After the Age Of The Spoiler

The wise men of Hindoostan have, once more, been utterly blind-sided byIndia’s electorate. Most pre-election projections had predicted the doom ofthe national parties and a rag-tag coalition--the Third Front, and uncommittedfragments inventively combined into a Fourth Front--catapulted to power underthe uncertain leadership of one among numberless pretenders. Even the‘scientific’ prestidigitations of learned psephologists making ‘precise’calculations on exit poll data saw no more than unstable coalitions, at best, ofone of the national parties, backed by a gaggle of ideologically irreconcilablegroupings. The national formations themselves appeared to suffer a collapse ofconfidence, and had reconciled themselves to one of these outcomes, and enormouspublic apprehensions had been provoked by the spectre of disorders that wouldcome in the wake of the opportunistic, rickety and volatile alliances that wereexpected to seize power at Delhi.

Abruptly, however, public anxieties appear to have crystallized into what onecommentator described as a "flight to stability". The fictional ThirdFront has been decimated, with its principal advocate, the Communist Party ofIndia--Marxist (CPI-M) suffering the most humiliating reverses just five yearsafter its supreme triumph, shrinking from a strength of 43 seats to a poor 16.Significantly, however, 76.79 per cent of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha are nowoccupied by the national alliances, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA, 258)and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA, 159). Crucially, the two principalnational parties, the Congress (206) and the BJP (116) together account for 59.3per cent of the House (322 seats), suggesting that the era of ‘spoilers’ maywell be at an end, at least for the time being. Some of the most disruptivepolitical formations have, moreover, been cut to size and will have littlecoercive influence over the new dispensation at Raisina Hill.

From a purely non-partisan perspective, there is an encouraging stability inthis outcome, and this will impact crucially on national security policy. Forone thing, the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai had made terrorism and internal securitycentral electoral issues--and both the leading national parties, the BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP) and the Congress had made elaborate and detailed commitmentson these issues in their manifestos and pre-election declarations. Clearly, thedivisive cacophony that has long impeded and undermined the evolution ofeffective counter-terrorism (CT), counter-insurgency (CI) and internal securitypolicy will now abate, at least to some extent, creating the mandate and thespace that the new government--hopefully--will better use.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has, of course, long offered some of the morecoherent assessments of India’s many internal security crises--though, in thepast, he apparently failed to carry many of his own Cabinet colleagues alongwith him. The Prime Minister had noted, moreover, "South Asia is inturmoil. And therefore in planning for our own development, we have to bemindful of the environment within which we have to operate." Union HomeMinisiter P. Chidambaram, in late March 2009, at the height of the run-up to theelections, had noted, further, that "India finds itself in a ring of fire.Our neighbours are countries in difficulty. Some of them even qualify to becalled failed states." It is evident that a UPA government led by ManmohanSingh is now irrevocably committed to placing India’s security among itshighest priorities.

It is significant, within this context, that the "ring of fire"may, in some measure, already have been breached by circumstances not ofIndia’s making. In Sri Lanka, a determined government has destroyed one of theworld’s most lethal and inventive terrorist groups, and there is nowreasonable expectation that Colombo will pursue an inclusive solution that willaddress at least the most urgent of Tamil grievances. India certainly hastremendous leverage to encourage such an outcome, and an internationalcommunity, appalled by the bloody endgame in the Sri Lankan North, will exerciseenormous pressure to ensure that Sinhala triumphalism is held in abeyance. Thereis, in any event, a very real opportunity, now, for peace and development in SriLanka, after over 25 years of relentless strife.

In Bangladesh, while the February revoltin the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) triggered grave concerns, the AwamiLeague’s sweep in the elections of December 2008 has opened up new vistas. Itis evident that the Sheikh Hasina government has committed itself to reversingthe trends towards Islamist radicalization and quasi-governmental andestablishment support to Islamist extremism and terrorism--including their‘export’ to India. There is also a clear effort and intent to delinkBangladesh from the pernicious Pakistani gameplan in this region. WhileDhaka’s initial postures have been encouraging, it remains to be seen howsustained the government’s efforts will be, and whether they will besuccessful in containing and neutralizing what may be an inevitableextremist-terrorist backlash. In any event, there appears to be a greateropportunity for peace in Bangladesh than has been the case for some years now,and the new dispensation at South Block would certainly have something to buildon to consolidate these gains.

