I have written more recently in On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian Revolution: Power and Resistance Today how shifts in rhetoric (discourse) beget shifts in policy. The current diplomatic language espoused by all sides have opened up the prospect of a larger strategic settlement with Iran, which may alter the dynamics underlying the international politics of West Asia and North Africa. The Obama administration understands very well that Iran is a regional power that cannot be sanctioned into submission or marginalised from the conflicts in Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq etc. There is an emergent understanding in the more liberal quarters of political elites in the US that Iran could be turned into a factor in the solution of regional crises, rather than ostracised as the ultimate threat to world peace. This is exactly why long-time US allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia are nervous: their criticism of the Geneva accord is a symptom of a larger anxiety. The fact that both failed to derail it is politically embarrassing, certainly for the Netanyahu administration, which adopted a loud campaign against diplomacy with Iran. Saudi Arabia has been rather more subtle, at least officially. The House of Saud certainly does not have an interest in being on the wrong side of history. But both Israel and Saudi Arabia are anxious about the legitimacy that the accord has lent to the Islamic Republic. States thrive in a social environment. External recognition by a superpower (in this case the US), in the form of diplomatic engagements and agreements such as the Geneva accord, are crucial ingredients in the political mix that delivers political legitimacy to rulers. The jubilations at the airport after the return of foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif to Tehran exemplify this boost to legitimacy. What a difference to 2009, when thousands of Iranians demonstrated against the re-election of Ahmadinejad, not least because of his confrontational rhetoric in international affairs.