Hungary After Orbán: Péter Magyar’s Win Signals Shift, Not Rupture

Viktor Orbán lost his 16-year hold on power on April 12, 2026, to his former supporter Péter Magyar. The Tisza Party, led by Magyar, secured about 138 seats, while the Fidesz–KDNP alliance won 55 of the 199 seats in the Hungarian National Assembly. This election outcome grants Tisza a two-thirds supermajority in the new parliament, paving the way for the power required to make changes to the constitution. This marks a major political shift in Hungarian politics and carries significant implications for Europe.

Formerly a part of Orbán’s inner circle, Magyar’s political transition began in 2024 when he announced his break from Fidesz and took over the leadership of Tisza—a pre-existing yet inactive political party. From the very outset, Tisza, under Magyar, emerged as a major challenger to Fidesz. The party won about 30 percent of the vote in the 2024 European Parliament election. Since then, the popularity of Magyar has continued to grow, especially among young voters. 

As one of the poorer countries within the EU, with low economic growth and a high unemployment rate, internal discontent within Hungary has grown over the years. Magyar’s campaign focus on reforming Hungary by reversing corruption, developing education and healthcare, and strengthening courts, among other issues, worked in his favour given the rising discontent among the people. F

Magyar campaigned on a pro-European mandate while distancing himself from Russia. He prioritised rapprochement with the EU, in contrast to Orbán’s policies that had caused friction with the EU. The freezing of EU funds for Hungary, in particular, had been a major source of discontent among the Hungarian population, a factor that Magyar pledged to reverse.

The election result is being celebrated across the EU, and the outcome is being touted as Hungary’s return to the very heart of Europe. European leaders see the election result as the beginning of a more cooperative Hungary, leading to improved consensus-building in the European Council. Meanwhile, the Russian response to the election result remains reserved. According to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Moscow expects to continue its ‘highly pragmatic contacts with the new leadership of Hungary.’

While Magyar’s win definitely marks a shift in Hungarian as well as European politics, it should not be seen as the herald of liberal reforms in Hungary and, by extension, in other parts of Europe. It may be noted that Tisza never overtly challenged the values of Fidesz, be it migration, border controls, or national sovereignty. In this sense, Magyar may not always align perfectly with the EU on these issues or on deeper integration with Ukraine.

Domestically, while the two-thirds supermajority grants him the power to make changes, it also raises new risks and challenges. The system that has flourished over the last two decades will take time and sustained effort to reform and ensure the implementation of any changes in the country. In this sense, the supermajority does not necessarily guarantee a transition in the short run.

Given the ideological transition of Orbán himself, one cannot help but draw parallels with the current political context in Hungary. It is important to note that Viktor Orbán first emerged on the Hungarian political scene in the late 1980s as a liberal youth leader. Over the years, he transformed the youth movement, Fidesz, into a centre-right nationalist party. 

Orbán first became the Prime Minister of Hungary in 1998. His first term oversaw Hungary's accession to NATO in March 1999 and pushed for integration into the EU, which was subsequently achieved under a different administration as his party lost both the 2002 and 2006 elections.

In many ways, Péter Magyar resembles a young Orbán in terms of his revolutionary mandate in the last two years. However, one needs to exercise caution in overplaying his reformist tendencies given that he is a Fidesz insider. He has been shaped by the same political culture and system under which his predecessor flourished. As has been observed by some analysts, Magyar didn’t run against Orbánism per se, but against Orbán, even though he claimed to have ‘liberated’ and ‘reclaimed’ Hungary from the Orbán regime after winning the election.

This is not to say that his victory does not weaken the Orbán-era model. Indeed, Orbán’s loss is a huge setback for right-wing populist or “illiberal” models in Europe, the idea of which was propounded by Viktor Orbán on July 26, 2014. It also marks the weakening appeal of Trump and, by extension, of the MAGA movement in nationalist movements across Europe. Both Secretary of State Marco Rubio as well as Vice President JD Vance visited Budapest during the election campaign to support Orbán, while Donald Trump showed his explicit favouritism on social media.

Overall, the election outcome in Hungary is very symbolically significant, but its practical impact remains ambiguous at the moment. Hungary’s conservative tendencies are unlikely to fade in the short run, but it is likely to become a more constructive and cooperative partner of the EU. The win may also have some positive implications for the Visegrád (V4) Group (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). Magyar has pledged to revive V4 ties and expand them. He has already stated that his first destination abroad as Prime Minister would be Warsaw—to strengthen Hungary's 1,000-year friendship with Poland.

Himani Pant is Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs.

Views expressed are personal