases had been filed in connection with the Easter Sunday attacks. Most remained at preliminary stages at that time. It also said the government had appointed a four-member committee to examine the Presidential Commission of Inquiry's report for further investigations.

That process continued into 2026. In April, the Cabinet approved a mechanism to monitor implementation of recommendations from the Presidential Commission and a parliamentary security oversight committee, noting that there had previously been no systematic mechanism for tracking their implementation.

The Criminal Investigation Department also arrested former State Intelligence Service chief Suresh Sallay in February 2026 in connection with the ongoing Easter Sunday investigation. Police said the arrest followed evidence that had emerged during the probe; an arrest does not establish criminal guilt.

What Has The Verdict Settled?

The High Court has now established criminal liability for 15 of the 24 defendants who remained in the main Easter Sunday prosecution and acquitted the other nine. The Supreme Court had earlier established that senior political and security officials violated fundamental rights through failures before the attacks.

Those are separate findings arising from the same tragedy. One concerns the criminal responsibility of people prosecuted for helping enable the attacks. The other concerns the failure of state institutions to act on warnings before they happened.

Seven years after Easter Sunday, Sri Lanka therefore has a major criminal verdict, but the broader accountability question remains: how did warnings about the attacks move through the security system, why did preventive action fail, and has the country fully addressed the institutional failures that allowed those warnings to go unheeded?

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