Peace As A Tool Of War

With the Ceasefire Agreement(CFA) virtually in tatters, Sri Lanka oscillates between hope and despair as theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) keeps everyone guessing. Amidst bloodshed and mayhem, the rebels sendconflicting signals which, at times, tempt the war-weary and desperate people todefy reason and entertain a glimmer of hope. But the ground realities present adifferent and bleak picture – Sri Lanka is fast sliding back to a full-scalewar.

There is no gainsaying thatthe country is already in the midst of a low-intensity war, and the only factorthat prevents analysts from describing the situation as an all-out war is theregular statements the rebels issue, expressing their ‘commitment’ to theCFA. But then the rebels do not match their words with deeds.

An overwhelming majority inthe Sinhala community, including those who have long given the LTTE the benefitof the doubt in the interests of peace, now believe the LTTE can no longer betrusted. It is also the case that some Tamils, whom the LTTE claims torepresent, are also unhappy with the present developments. The Tamils, whobelieved that the CFA the Tigers signed with the Sri Lankan government wouldhelp them win autonomy within a federal Sri Lanka, blame both the government andthe Tigers for not conducting negotiation in a spirit of give-and-take, blamingboth sides for squandering an opportunity for peace at the Geneva talks onFebruary 22-23, 2006. Save the handshake at the beginning of the Geneva talks,it was a war of words between the two sides waged for two days at the Swisschateau.

With hindsight, it can easily be seen that, throughout Sri Lanka’s 23-year separatist war, the LTTEhas been setting all the traps — either in war or in peace — and the governments of the day have simply walked into these.

Many a Sinhala hardlinerstands vindicated today for warning the governments not to trust the LTTE,describing the LTTE’s peace gambit as a ploy to regroup and rearm for anothermajor offensive. Had the LTTE been keen on a political solution, it would nothave engineered the victory of Mahinda Rajapakse, who aligned himself withhardline Sinhala parties at the November 2005 presidential election. If theTamils had been allowed to vote freely, opposition candidate RanilWickremesinghe would have won the elections and the LTTE would have secured aTsunami aid-sharing mechanism as an initial concession and would also have wonsome form of political and administrative authority for the north and east. Butthe LTTE, clearly, had different plans – indeed, a multiplicity of contingencyplans.

The government is not lost tothe reality that the war cannot be won, although hardline parties such as theJanatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), in anapparent bid to gain political mileage, arouse Sinhala nationalist emotions andpromote the view that the separatist rebellion could be militarily crushed. The governmentis also aware that India will not get militarily involved in the SriLankan conflict to help crush the LTTE. Neither will India allow another countryor even the United Nations to intervene in the Sri Lankan conflict.

The government is also awarethat the international community will continue to stress a peaceful solution tothe conflict even though more and more countries brand the LTTE a terroristorganization. The fact that the international community holds the purse stringsand is in a position to exert pressure on the Sri Lankan government and to focuson human rights violations, is also not lost on the Rajapakse Administration.

These circumstances haveforced the government to resort to a measured response in retaliation to theLTTE’s acts of violence against civilians and military targets.

Since April more than 700people — half of them civilians — have died in renewed violence. The governmentexercised restraint at the beginning but launched military operations of alimited nature when a suspected LTTE suicide cadre blew herself up in an attemptto kill the Army Chief on April 25. A month later, when some 64 civilians werekilled in a rebel attack on a passenger bus in a frontline village, the governmentagain launched limited air strikes against LTTE positions, andclaimed that the air strikes caused damage to the LTTE’s airstrip in theMullaitivu jungles, though there is no independent verification of this claim.

It appears, however, that airstrikes and artillery barrages by the security forces have not caused anysignificant losses to the LTTE. If anything, it is the civilians living in theLTTE-controlled territories who have suffered the brunt of these attacks, withmany leaving villages, while others stay back to tell their woes to the outsideworld. Even Tamil people living in government-controlled areas speak ofatrocities by the security forces, and there have been allegations of rape andlooting by men in uniform wearing hoods.

The Security Forces are alsosaid to be hitting back at the LTTE, using the rebels’ own tactics. Deeppenetration units of the security forces, with the help of the Karuna faction,have planted claymore bombs aimed at vehicles carrying top LTTE cadres insiderebel-controlled areas. Citing these incidents, pro-LTTE websites justify LTTEattacks in Colombo.

