InDepth | From Bofors to AI and Drones, India’s Artillery is Rewriting its Battlefield Strategy

Twenty-seven years after the Bofors guns helped India turn the tide in the high-altitude battlefields of Kargil, the Indian Army’s Regiment of Artillery is undergoing one of its most significant transformations—from an arm once dominated by ageing imported guns to a force increasingly built around indigenous systems, precision firepower, drones, networked sensors and mobile artillery.

The transformation, however, has been neither quick nor linear. The Kargil war of 1999 provided perhaps the clearest demonstration of what artillery can do in a modern conflict. The 155mm Bofors FH-77B guns, acquired in the 1980s, became one of the most important weapons in the campaign to recapture the heights occupied by Pakistani forces. The sustained and accurate fire of the guns helped to crush Pakistani positions and provided crucial support to infantry assaults on some of the most difficult terrains in the world.

But Kargil also exposed a paradox: the army had discovered the enormous battlefield value of modern artillery, even as its artillery modernisation had effectively stalled. The Bofors guns were procured in 1986. After the political controversy surrounding the deal, the original manufacturer was banned from dealing with India in 1989. The consequence was felt for years. The army’s efforts to acquire a new generation of 155mm guns repeatedly ran into delays involving operational requirements, trials, vendor response and procurement procedures. A Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) audit later recorded that modern artillery guns had not been made available for more than a decade to replace the weapons of the 1970s, warning that the delay had affected the army’s operational preparedness.

Now, parliamentary criticism has acquired a fresh edge. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament has pulled up the Ministry of Defence for a two-decade delay in procuring new artillery guns, saying the prolonged process left the army dependent on obsolete weapon systems with limited firepower and this had adversely impacted its operational preparedness. In its 49th report of the 18th Lok Sabha, the committee said the delay had created a “huge deficiency” in artillery capability and called for structural reforms in defence procurement and project execution. The criticism is significant because it captures the central contradiction in India’s artillery story: the army understood the importance of firepower, but its equipment base struggled to keep pace with changing warfare.

The Bofors experience left behind an important technological legacy. The 1986 agreement included technology transfer, which eventually provided the foundation for India’s attempt to develop an indigenous successor. The result was Dhanush, an electronically upgraded 155mm/45-calibre gun developed by the erstwhile Ordnance Factory Board. But even this effort took years for completion. The CAG had earlier recorded that the Ordnance Factory Board began the development of Dhanush using technology transferred from the Bofors programme. The indigenous programme itself encountered delays, with the gun taking years to clear trials and enter service.

The PAC has now again highlighted problems in the Dhanush programme, including inadequate infrastructure, evolving production methodology and shortages of specialised technical expertise. The committee also questioned the argument that delays were unavoidable because India had not previously manufactured such an advanced artillery gun.

Yet the story today is different from the one that confronted the army after Kargil. According to defence sources, “Almost all major gun systems now being inducted have around 80 per cent or more indigenous content. Some electronic components that were earlier imported are also moving towards joint production in India.” The biggest concern is the ‘engine’—an area where indigenous solutions exist, but remains a critical technological challenge. That represents a dramatic shift from the days when India’s principal modern artillery capability was tied to a foreign-origin platform.

The Artillery Ecosystem

The transformation is not about replacing one gun with another. It is about building an artillery ecosystem around three broad categories: the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS), the Mounted Gun Systems (MGS) and the self-propelled artillery. The army’s field artillery rationalisation plan has accelerated this process. According to artillery veterans, the induction of the K9 Vajra and the MGS is one of the most significant aspects of artillery “mediumisation”.

“After the Kargil conflict, there was a growing realisation in strategic circles that we needed to increase the range and lethality of our guns. The 155mm was adopted as the standard calibre for all future gun procurements. The 155mm Bofors gun had already proved its effectiveness during the conflict. That’s why we have gradually moved towards mediumisation of the artillery, with 155mm guns with a longer range and more lethal shells, says Lt Gen Tarun Kumar Chawla (retd), the former director general of artillery.

The K9 Vajra gives the army a tracked, self-propelled artillery capability, while the MGS is designed to combine artillery firepower with road mobility. At the lighter end, the army has also inducted the American-origin M777 ultra-lightweight howitzer, particularly suited for high-altitude areas. This has direct relevance for the northern frontier which borders both Pakistan and China.

The army’s artillery profile in high-altitude areas has changed significantly since the 2020 Ladakh clash. “The K9 Vajra presents a similar story. It was originally designed primarily for the Western Sector, particularly the desert areas. But after Galwan, the requirement was to be better prepared for high-altitude warfare. The system was consequently adapted and upgraded, and K9 Vajras are now also being deployed in high-altitude areas of the Northern Sector,” says Chawla.

Similarly, according to senior officials, the induction of the M777, K9 and Dhanush in high-altitude areas was itself a “result of lessons from earlier stand-offs and Operation Snow Leopard” (Indian army’s operation after the Galwan clash) and added that “a lightweight MGS, specifically suited for mountainous terrain, is also being pursued”.

