Peace Games In Nagaland

Four years and three months after that declaration, and after numerous roundsof subsequent parleys between both the sides in India and abroad, Nagaland stillstands at the crossroads, waiting for peace. And recent statements by the NSCN-IMsuggest that both sides are still far away from anything that resembles asettlement.

Difficulties became apparent on July 31, 2005, with the NSCN-IM’s demandthat the ceasefire extension be limited to six months, rather than the usualone-year period. Then, on November 5, IM leader R.H. Raising declared:"There is no point in operating a cease-fire and holding talks without anysolution in sight." This statement came less than a month after the October11, 2005, negotiations in Bangkok, where Muivah had stated, "We are veryhappy to have the talks with the Indian representatives because both sides arenow more serious about all the issues." On November 7, other sympatheticorganizations, including the Naga Hoho, the Naga Mothers Association and theNaga Students’ Federation put their weight behind the NSCN-IM’s positionthat the talks served no purpose unless they were seen to be leading up to apeaceful solution, creating some consternation in the concerned circles.Finally, on December 19, Muivah issued a veiled threat of the resumption of abush war in case a tangible solution was not found by January 31, 2006, the daythe current ceasefire comes to an end.

The eight year-old ceasefire, beginning August 1997, has led to a significantreduction in insurgency-related fatalities in Nagaland. Between 1992 and 1997,1,338 persons had been killed in the conflict, averaging 223 per year. Between1998 and 2004, a further 595 persons have been killed, bringing the average downto 85 per year, still a disturbing number in view of the ‘cease fire’ thatis now in place. During the current year, 40 fatalities (data till December 25)have been reported from the State. The fatalities in the post cease fire periodhave overwhelming been the result of turf wars between the NSCN-IM and its archrival, the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K). However, the reduced fatalities fail toreflect the ground-level violence which persists across the State, and whichaffects the widest possible spectrum of the population. A review of someincidents in November 2005 alone gives an indication of the nature and extent ofthis impact.

• On November 8, suspected NSCN-K militants killed Hesso Mao, former Director General of Police of Nagaland, at his residence in the capital Kohima.
• On November 10, NSCN-IM militants abducted seven persons from the Phek district, including Pfutsero Town Council chairman Dingulo Khutso, Chakhesang pastor Nuvosaye Vese and village elder Puneru Chakhesang. The abducted persons were later released following intervention of community-based organizations.
• On November 25, militants opened fire on two journalists, injuring Xavier Rutsa, senior correspondent of ‘Nagaland Post’ at Kohima.

Violent area-domination attempts by both factions (Khaplang and Isak-Muivah)continue and during just the second half of 2005, both factions clashed at leastfive times [Kohima (August 1), Peren (September 10 and December 5), Tuensang(September 26), and Mon (October 5)]. The most recent clash was reported fromthe Makhom Part-I village in Tamenglong district in neighbouring Manipur onDecember 19.

The ‘threat’ to withdraw from the peace process needs to be seen in thecontext of the failure of the NSCN-IM leadership to make any sort of progresstowards its final goal, the integration of the Naga inhabited areas (NIA). OnDecember 15, Muivah, in fact summed up his frustration in the following words."We Nagas have extended our hand of friendship and India is puttingconditions before accepting it. Is this wise? Can we keep coming back again andagain, demanding friendship from India? Do Nagas have no honour?" Muivahclaimed further that there has been no progress ‘from the Indian side’ overthe last six months of the ceasefire. Five days after, on December 20, the NSCN-IMDeputy Kilonser (Minister) of the Ministry of Information and Publicity (MIP),Kraibo Chawang indicated that unilateral abrogation of the ceasefire by theoutfit is still a possibility and will rest on the outcome of the next meetingbetween the two sides.

There is a pattern to these threats, issued periodically by the NSCN-IM since1997. These have been used either to keep its bete noire, the Khaplangfaction, out of the negotiation process in spite of several demands tobroad-base the process; or to wriggle out of difficult positions after theGovernment has indicated the possibility of a solution short of the IM demand ofan integrated Naga territory. Threats have also been used to keep its supportbase intact, to ensure that the Nagas do not come to view the group as a weakorganization, susceptible to the Government’s pressure.

The fact remains that, in spite of Muivah’s six-month stay in India betweenJanuary and July 2005 and the three rounds of dialogue [July 29-30, October10-11 and December 16-17] that followed, very little has been achieved beyondthe usual rhetorical assertions. States like Manipur and Assam remain opposed toany dismemberment of their territory to please the NSCN-IM. Minister andmediator Oscar Fernandes’ October 18 assertion that the NSCN-IM was ready foran interim solution was rebuffed by the outfit. Even the show of camaraderie,evident in Minister Fernandes’ playing the mouth organ to the tune ofMuivah’s favourite ‘We shall overcome’, is fast disappearing as the NSCN-IMresorts to tough talk in the hope that this may prod the Government to take someaction.

In a late effort to force some progress in the process, reports are now beingvigorously circulated that a Dutch non-governmental organization is being‘formally involved’ in the peace process as a third party facilitator. TheNSCN-IM had, for some time, been hard-selling the idea of involving Kreddha (theorganization takes its name from an Indo-European word meaning ‘to placetrust’) as a facilitator in the process. Consisting of ‘experts in conflictresolution’, led by the former Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization(UNPO) General Secretary Michael C. Van Walt Praag, Kreddha, is reported to have‘briefed’ the Indian negotiators on their proposals for taking the Nagapeace process forward, on December 17, the second day of the two-day round ofnegotiations in Bangkok. Media reports suggest further that the IndianGovernment has ‘accepted the proposal’ and that Kreddha and its team of‘experts’ would consequently be involved in the next round of negotiations– an eventuality that borders on the ludicrous.

Kreddha’s links with the NSCN-IM and its support for the Naga right to‘self-determination’ is well-known. Van Praag has been one of theinternational promoters of the cause of ‘Naga independence’ and wasinstrumental in securing some international exposure for the NSCN-IM by itsinclusion in the UNPO in 1993. It was during his tenure (1991-98) as the GeneralSecretary, that the UNPO passed a resolution, in January 1995, condemning theIndian and Myanmar Governments for their military action against the group andfor what was described as their "forceful invasion and continual occupationof Naga territory and their rampant violations of human rights".

Official sources reject the idea of third party intervention in the talkswith the NSCN-IM, or even of the supposed December 17 'briefing' by Van Praag,and it is apparent that current media reports regarding Kreddha’s involvementin the ‘dialogue process’ are part of the insurgents’ continued efforts tointernationalize the issue, and possibly to lift the IM leadership’s saggingspirits. The involvement of a third party would militate directly against theestablished Indian policy of rejecting international mediation in internalconflicts, and its impact would reverberate well beyond Nagaland. It is adecision, consequently, that is not likely to be taken lightly.

Bibhu Prasad Routray is Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.