China Opens Military Outpost At Former CIA Airfield In Laos: What We Know

China and Laos have opened a joint military support and training centre at Ban Keun Airport, about 50 km north of the Lao capital, Vientiane. The centre and the Laos-China Friendship Aviation Academy became operational on September 29, marking a new phase in military cooperation between the two countries, according to China’s Defence Ministry and the Lao state news agency Khaosan Pathet Lao (KPL).

The inauguration was attended by Lao Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Khamlieng Outhakaysone and a delegation from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Both governments have presented the facility as a means of improving Lao military aviation training and strengthening bilateral defence cooperation.

What Is The Facility?

China’s Defence Ministry said the China-Laos Joint Support and Training Center would be jointly maintained and operated by the two countries, with the primary purpose of helping Laos train its air force pilots.

Beijing said the facility complied with domestic and international law, was “not directed against any third party” and would contribute to regional peace and stability.

KPL reported that the centre and aviation academy would also develop aviation skills and expand cooperation through joint exercises, personnel training and humanitarian assistance.

Satellite imagery reviewed by Reuters and cited in an earlier Outlook India report shows the scale of the construction. Work began in late 2025 on what had previously been agricultural land, with a paved runway, parallel taxiway, aircraft parking apron and several buildings visible by September.

China has not publicly disclosed how many military personnel or aircraft will be permanently based at the facility, or detailed its operational role beyond training and support.

What Is Its CIA Connection?

Ban Keun has a history dating to the Vietnam War era. A declassified CIA aerial-intelligence document from 1963 lists Ban Keun Airfield among the air installations identified in Laos.

Separate records published by the US State Department document Washington’s covert paramilitary operations in Laos during the period, including CIA-backed guerrilla forces and US air support for operations against communist forces.

These records establish the airfield’s existence during the conflict and the broader CIA role in Laos. However, the documents cited here do not independently establish the full operational history of the specific airfield or the extent of its use by the agency.

The site’s historical associations contrast with its new role as a facility jointly operated by China and Laos.

Why Does It Matter?

The centre adds to China’s growing network of military-related facilities and partnerships in Southeast Asia. Beijing already operates a logistics base in Djibouti and has established a joint support and training centre at Cambodia’s Ream naval base.

Rachel Vandenbrink, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told Reuters that the support-centre designation could indicate an effort by the PLA to gain sustained access to a logistics hub, potentially including a small forward support presence.

Another regional security scholar, Collin Koh, said the facility could represent China’s first full-fledged overseas military base in Southeast Asia, according to the earlier Outlook report.

That remains a possibility rather than an established description of the facility. The publicly released information does not confirm the number of Chinese personnel to be stationed there or whether the centre will support missions beyond training and logistics.

What Happens Next?

The facility’s significance will depend on how it develops beyond its stated training role. Its aircraft capacity, future equipment deployments, permanent staffing and use during joint military exercises will help establish whether it remains primarily an aviation training centre or develops into a broader logistics foothold for the PLA.

For now, China and Laos describe the project as a bilateral military cooperation initiative. Its longer-term strategic implications remain uncertain, even as it expands Beijing’s defence presence in mainland Southeast Asia.