Nepal, of course, continues to stare into the abyss, though from a positionof ‘ugly stability’. Despite abrasive confrontations with the variouspolitical parties, the Maoists have remained within the ‘peace process’, andviolence--beyond levels that have become ‘acceptable’ within this troubledcountry--is not an immediate risk.

It is Pakistan alone that remains a rising inferno, and will be the mosturgent security challenge--both from an internal and external perspective--forthe new regime. Regrettably, there is little evidence of any emerging coherencein India’s foreign or defence policy postures towards Pakistan, though"The Congress Party’s Pledge: Protecting India From Terror" document(Pledge Document),released during the election campaign, does, in passing, state that"Counter-intelligence measures must be designed to foil activities offoreign intelligence agencies. Counter-terrorism measures must be crafted in amanner that they act as warning and strong deterrent to potentialterrorists." 

India, however, remains apparently committed to restoring the‘peace process’ with Pakistan if there is perceptible action against thosewho were involved in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, and there is little evidence ofany new strategic orientation towards this relentless enemy. The myth that"a strong and stable Pakistan is in India’s interests" remainsfirmly entrenched in the Delhi establishment, though there is little evidentthat any instrumentalities or agencies exist to secure this eventuality. 

Thereality is, neither India nor the paltry billions in aid that are flowing fromthe ‘great powers’ and international community, have any significant impacton Pakistan disastrous trajectory. It is critical, now, to recognize thedistinction between wishful and strategic thinking, and to accommodatePakistan’s accelerating descent within India’s national policy projections.It is imperative, consequently, that India reviews its ‘end state’objectives with regard to Pakistan, to accommodate emerging realities. Thisincludes the growing possibility of a ‘regime change’ that transforms--ordestroys--the existing state structure in Pakistan, and the consequent risks ofrising instability, export of terrorism, and the transfer of Pakistan’snuclear arsenal to extremist and non-state elements. 

A strategy to tacklePakistan’s implosion and possible collapse is now necessary, even if analternative track of negotiations is kept alive. There will, moreover, be aprogressive urgency to addressing the evolving disaster of President BarackObama’s AfPak policy.

Within the internal security context, the shock to the system administered by26/11 has resulted in a greater focus on the threat of terrorism and insurgencyin the country, and a number of new measures have already been announced orinitiated. Long pending sanctions to strengthen the Intelligence Bureau havebeen cleared. The Multi Agency Centre (MAC), the Congress Pledge Documentclaims, has been established and "connectivity has been achieved betweenMAC and S-MACs in the State Capital and the Special Branch of the Police in theState. All these Centres are now functioning on a 24x7 basis…" 

Surprisingly, however, the Ministry of Home Affairs’ (MHA) website claims that"Sanction has been issued for site preparation at 30 locations in India toestablish connectivity between the Multi Agency Centre (MAC), SMAC and theSpecial Branch of the State Police concerned". There is obviously someroutine fudging here, and what is ‘sanctioned’ is evidently projected ashaving been achieved. The reality, of course, is that the MAC-SMAC structureremains in its infancy, as does the national intelligence database it isintended to create--but the impediments that had long obstructed theseinitiatives are now quickly being removed. The sheer burden of cumulativecapacity constraints will, however, continue to dog these projects for some timeto come.

Among other post-26/11 initiatives, whatever their actual implementation orutility, that the MHA lists, are:

• Identification of land to establish NSG hubs in Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Hyderabad.
• Voluntary agreement between the NSG and eight scheduled airline operators to provide aircraft within 30-45 minutes in case of emergency.
• Amendment of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) Act to enable the CISF to extend security cover to private, joint and cooperative sector establishments.
• Sanction of INR 2.39 billion for the creation of infrastructure for various CPMFs.
• Sanction of INR 7.05 billion under the Modernisation of Police Forces scheme for 14 States under the Annual Action Plans for 2009-10.
• Approval for augmentation of 383 Border Observation Posts (BOPs) on the Indo-Bangladesh border (adding to 802 existing), and 126 BOPs on the Indo-Pak border (adding to 609 existing). Construction is to be completed by 2012-13.
• Sanction of 94 posts to the National Investigation Agency (NIA)

