So What About Mush's Army Colleagues?

According to reliable ex-military sources in Pakistan, at the meeting of the Corps Commanders of the Pakistani Army convened by President General Pervez Musharraf on November10, 2007, there was an unanimous endorsement of his decision to impose an Emergency, suspend the Constitution and sack Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury of the Pakistan Supreme Court.

However, the majority of the Corps Commanders expressed their reservations over the wisdom of his attempts, under US pressure, to reach a power-sharing agreement withMrs Benazir Bhutto. Their reservations were based on the following grounds:

• Before 1988, Al Zulfiquar, the organisation headed by her brother, the late Murtaza Bhutto, was responsible for the killing of Punjabi political leaders perceived by it as close to the Army. They recalled in particular its alleged role in the assassination of Chaudhury Zehur Elahi, who was very close to Gen.Zia-ul-Haq and related to Chaudhury Shujjat Hussain, the present leader of the pro-Army Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam) and Pervez Elahi, the present Chief Minister of Punjab.
  
  
• The PML (QA) has remained loyal to Musharraf and the Army for the last five years and supported him in all his actions in a crisis--whether it be against Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury or for the imposition of the Emergency. To succumb to US pressure to facilitate the return of Benazir to power would be extremely unfair to the PML (QA) and Musharraf might end up by losing the support of the Punjabi political class,the religious fundamentalist parties and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) of Mr.Altaf Hussain.

The dissenting Corps Commanders expressed their resentment over what they projected as the US attempts to interfere in the internal political affairs of Pakistan by backing Benazir. They said that while Pakistan should continue to co-operate with the US in the operations against Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda terrorist groups, it should resist US pressure to reach a power-sharing agreement with her. They also expressed their resentment over the kind of allegations she has been making against the Inter-Services Intelligence and serving and retired Army officers in the intelligence community ever since she returned to Pakistan on October 18,2007. They were of the view that at a time when the fundamentalist political parties and jihadi organisations were expressing their opposition to Benazir becoming the Prime Minister again, to give her share of the power under US pressure would aggravate the difficulties already being faced by the security forces in countering the upsurge in terrorism since the commando raid in the Lal Masjid in July,2007.

They were also of the view that Musharraf should not be in a hurry to lift the Emergency. They wanted it to continue till the elections were over and a newgovernment was in position. They were afraid that in the absence of the Emergency, she and her followers in the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) might use their considerable money and street power to create political instability if her party did not do well in the elections.

Following this, Musharraf has been evasive on the question of an early end to the Emergency. He has started projecting her as one among the many political leaders of Pakistan instead of the first among the political leaders as she is fond of projecting herself. The Corps Commanders wanted her to be cut down to size. 

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.