The result is that the artillery arm is increasingly being tailored for different battlefields rather than relying on one platform for every operational requirement.

Perhaps the most visible symbol of this new phase is the ATAGS. Developed in India, ATAGS represents the transition from licensed production and incremental upgrades towards designing and producing sophisticated artillery systems indigenously. The army’s assessment is that ATAGS is not simply about greater range. Its autonomous capabilities improve speed of engagement, rate of fire and accuracy. The gun can receive digital orders directly from an observation post and has improved ‘shoot-and-scoot’ capability despite its weight.

This is important because artillery survivability is increasingly determined by how quickly a gun can fire, relocate and disappear from an adversary’s targeting cycle. The Ukraine war has reinforced this lesson. Artillery is no longer simply a contest between guns. It is a contest between sensors, shooters and the speed of the kill chain. India’s artillery is, therefore, being redesigned around that reality.

The next major transformation is taking place above and around the gun. The army has integrated weapon-locating radars, battlefield surveillance radars and drones into artillery operations. The battlefield surveillance system, or Project Sanjay, has been inducted and is designed to integrate different surveillance systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and loitering munitions. According to officials, Project Sanjay is directly linked with the artillery combat command and control system (ACCCS) or Project Shakti, which is strengthening the sensor-to-shooter network and reducing the time required to complete the observe-orient-decide-act cycle.

This is where the artillery’s future begins to look very different from its Kargil-era avatar. During Kargil, the Bofors gun’s ability to deliver sustained fire on inaccessible mountain positions proved decisive. Tomorrow’s artillery battle could involve a drone finding a target, a network identifying and prioritising it, a precision munition engaging it and another sensor assessing the damage—potentially without a conventional forward observer physically exposing himself on the battlefield. The Army is already moving towards that architecture.

One of the most consequential organisational changes is the creation of specialised Divyastra Batteries and Shaktibaan Regiments, say senior officials. “Each army division is authorised a Divyastra Battery, while each corps is authorised a Shaktibaan Regiment. Their engagement capability is envisaged at ranges of around 100 km and beyond. At the individual artillery regiment level, UAVs and loitering munitions are also being introduced,” said the sources. The artillery arm is also developing precision-guided munitions, terminally guided munitions and ramjet-assisted systems, while BrahMos and Pinaka Guided Extended Range systems are already in service. Officials also highlight that work is “progressing with academia on newer precision and extended-range technologies”.

The changing battlefield has also forced a rethink of how guns survive. The Ukraine conflict has shown that a gun position can be located rapidly through UAVs, satellite imagery and electronic surveillance. Once detected, counter-battery fire can follow within minutes. The army’s answer is, therefore, not merely armour or camouflage. According to officials, counter-UAS systems are being procured for gun systems, while passive measures such as camouflage, concealment, dispersion and protective “cage” structures are being incorporated alongside changes in tactics, techniques and procedures.

The 2035 Artillery

Despite the progress, the army acknowledges that the transformation is incomplete as some vintage systems still remain in service. The stated objective is to achieve artillery mediumisation by 2035, with the overall profile moving to the 155mm calibre. By then, the army expects its gun inventory to be centred around three principal categories—Towed Gun Systems, Mounted Gun Systems and Self-Propelled systems—while retaining some specialised 105mm systems for roles such as operations with special forces.

The army does not envisage eliminating every variant. Instead, it wants a limited but flexible family of 155mm systems suited for different operational environments. Experts say that the challenge is to achieve this without repeating the procurement delays of the past. That remains perhaps the most important lesson from the Bofors-to-Dhanush journey.

The PAC’s criticism demonstrates that indigenous capability alone is not enough. Production capacity, specialised skills, testing infrastructure, procurement timelines and project management have to move together. The artillery arm’s own assessment suggests that this lesson has been absorbed. The stringent trials for new systems are being retained because guns are expected to remain in service for two or three decades. Summer and winter trials in high-altitude conditions can require six to seven months. But the army says acquisition timelines are getting shorter. The transformation is, therefore, not merely about buying new guns. It is about changing the philosophy of artillery itself.

From the Bofors guns hitting Pakistani positions in Kargil, to Dhanush and ATAGS, from K9 Vajra and M777 to Pinaka, BrahMos, UAVs and loitering munitions, India’s artillery is gradually moving from a platform-centric force to a networked, mobile and precision-oriented firepower arm.

“Artillery remains the ‘God of War’. It has the ability to destroy enemy targets with tremendous lethality, and that fundamental character has not changed. What has changed is the technology around it. Drones, modern radars and other technologies are giving artillery greater situational awareness, targeting information and precision. They are not replacing artillery; they are multiplying its effectiveness and giving it a much greater operational advantage,” says Chawla.

Kargil demonstrated what concentrated artillery fire could achieve. The next generation of warfare will test whether India can make that firepower faster, smarter, more precise, and crucially, available when the battlefield demands it.

Saurabh Sharma is correspondent, Outlook