Strangely, the government launched no retaliatory strikes when the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt.Gen. Parami Kulatunga, was killed in an LTTE suicide attack on June 26, 2006.The attack on Lt. Gen. Kulatunga came a week after a botched attempt by the LTTEto attack the Colombo harbour, on June 19.

Whether the government’srestraint is due to intelligence advice or its desire not to scuttle renewedefforts at resuming the peace process is not clear. What is obvious, however, isthat the security situation in the country is becoming volatile by the day. Somemilitary analysts, who take LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran’s ‘HeroesDay’ speech in November 2005 seriously, say the LTTE is preparing for thedecisive phase of the Eelam war. According to these analysts, the focus of theLTTE on attacking targets in Colombo and suburbs is not without strategicsignificance.

Under the CFA, the LTTEallowed international organizations to remove landmines from the northern andeastern battlefields, sending signals to the world that it was serious about thepeace process. With large parts of the north-east being de-mined to a greatextent, the security forces can gain unimpeded access to Tiger areas iffull-scale hostilities break out. Therefore, the LTTE apparently feels that thewar should be taken outside the areas it dominates, and particularly intoColombo, its suburbs and other important cities in the south. Militarystrategists say such a move will require a greater security forces presence inColombo and other areas in the south, effectively implying a weakened presencein the north and east. If full scale war breaks out, consequently, the theatresof conflict will not only be the north and the east, but also the capital.

The economic costs of such aneventuality would be devastating. While the government will have some success inthe eastern front because of its alliance with the Karuna faction, it will findit difficult to control the north and to keep Colombo safe. The government, ofcourse, officially denies it has any dealing with the breakaway LTTE faction.

The fear of war coming toColombo and damaging the economy has fuelled President Rajapakse’s efforts tostrike a direct but secret deal with the LTTE. Two weeks ago, he contacted theeditor and the publisher of the Jaffna-based pro-LTTE newspaper, Udayan,and asked them whether they could use their good offices to arrange talks withthe LTTE, bypassing the Norwegians, the facilitators of the current Sri Lankapeace process. The media duo conveyed the President’s message to the LTTE, andin turn delivered the rebels' reply to the President. Although the LTTE rejectedoutright the President’s call for secret talks, it forwarded five proposals tostall the outbreak of a full-scale war and create conditions for a resumption ofthe dialogue process. These were:

1. The Security Forces and the paramilitary groups (an obvious reference to the Karuna faction) should halt all hostile acts against Tamils.

2. All paramilitary groups should be disarmed and removed from the north and east.

3. The government must lift the limited economic embargo that was imposed in the wake of recent violence.

4. Stop abduction of children by the Karuna faction. (Even UNICEF, on June 22, 2006, expressed concern over child soldier recruitment by the Karuna faction).

5. Stop subjecting LTTE delegates to humiliation and desecrating LTTE war hero cemeteries.

In substance, once again, thewhole issue boils down to one factor – the Karuna group. It is on this issuethat the second round of Geneva talks scheduled for April 19-21, 2006, did nottake place. But the government does not want to take risk antagonizing theKaruna faction, though at the end of the Geneva talks in February, the governmenthad pledged that no groups other than the Security Forces would beallowed to carry arms in government-controlled areas. But it took little actionby way of fulfilling this pledge. It is, consequently, doubtful that the newLTTE proposals will stir hopes of peace.

With questions hanging overthe fate of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) after the Tigers protestedthe presence of monitors from the European Union, which recently put the LTTE onits list of terrorist organizations, indications are that there is little tostem the country’s rapid slide back to a major war. The Norwegians, whom thePresident is once again is trying to bypass, convened a meeting on June 29, 2006,in Oslo to discuss the future of the SLMM. At the meeting the truce monitorsdecided not to give into the demands of the LTTE. In other words, the ceasefiremonitoring operation is also stuck in a limbo.

In a nutshell, the peace inSri Lanka has been, and remains, a deadly tool of war. This is the irony of theSri Lankan conflict.

Ameen Izzadeen is DeputyEditor, The Sunday Times, Colombo. Courtesy, the South Asia IntelligenceReview of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal