Blowback Time

Ever since the American-led ouster of the Taliban regime from Kabul in 2001,pro-Taliban tribals in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) have beenstirred up to join their Pashtun brethren in Afghanistan, waging jihad againstthe Americans and the Karzai regime. The entire province and particularly itstribal areas, which are administered by the federal government, have sincebecome a hotbed of violence, terrorism and Islamist radicalism. Thesedevelopments are now threatening the writ of the Pakistan government along itsdisputed borders with neighbouring Afghanistan. These border regions are now, infact, often referred to as the epicentre of global terrorism. 

The blame for this state of affairs along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border liesprimarily with successive federal governments in Pakistan, which chose to ignoreeducation and economic development in the tribal areas. As a result, the peoplelead a lifestyle rooted in the 19th, rather than the 21st century. The tribalshave also, for nearly three decades now, been armed with some of the most potentweapons and encouraged to join their Pashtun brethren across the Durand Line tosupport jihad in Afghanistan. 

This propensity to using tribals for achieving foreign policy objectives has,in fact, been a regular feature in Pakistani military strategy, ever sincetribals were let loose on Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in 1948. The entire questof the Pakistani military establishment for 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan hasbeen nothing more than an attempt to make Afghanistan a client state ruled by aninternationally isolated medieval clique, the Taliban, which is totallydependent on Pakistan for its survival. But Pakistan is, now, paying the pricefor these policies.

Pakistan's follies have been matched by American military ineptness, withGeneral Tommy Franks making no effort to block exit routes for the Taliban andal Qaeda leadership, even as the Northern Alliance overran Kabul in 2001. Thenet result of this ineptitude was that, while the Taliban leadership, includingits 'Amir' (chief) Mullah Mohammed Omar, took refuge in Balochistan, Talibanmilitary commanders and their al Qaeda, Chechen and Uzbek allies melted into therugged mountainous terrain of the NWFP. Some second ranking al Qaeda leadershave since been captured. But, the Taliban leadership under Mullah Omar remainsintact. 

In the face of tremendous American pressure, the Pakistan army moved into thetribal areas in 2004, but soon found that the tribals it had armed for jihad inAfghanistan were more than a handful to deal with. Successive 'peace deals' weresigned with tribal leaders like Baitullah Mehsud and Faqir Mohammed between 2004and 2006. These 'deals' required the tribals to end all support for 'foreignmilitants', in return for lifting of the blockade imposed by the army and apledge by the government of Pakistan for large-scale economic assistance. 

None of the peace agreements of the past has worked, with the tribal militantsescalating terrorist attacks and suicide bombings across Pakistan after thesiege of the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in July 2007. Around 300 Pashtun womenstudents from the tribal areas are reported to have been killed in the assaulton Lal Masjid. The tribals also declared war on the Pakistan army and terroriststrikes were undertaken on military installations, including units of the eliteSpecial Services Group (SSG), once commanded by General Musharraf. The Pakistanarmy had earlier got a bloody nose in its operations in the tribal areas. Anestimated 1,564 armed forces' personnel have been killed and 570 captured inoperations in the NWFP between March 2004 and May 2008. 

There are also reports of significant desertions and refusals to fight bymembers of the armed forces. In the meantime, various pro-Taliban tribal groupswithin the country united under the banner of the Tehriq-e-Taliban e Pakistan,headed by Baitullah Mehsud, on December 14, 2007, on which date 40 pro-Talibantribal leaders from all the Tribal Agencies and the districts of Swat, Banu,Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner and the Malakand, met anddecided to form a joint resistance movement. The Tehriq vowed to step upoperations against NATO forces in Afghanistan and build up strong defences totake on Pakistani forces. A ten-day ultimatum was issued to the Pakistangovernment to release the jailed Lal Masjid cleric, Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi,who had been incarcerated after he surrendered during the July 2007 assault inIslamabad.

Baitullah Mehsud offered a ceasefire on February 7, 2008, following what wereevidently secret negotiations with the army. An exhausted army Chief, GeneralAshfaq Kiyani, seeking space to distance himself from the widely unpopularpolicies of General Pervez Musharraf, duly reciprocated, and an uneasy andtenuous ceasefire prevails in the tribal areas, disturbed occasionally bystrikes by American assets on suspected Taliban and al Qaeda hideouts in thetribal areas. 

While American ire has been directed against the newly elected government forpursuing what are believed to be policies of appeasing terrorism on Pakistanisoil, the reality is that it is the Pakistan army that is no longer willing tofight pro-Taliban tribals in the NWFP, even as it enriches its coffers withAmerican aid. At the same time, however, another drama has been enacted in thepicturesque tourist district of Swat, where the newly elected Awami NationalParty (ANP)-led provincial government has concluded yet another 'peace deal'with the leader of a longstanding fundamentalist and pro-Taliban outfit, theTehriq-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) led by Maulana Fazlullah, popularlyknown as 'Maulana Radio', because he runs an illegal radio station demanding theimplementation of Shariah law. The military had launched operations against 'MaulanaRadio' in November 2007 after he took over the entire District, enforced rigidShariah laws and blocked the strategic Karakoram Highway, linking Pakistan andChina.

The 15 point 'Peace Deal' signed between the ANP government and TNSM on May21, 2008, bans private militias. The public display of weapons is forbidden. TheTNSM has agreed that it will not interfere in the education of girls, that itwill not attack barber shops and music parlours and will not prevent vaccinationof children against polio (earlier obstructed as an 'American plot' to sterilizeMuslim children). The TNSM has pledged to close down training centres forsuicide bombers (thereby acknowledging such centres existed earlier) and that itwill end manufacture of explosive devices. In return, the ANP government hasaccepted that Swat will be governed, not by Pakistani laws, but by Shariah law.Moreover, the impasse over the illegal Radio station has been resolved byMaulana Fazlullah nominally accepting the writ of the Pakistan government andagreeing to seek government permission to run the radio station--permission thatcan hardly be refused. This 'peace deal' was signed by a high-level ANPdelegation and by representatives of Maulana Fazlullah. Just as the agreementwas being signed, two girls' schools, a picnic centre and a gas pipeline wereblown up in Swat. 

There is little scope for such agreements to succeed,either in preventing cross-border terrorist activities, or in reasserting theeroding writ of the Pakistan state in its volatile western border areas. Thefundamental problem arises from the fact that no Pashtun leader will ever acceptthat his Afghan Taliban brethren are 'foreign militants'. The Taliban leadershipand cadres will, therefore, continue to receive haven and support in the tribalareas and, indeed, throughout the NWFP. Secondly, there is the problem of the socalled 'Kashmiri Mujahideen' who entered the NWFP and were settled by the ISI inthe Malakand division and in some of the tribal areas, after the earthquake thatstruck Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) in October 2005. 

Informed sources in the NWFP note that, when the earthquake struck in PoK, anestimated ten thousand jihadis, mostly comprising Pakistani Punjabis from groupslike the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), collectivelyreferred to as 'Kashmir Mujahideen', who were in camps in PoK, had to be movedinto the NWFP, when NATO and western relief teams descended on PoK. Thesejihadis have made common cause with the Taliban and have been responsible for anumber of terrorist attacks and suicide bombings, both within Pakistan (afterthe Lal Masjid siege) and in Afghanistan. They will not countenance any curbs oncrossing into Afghanistan. It remains to be seen if, during negotiations for'peace deals' in the tribal areas, the ISI succeeds in persuading the 'KashmirMujahideen' to leave the country's western borders and return to POK and topursue their original aim of waging jihad in J&K.

When asked whether the ceasefire he announced on February 7, 2008, was a preludeto his ending his jihad in Afghanistan, Baitullah Mehsud replied: "Islamdoes not recognize frontiers. Jihad in Afghanistan will continue". Any'peace deal' the NWFP government or the army concludes with Pashtun militantgroups is set to fail, because Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line do notrecognize the Durand Line as an international border which separates them. Andall efforts by the Americans or others to persuade any government in Afghanistanto recognize the legitimacy of the Durand Line as an international border willinevitably fail. 

It remains to be seen for how long the Americans will continue to toleratecross-border attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan. A bruised Pakistan army, inwhich Pashtuns constitute a significant element, is reluctant to face furtherdisaffection and desertions in its ranks caused by fighting its kinsmen in theNWFP. Moreover, there is, as yet, no evidence to suggest that the Pakistan armyestablishment has given up its zeal for 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan, or itspropensity to use radical Islamist groups to achieve its strategic goals. Forall practical purposes, however, the Durand Line no longer exists as amanageable international border. The writ of the Pakistani state in this entireregion has been significantly eroded.

Where is Pakistan headed in the coming years, as it faces up to the blowback ofpast policies? In its Report of 2001, entitled Global Trends 2015, the USNational Intelligence Council noted: 

Pakistan will be more fractious, isolated and dependant on international financial institutions. Nascent democratic reforms will produce little change in the face of opposition from entrenched political and Islamic Parties. Further, domestic decline would benefit Islamic political activists, who may significantly increase their role in politics and alter the make up and cohesion of Pakistan's military--once Pakistan's most capable institution. In a climate of continuing domestic turmoil, the central government's writ will probably be reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of Karachi.

These observations, dating back more than seven years, are certainlyprescient, and it will be interesting to observe how present developments alongthe Pakistan-Afghanistan border play out, against the backdrop of this scenario

G. Parthasarathy is former Indian High Commissioner/Ambassador toPakistan, Myanmar and Australia