Tarique Rahman's India Visit Has A Sheikh Hasina Problem, What Happens Next?

Tarique Rahman’s proposed India visit was expected to be an early opportunity for New Delhi and Bangladesh’s new BNP government to establish a working relationship. But on Sunday, Dhaka made the connection between the trip and its wider dispute with India over Sheikh Hasina more explicit, saying a “propitious environment” was needed for the visit while it awaited New Delhi’s response to its request for Hasina’s extradition.

The statement adds a new layer to a visit that India has already formally invited Rahman to make. Prime Minister Narendra Modi invited him to India after the BNP’s election victory, while New Delhi has also indicated that it wants to strengthen relations with the new government in Dhaka.

The latest position does not establish that Bangladesh has formally made Hasina’s extradition an absolute precondition for Rahman’s visit. But it does indicate that the unresolved dispute is affecting the circumstances in which Dhaka wants the trip to proceed.

That leaves Rahman’s proposed visit caught between two parallel tracks: India’s effort to build a relationship with the government now in power in Dhaka, and Bangladesh’s demand for action against the leader who preceded it.

How Hasina Became The Problem

Hasina’s presence in India became a bilateral issue after she left Bangladesh amid the political upheaval that ended her government.

Bangladesh subsequently sought her extradition after proceedings were launched against her, including before the International Crimes Tribunal. Dhaka has repeatedly argued that India should return her under the countries’ extradition framework.

For Rahman’s government, the issue is both legal and political. Hasina’s continued presence in India remains tied to the domestic transition that brought the BNP to power, while her statements and political activity from Indian territory have continued to draw objections from Dhaka.

India, meanwhile, has sought to distinguish its treatment of Hasina from its relationship with the current government in Bangladesh.

That distinction has become increasingly difficult to maintain politically. Each development involving Hasina, from extradition requests to her public interventions can affect the atmosphere in which New Delhi and Dhaka are trying to establish a new working relationship.

What Exactly Does Dhaka Want?

Bangladesh’s position has three closely connected elements.

The first is extradition. Dhaka wants India to hand Hasina over in connection with the proceedings and verdict against her.

The second concerns Hasina’s public statements and political activity from India, which Bangladesh has objected to.

Beyond extradition, Dhaka also wants its relationship with New Delhi to reflect the political reality created by the change of government in Bangladesh.

The three issues are related, but they are not identical.

Extradition is a legal request. Hasina’s public activities raise a separate political and diplomatic question. And engagement with Rahman is a broader bilateral matter.

However, for the BNP, the demand also carries the weight of its own experience under Hasina’s government, when Tarique Rahman remained in exile and his mother, Khaleda Zia, was placed under house arrest.

Bangladesh’s latest position suggests that these separate tracks are beginning to affect one another more directly, with the circumstances of Rahman’s proposed visit now being discussed alongside the unresolved extradition request.

Why India Cannot Simply Hand Her Back

The existence of an extradition treaty does not mean that every request automatically results in extradition.

India and Bangladesh signed their extradition treaty in 2013 and amended it in 2016. Bangladesh has relied on the agreement in pressing for Hasina’s return. But the treaty itself contains grounds on which extradition can be refused.

The treaty contains an exception for offences of a political character. It also sets out circumstances in which a request may be refused, including where it is not made in good faith, is not in the interests of justice, is made for political reasons, or would otherwise be unjust or oppressive.

At the same time, the treaty specifies categories of offences that cannot be treated as political offences.

Whether those provisions apply to a particular request is therefore a legal question; the treaty does not automatically determine the outcome of every extradition case.

India has accordingly maintained that the extradition question is a legal matter rather than simply a political decision.

That position gives New Delhi room to engage Rahman diplomatically without committing itself to Dhaka’s preferred outcome on Hasina.

Why Is Rahman’s Visit Entangled With This?

The proposed visit is, in effect, an attempt to establish a relationship with the government that replaced the one India knew for years.

New Delhi had cultivated close ties with Hasina and her government, particularly around security, connectivity and regional interests. The political transition in Bangladesh has changed that equation.

Rahman therefore needs to establish his government’s relationship with India on its own terms, while New Delhi has to build a working relationship with a government whose political base is markedly different from Hasina’s.

That is why the visit cannot be treated as an ordinary bilateral engagement.

Rahman represents a new political order in Dhaka, while Hasina remains an unresolved question inherited from the previous one.

The two matters can be treated as separate diplomatic tracks. Politically, however, they remain difficult to disentangle.

What Can Rahman Get From India?

Rahman has several reasons to seek a functional relationship with New Delhi beyond the Hasina issue.

India is Bangladesh’s immediate major neighbour and an important partner in trade, energy, connectivity and regional security. Dhaka also needs stable access to Indian markets and transport routes at a time when it is balancing relations with several major powers.

Rahman’s government can therefore use engagement with India to seek progress on practical bilateral issues, from energy supplies and connectivity to water-sharing and trade.

The Hasina question would remain part of that diplomacy. But Bangladesh has an interest in ensuring that the demand for her extradition does not prevent cooperation on issues where both countries have immediate interests.

That is also politically useful for Rahman. He can maintain pressure on India over Hasina while demonstrating that the BNP government is capable of conducting a broader state-to-state relationship with New Delhi.

What Can India Get From Rahman?

New Delhi also has strong reasons to keep the relationship functional.

Bangladesh’s geography makes it important to India’s Northeast, while the two countries share a long land border and extensive economic and transport links. Cooperation with Dhaka affects India’s interests in border management, connectivity, trade and regional security.

The return of a BNP-led government therefore makes direct political engagement with Dhaka important for New Delhi rather than allowing the Hasina dispute to become the sole framework through which it deals with Bangladesh.

India also has an interest in keeping its relationship with Dhaka functional as Bangladesh expands its engagement with China.

That makes Rahman an important interlocutor even if New Delhi and Dhaka remain divided over Hasina.

Can The Two Issues Be Separated?

The question is therefore not simply whether India will return Sheikh Hasina. It is whether New Delhi and Dhaka can build a new relationship while carrying a dispute from Bangladesh’s previous political era into its new one.

For Bangladesh, Hasina’s extradition remains a politically and legally important demand. For India, the matter remains subject to the treaty and its legal position rather than a straightforward political handover.

At the same time, both countries have interests that continue irrespective of the dispute: trade, energy, connectivity, border management and regional stability.

Rahman’s proposed India visit could provide an early opportunity to establish that distinction. Bangladesh can continue pressing for Hasina’s return while engaging India on broader bilateral issues. New Delhi can engage the new government while maintaining its position on the extradition request.

The difficulty will be preventing the Hasina dispute from becoming the organising principle of the entire relationship.

The outcome will indicate whether Rahman’s first India visit can become an early step towards a more functional bilateral relationship or remain dominated by the unresolved legacy of Sheikh Hasina.