Bangladesh-Rohingya Repatriation: Could Contact With Arakan Army Open A New Path?

Bangladesh is already maintaining contact with the Arakan Army (AA) as it seeks to restart the stalled repatriation of Rohingya refugees, while continuing to deal with Myanmar’s government.

The contact predates the latest reporting about possible engagement over repatriation. Bangladesh’s National Security Adviser Khalilur Rahman said Dhaka maintains contact with the AA because of “practical necessity” after the group took control of territory on the Myanmar side of the Bangladesh border. He said Bangladesh was simultaneously maintaining contact with Myanmar’s government.

The Diplomat reported in August that Dhaka is considering whether engagement with the AA could help address the wider repatriation impasse. That does not establish that Bangladesh has opened formal negotiations with the group.

The distinction matters because Bangladesh has not replaced Myanmar’s government as its formal counterpart on repatriation. But the AA’s significant territorial control in Rakhine has made it harder to separate the diplomatic process from realities on the ground.

Is Bangladesh Actually Negotiating With The Arakan Army?

Not in the sense of publicly announced formal negotiations over Rohingya repatriation.

What Dhaka has acknowledged is informal contact with the AA because of its control over territory along the border. Khalilur said the engagement covered humanitarian support, Rohingya repatriation and the participation of Rohingya in Rakhine’s emerging governance and security structures.

The significance of the August reporting is therefore not that Bangladesh has suddenly opened talks with the AA. It is that Dhaka may be considering whether an existing channel could become more relevant to the stalled repatriation process.

Why Does The Arakan Army Matter?

The AA has emerged as a major actor in Rakhine during Myanmar’s civil war, and its control of areas near Bangladesh has given it direct relevance to Dhaka’s border security and humanitarian concerns.

Bangladesh’s diplomatic record also shows that Dhaka considers the AA relevant to the Rohingya question. In a 2025 statement to the UN, Bangladesh called for violations against Rohingya by both the Myanmar military and the AA to end and linked stability in Rakhine to sustainable repatriation.

Khalilur has said Bangladesh continued engaging the AA on humanitarian support, repatriation and Rohingya participation in emerging governance and security structures.

Bangladesh is therefore maintaining channels with both Myanmar and the AA because each has relevance to a different part of the crisis.

What Is Bangladesh’s Position On Repatriation?

Dhaka’s core objective has not changed.

Bangladesh continues to describe repatriation to Myanmar as the durable solution. In June, its Permanent Representative to the UN said the crisis originated in Myanmar and that its durable solution must be found there. Dhaka called for intensified efforts to facilitate early and sustainable repatriation.

Bangladesh also highlighted the burden of hosting nearly 1.2 million forcibly displaced Rohingya for almost a decade and called for conditions that would allow safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable returns.

The reported interest in wider engagement with the AA should therefore not be read as Bangladesh abandoning the bilateral framework.

Instead, Dhaka faces a practical problem: an agreement with Myanmar’s central authorities may not be enough if they do not exercise effective control over all the territory where returnees would live.

Why Has Repatriation Stalled?

The central difficulty is that both sides support repatriation, but the conditions for it remain disputed.

Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said last week that it had continued preparations to receive people it had verified as former residents of Rakhine. It said verified former residents could return once the security situation became more stable.

These are Myanmar’s stated positions. The dispute with Bangladesh centres on verification, eligibility and security conditions.

That was highlighted again this week when Bangladesh rejected parts of Myanmar’s latest statistics, saying UN-registered data reflected the accurate numbers. Dhaka also urged Myanmar to accelerate verification under existing bilateral arrangements.

The disagreement may appear technical, but it has direct consequences. A repatriation process requires an agreed population list and a mechanism for establishing who is eligible to return.

Why Isn’t A Myanmar-Only Process Enough?

This is where Bangladesh’s existing contact with the AA becomes significant.

A repatriation agreement between Dhaka and Myanmar may settle the formal diplomatic side, but implementation could still depend on conditions in areas where another armed authority exercises power.

Bangladesh’s security adviser has said Dhaka maintains contact with the AA precisely because of its control along the border.

There is also evidence that the contact has an operational dimension. On Wednesday, Border Guard Bangladesh received 24 Bangladeshi fishermen from the AA after they had been detained for crossing into Myanmar’s territorial waters.

The episode does not establish that Bangladesh and the AA are negotiating over repatriation. It does show that Dhaka already has channels for dealing with the group over practical border issues.

The question is whether those channels could eventually become relevant to Rohingya return.

What Does Bangladesh Expect From The AA?

Dhaka has also attached conditions to its engagement with the AA.

Khalilur said Bangladesh expected the group to ensure humanitarian access and demonstrate a commitment to an inclusive society in Rakhine by including Rohingya in emerging governance and security structures.

That gives Bangladesh a difficult balancing act. The AA is an increasingly important actor in the territory, but Dhaka also wants any future arrangement to protect Rohingya rights and prevent another cycle of displacement.

Engagement therefore does not necessarily mean political endorsement. Bangladesh can use contact to communicate conditions to an actor with influence over the environment into which refugees would return.

What Are The Risks Of Engaging The AA?

The risks are precisely why the issue is politically sensitive.

UN human-rights reporting has documented allegations of abuses affecting Rohingya, including arbitrary detention, ill-treatment and forced recruitment by the AA.

The group may therefore be difficult to exclude from practical discussions about Rakhine, while engagement also risks appearing to legitimise an armed actor accused of abuses.

For Dhaka, the challenge is to distinguish contact from endorsement and practical coordination from political recognition.

What Would A Safe Return Require?

The identity of the parties to a future agreement is only one part of the problem.

UNHCR’s position centres on voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return. Its data also shows that displacement inside Myanmar continues.

For a return to be meaningful, refugees would need more than a border crossing. Questions would remain over physical security, freedom of movement, legal documentation, access to services and livelihoods, and protection from renewed violence or discrimination.

The question of who controls the territory is therefore important. If the authority responsible for security and local administration differs from the government that signed the repatriation agreement, guarantees negotiated in one forum may still have to be implemented through another.

What Happens Next?

The immediate diplomatic picture remains unsettled.

Myanmar says it will continue working with Bangladesh and is prepared to receive people it has verified as former residents of Rakhine once security conditions become more stable.

Bangladesh, meanwhile, has rejected parts of Myanmar’s account of the refugee population and is pressing for faster verification.

At the same time, Dhaka is maintaining practical contact with the AA, including on border and humanitarian issues. The return of 24 fishermen this week is one recent demonstration of that channel.

For Bangladesh, the challenge is no longer simply persuading Myanmar’s central government to accept the Rohingya back. It is finding a workable mechanism in a Rakhine State where the balance of power has changed, while ensuring that engagement with the armed group exercising significant territorial control does not come at the expense of Rohingya rights.

The question is whether Bangladesh can turn an existing channel with the Arakan Army into something useful for repatriation without compromising the conditions that would make any return voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable.