Can An LoC Deal Be Sold?

It is splendid to watch leaders and governments whenthey become cautious friends. Ever since May 23, whenthe Indian government ended its cease-fire, only tooffer the tantalising prospect of direct Indo-Paktalks, an air of optimism has returned to discussionsof Kashmir. What next?

In Kashmir: A Framework For Peace, V.Sudarshan has put forward aproposal for progress on the Kashmir issue. At its heart isconverting the Line of Control (LoC) into a trueborder - and bunkers into crossing points. Convertingthe LoC into an international border - recognised andupheld by both India and Pakistan, and theinternational community - is not a novel proposition.While more of a whisper a decade ago, today it is afrequent, if private, refrain from senior politiciansand officials in Delhi. It remains a peculiarlystrangled position. For in advocating it, itssupporters drop all pretence to uphold the territorialintegrity of J&K. The claim to the entire state of J&Kis dropped. This, at least, is pretty realistic.

Despite many jibes about Pakistani Kashmir, somedeserved, it's tough to argue with the fact that manyresidents of that part of J&K are comfortable withbeing Pakistani. The nationalist claim, as put forwardby the JKLF, remains untested. In part this is due tothe lack of democracy in Pakistani Kashmir, in part itcould reflect that fact that Mirpuris and Punjabis areneighbours as well as uneasy rivals. Muzaffarabad maystyle itself as a capital city, but it remains aprovincial town, without even a newspaper to call itsown. For all the militants and 4-wheel drives, it is apretty sleepy place. Let it slumber.

So far, so good. But a deal on Kashmir needs more thana passing nod in the direction of the status-quo. TheKashmir problem is about two groups of people who havea problem with the current state of affairs. MostPakistanis. And many Kashmiris. Figuring out how muchof a problem - and where compromises could be struck -has been the mantra for all those concerned about theKashmir problem.

A(nother) Framework for Peace. So what has beensuggested by V. Sudarshan? The LoC becomes theinternational border, with a series of offers tosweeten it for both Pakistan and Kashmiris.Effectively, what is the reality on the ground todaybecomes the ground-reality tomorrow. Only this time,peace, harmony and - it is suggested - an end tomilitancy prevail. V.Sudarshan reckons that a thaw inmindsets, and a pragmatic approach, could make a LoC'solution' stick. Perhaps. Lots of his subsidiarysuggestions make good sense. Victoria Schofield hasalready advocated the opening of theSrinagar-Muzaffarabad road. Indeed, Farooq Abdullahhas been using the same call as an election slogan foryears. Restoring autonomy is a more complexproposition.

While Article 370 or a recognition of Kashmiriidentity in, say, passports, are put forward asimportant measures, in a sense this may not help.After all, for all the love and hate that is heaped onthe figure of Sheikh Abdullah, he was by no means ademocrat. The political model that he mastered inKashmir, both pre-1953, and post-1975, was by andlarge an authoritarian, populist one. For a man whosememorial bears noble words about the will of theKashmiri people, he was remarkably unwilling toconsult it meaningfully. Bakshi, who followed Abdullahin 1953, may have been corrupt, undemocratic andwilling to follow Delhi's lead. But was he thatdifferent from Sheikh Abdullah?

That said, a word about Kashmiris - and the deals thatneed to be made. Kashmir is a mix of differentregions, peoples, religions and political parties.Political unity is as elusive as the normalcy cravedby Indian politicans. There are two deals that have tobe done on Kashmir, and the jury is still out as towhether they can be done jointly, as a full package,or separately. The first is to settle, or at leastsoothe, the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir. The secondis to deliver a government and settlement that worksfor different Kashmiris, in different regions. Aboveall, it needs to earn the support, if not the love, ofValley Kashmiris. Militancy was born in the Valley,even if nurtured elsewhere, and it is there that asolution will succeed - or fail. The devil is in thedetail.

Right now moves are afoot to push towards a first deal- and we are only witnessing another tentative step inthat direction. It is great that Musharraf andVajpayee are making all the right noises, even riskingdomestic opinion in the process. But it istremendously difficult to move from public warmth, andthe right words about cracking down on fundamentalism,or working credibly towards a deal on Kashmir. It isanother to try and map out in the sand what asettlement might look like.

 It is also important not to lose sight of the needfor the second deal. It may well be, as a range ofanalysts and politicians suggest, that an overallIndo-Pak deal is impossible without cutting asettlement with Kashmiris. This is a position that Ihave put forward before. On the other hand, there arethose, including US and Indian analysts, who arguethat finding a way to settle the Indo-Pak dispute overKashmir will, over time, generate the impetus to solvethe problems of Kashmiris. Perhaps.

What of Sudarshan's other suggestions? Many arehonourable. Of course the 1.6 lakh displaced KashmiriHindus should be allowed to return. (So too should thesmaller numbers of Muslim Kashmiris who have alsochosen to live away from the Valley.) Demilitarisationis also a sensible proposition for the entire region,supposing that security for ordinary civilians can beassured. A free-trade zone raises firm practicalquestions. Both Indian and Pakistani Kashmir arefirmly dependent on government subsidies. Pushingfree-trade in and between the two parts of Kashmirmakes good sense, but it would also require majorchanges to the economies of both. All parts of theprivate sector, certainly in J&K, are facing toughtimes. Whether Kashmiri apples, houseboats orhandicrafts, better quality competitors (and, dare itbe said, even equally beautiful destinations)challenge the idea that the economy could take off.Hydro-electric power is one notable exception.

Proposals are fine. But can they be sold? The UN,American and British archives groan with papers frompast attempts to forge a Kashmir solution. Some of thebest diplomatic, legal and political minds of the 20thcentury grappled with the Kashmir problem - along withmany of the worst. But the real problem, as MarianaBaabar pointed out in her piece from Pakistan, is howto sell a solution. And, as she explains, mostPakistanis just don't consider the LoC enough tocement a deal. The same could be said for Kashmiris.Those sympathetic to the All Parties HurriyatConference are sceptical of Delhi's motives. KashmiriPandits fear they will be left out. And even NationalConference leaders are suspicious of moves that mightchallenge their primacy in the state.

Meanwhile, long-term Indian policy on Kashmir isdifficult to read. Even so, it is tough to see howDelhi would offer more than the LoC, and even offeringthat comes at a price. The more talk between India,Pakistan and Kashmiris, the better. The less rigid aframework for those talks, whether formal or informal,the better. Because the talk can only lead somewherewhen people are frank about what they could offer, andmight accept. Two key principles could help guidediscussions and commentary over the next few months.First, keep talking, but don't box people in too much.The challenge on Kashmir is to establish the groundsfor a solution. Whatever that could be, it needspublic support in India, Pakistan, and from mostKashmiris. The challenge is getting to a solution thatcan earn, and keep, that support. Second, don't expecttoo much, too quickly - either from Delhi, Islamabad,Srinagar or from militants. Only one thing is certainabout the search for a just and enduring peace inKashmir: it will take time.

(Alexander Evans is a regular commentator on Kashmirbased in London. He has visited both Pakistani andIndian Kashmir in the past few months)