Beyond Budgets: The Real Work Of Strengthening The Higher Judiciary

Every discussion on reforming India’s higher judiciary seems to return, sooner or later, to the question of money. Budgetary allocations are examined closely, compared year on year, and debated as though they hold the key to restoring efficiency and credibility to the courts. Infrastructure, technology, and administrative support are all important, but the assumption that increased funding by itself can rescue the higher judiciary is misplaced. The central problem facing our High Courts is not financial. It is institutional, and it is rooted in the persistent failure to appoint judges in adequate numbers.

Courts exist to decide disputes. That function can only be performed by judges. When courts are left understaffed, no amount of expenditure can compensate for the absence of judicial capacity. A well-built courtroom without a judge does not deliver justice any more than a well-stocked library without readers produces knowledge. Almost every High Court in the country today functions below its sanctioned strength. Vacancies are neither marginal nor temporary. They are prolonged, widespread, and increasingly accepted as routine. This acceptance is perhaps the most troubling aspect of the problem. A system that learns to live with shortage begins to lower its expectations of itself. Delay becomes normal and Backlogs become inevitable.

The consequences are felt daily, both inside and outside the courtroom. Judges are compelled to manage lists that far exceed reasonable limits. Matters that deserve careful hearing are pressed into narrow time slots. Final hearings are adjourned not because they lack merit or urgency, but because the court simply cannot accommodate them. Judgments are reserved for extended periods as judges struggle to balance writing with an unrelenting flow of fresh matters. These are not failures of diligence. They are symptoms of a system stretched beyond its capacity.

In this context, the emphasis on budgetary expansion risks becoming a distraction. Funding can improve facilities and support systems, but it cannot create judicial time. Technology can assist judges, but it cannot replace them. Administrative efficiency has its limits when the core workforce is insufficient. To suggest otherwise is to misunderstand how courts actually function. This is not an argument against funding the judiciary. Courts must be adequately resourced. But funding must be aligned with purpose. When vacancies remain unaddressed, increased expenditure produces diminishing returns. New court complexes stand underutilised. Digital systems speed up filing but not disposal. The process becomes smoother at the entry point, even as the exit remains blocked.

Judicial appointments, on the other hand, address the problem at its root. More judges mean more benches. More benches mean more hearings. More hearings mean timely decisions. This relationship is neither abstract nor controversial. It reflects the everyday reality of judicial work. Yet appointments continue to be delayed, staggered, and treated as a matter of routine administration rather than institutional urgency.

Part of the difficulty lies in the complexity of the appointment process itself. Safeguards exist to preserve judicial independence, and rightly so. But independence cannot become synonymous with inaction. Vacancies are often allowed to arise and persist before the process of replacement gathers momentum. Courts are left to cope in the interim, as though the loss of judicial capacity were a minor inconvenience rather than a structural failure.

The cost of this approach is borne by litigants and by the legal system as a whole. For individuals, prolonged litigation erodes faith in the law. For businesses, uncertainty discourages investment and risk taking. For the state, unresolved disputes weaken governance and accountability. These effects accumulate quietly, but steadily, until delay itself becomes a defining feature of justice.

It must also be recognised that judges are not interchangeable units. Each appointment brings experience, judgment, and perspective. Persistent vacancies deprive courts of this collective strength. They also place an unreasonable burden on those who remain, increasing the risk of fatigue and error. Expecting judges to indefinitely compensate for institutional shortfalls is neither fair nor sustainable. There is, however, room for cautious optimism. The solution does not require radical restructuring or constitutional upheaval. It requires seriousness of intent. Vacancies must be anticipated and filled in time. Appointments must be treated as a priority, not an afterthought. Courts should not be allowed to drift far below their sanctioned strength as a matter of course.

Budgetary allocation has an important role to play, but only when it complements judicial capacity. Infrastructure and technology can enhance efficiency once courts are adequately staffed. Without that foundation, they remain peripheral improvements applied to a weakened structure. The higher judiciary occupies a central place in India’s constitutional framework. Its effectiveness is not a matter of internal concern alone. It affects governance, economic confidence, and the lived experience of justice for millions. Strengthening it requires an honest assessment of what holds it back.

That assessment leads to a simple conclusion. Reform begins with judges. Until courts are enabled to function with their full complement of judges, discussions about efficiency and investment will remain incomplete. Money can support justice, but it cannot substitute for those entrusted to deliver it. If the objective is a judiciary that is timely, credible, and resilient, then the path forward is clear. Fill the vacancies. Strengthen the benches. Allow the courts to do the work they are meant to do. Only then will other reforms find their true value.

The author is an advocate at Supreme Court of India.