Significantly, the Pledge Document also makes a number of quantified andtime-bound commitments. Recognizing terrorism as "the single most importantissue", the Document asserts that this is "a challenge that anyresponsible government must address on a war footing" (emphasisadded). To this end, the most significant objective commitments include:

• Appoint a Panel to draw up a Police Recruitment Plan 2009-2020 to assess the growing needs, at the officer level, of all Police forces, and to ensure that the deficiency in IPS cadres "is addressed decisively once and for all, after the Panel submits its report by 31.5.2009".
• To fill all existing vacancies in the Police forces before 31.3.2010, and ensure that there is "at least one police station in every block; every police station has an adequate and effective complement of well-armed constables, all police stations in a state are connected to each other and to the district/state police headquarters; and that at least one police personnel in each police station is exclusively tasked for intelligence gathering."
• The Modernisation of Police Force Scheme will be included in the Plan and grants under the scheme will increase five-fold over a five year period.
• 20 Counter-Insurgency and Anti-terrorism Schools will be set up across India.
• A 100 day Action Plan formulated by the MHA will be completed by May 31, 2009. An additional two plans will be drawn up, one for the remaining period of 10 months in 2009-10, and another for the five-year term of the new government.
• Preparation of the National Population Register (NPR) is already underway along with the Census of 2011. Once the NPR is ready, Multi-purpose National Identity Cards (MNICs) will be issued to all residents of India. NPR of coastal villages/towns are to be created in 2009-10, in view of the urgency of the matter, and identity cards are to be issued to all residents of these areas, and to the whole of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
• A ‘world-class National Security Database’ and National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) is to be "delivered in three phases within a period of two years."
• A Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and System (CCTNS) will be created by 2011-12.
• NSG hubs at Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Hyderabad "will be operational by 30.6.2009.
• A Judicial Task-Force on Fast-track Trials will be established to recommend measures to ensure that national security and terror-related cases are tried within 90 days. The Task-Force will submit its findings by 31.8.2009 and the government will act on its recommendations within 30 days of receiving them.
• A Coastal Command will be established, and a Sagar Prahari Bal (Sea Assault Force), comprising 1,000 personnel will be raised to protect naval assets and bases.

These and other measure are proposed under a five pronged strategy with twooverarching objectives, comprising:

Highest Possible Level of Preparedness

• Capable and Equipped Human Assets
• Actionable Intelligence and Cutting-edge Analytics
• Empowered and Coordinated Security Agencies

Rapid and Decisive Response and Follow-up

• Decisive Response to Threats and Attacks
• Strong and Speedy Investigation and Prosecution

‘Intra-agency collaboration’ is to be a ‘cardinal principal ofgovernance’, and ‘greater powers and funds’ are to be provided to ‘ourfrontal security agencies’. There is a promise to "deal with the scourgeof terrorism squarely and decisively, but without weakening the delicate strandsthat have, together, bound our society for centuries."

In broad terms, these proposals appear to address the issues relating tomajor capacity deficits that have crippled India’s CT-CI responses in thepast, and made the country a soft target for terrorism and proxy war.Regrettably, there are, within the Indian constitutional scheme, acute limits tocentral power, and the fragmentation of state responses, or the unenthusiasticimplementation of central schemes, has long undermined capacity building whereit is most needed, despite increasing central support for the augmentation ofnecessary state capacities. 

Securing effective centre-state collaboration willhave to be another ‘cardinal principal of governance’ if the central schemesare to secure desired impact, and this has been enormously difficult in thepast. Fortunately, a measure of consensual clarity has appeared across partylines regarding the need for sustained and coherent effort to address deficitswithin the security apparatus and confront the threats of terrorism, insurgencyand the covert wars that are being directed against the unity and integrity ofthe state and nation in India, and this may provide the context of somewhatgreater efficiency of operation.

The surprise electoral outcome will provide the new regime unprecedentedstability. It has also ensured continuity, and will give greater authority tothe Prime Minister to translate his understanding and assessment of India’sinternal security threats into an effective framework of response. A range offirm commitments have already been made to implement a ‘zero-tolerance policytowards terrorism’ and to "guarantee the maximum possible security toeach and every citizen". The clear electoral mandate ensures that, to theextent that the new regime succeeds in fulfilling its pledge, this achievementwill be entirely its own; to the extent it fails, there will be no one else toblame.

Ajai Sahni isEditor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy,the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal