Explained: How Sheikh Hasina’s Presence In India Is Complicating Ties With Bangladesh

Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India once symbolised the close political ties between New Delhi and Dhaka. Two years after she fled Bangladesh, it has become a growing diplomatic complication.

The former Bangladeshi prime minister has reopened an old diplomatic wound by addressing journalists from New Delhi and declaring that she plans to return to Bangladesh in December. Her move comes as India tries to rebuild relations with the government that replaced her.

Dhaka has reacted sharply. Bangladesh’s foreign ministry accused India of allowing a fugitive convicted of “crimes against humanity” to use Indian soil to attack the country’s sovereignty and political leadership. It has again demanded Hasina’s extradition.

India has sought to distance itself from the episode. The Ministry of External Affairs said it played no role in organising the interaction and did not endorse the political views expressed by Hasina.

Hasina fled Bangladesh in August 2024 after weeks of student-led protests ended her 15-year rule and has remained in India since then. A Bangladeshi tribunal later sentenced her to death in absentia over her government’s crackdown on the uprising. Hasina has rejected the charges as politically motivated.

Speaking on the second anniversary of the uprising, she said she would return to Bangladesh in December, whatever fate awaited her. She said she was prepared to face imprisonment or even death.

The significance of that declaration lies not only in what may happen in December, but also in how it could reshape Bangladesh’s politics in the months ahead.

The Political Equation

Since Hasina’s ouster, the Awami League has been pushed to the margins of formal politics. The party has been banned, while many of its leaders have fled abroad, been arrested or faced legal proceedings.

The February election and the subsequent rise of the BNP government under Tarique Rahman appeared to mark the consolidation of a post-Hasina political order.

Hasina’s announcement unsettles that assumption. For Awami League supporters, the prospect of her return provides a rallying point and suggests that the party’s political story is not yet over. For her opponents, meanwhile, her continued prominence offers a common adversary around whom otherwise disparate political forces can unite.

That is why the December deadline may prove politically important even if Hasina never boards a plane for Dhaka.

Her return would present the BNP government with an unenviable choice. Arresting her would fulfil the government’s stated legal position, but could also turn a defeated former ruler into a political martyr. Allowing her political space would risk giving the Awami League a fresh lease of life.

The government has already challenged her to return immediately rather than wait until December.

The underlying question, however, is larger, can the Awami League survive without Hasina, and can it survive with her?

The party remains deeply rooted in Bangladesh, but its identity has become closely intertwined with its long-serving leader. A comeback centred entirely on Hasina may reassure loyalists while making it harder for the party to reinvent itself.

New Delhi’s Dilemma

India had a close relationship with Hasina’s government. During her tenure, cooperation expanded across security, connectivity and trade, while Dhaka took steps that were broadly welcomed in New Delhi on issues concerning India’s north-east and border security.

Her sudden departure left India with a new political reality on its doorstep.

New Delhi now has to deal with the BNP government while managing its longstanding relationship with Hasina. That balancing act is made harder when the former prime minister uses Indian territory to make political declarations aimed directly at Bangladesh.

India and Bangladesh have unresolved questions over water-sharing, trade and migration. The Ganga Water Treaty is due for renewal, while the long-discussed Teesta agreement remains unfinished. Dhaka has also been seeking to recalibrate its external relationships, including closer engagement with China.

Against that backdrop, Hasina’s presence can easily reinforce the suspicion in Bangladesh that India remains emotionally or strategically tied to the Awami League.

That perception could complicate any attempt by New Delhi and Tarique Rahman’s government to establish a working relationship. It may also cast a shadow over Rahman’s possible engagement with India around the BRICS summit.

The Road Ahead

For India, many believe that Hasina is an asset and a liability. Her presence gives New Delhi a connection to Bangladesh’s former political establishment and, potentially, a degree of diplomatic leverage. But the same presence can make it harder to convince the new government in Dhaka that India accepts the political changes brought about by the 2024 uprising.

For Bangladesh, too, the matter can not be reduced to a quarrel with India. The country remains deeply divided over Hasina’s legacy and the events that brought her government down. A return could produce demonstrations, counter-demonstrations and renewed violence.

The attack on the home of former Bangladesh cricketer and Awami League politician Shakib Al Hasan, after he appeared at the New Delhi event with Hasina, offered an early indication of how charged the atmosphere remains.

For now, Hasina remains in India and the BNP government remains in Dhaka. Between them lies a relationship that neither side can afford to neglect.

India’s challenge is to persuade Bangladesh that sheltering Hasina does not amount to backing her political comeback. Dhaka’s challenge is to pursue its legal and political claims without allowing the Hasina question to overwhelm its relationship with its largest neighbour.

The real test for New Delhi will therefore not be whether it can keep Hasina safe. It will be whether it can do so without allowing her to become the defining issue in India-Bangladesh relations.