The BSP's decision to go it alone in the forthcoming parliamentary elections has created ripples in political circles. Given the BSP's Dalit base, the fate of the major parties in contention will be affected by its fortunes, particularly in Uttar Pradesh where the BSP has declared its intention to contest all seats. On an all-India level, the party will contest 200 Lok Sabha seats with an alliance with the Akali Dal (B) in Punjab and minor understandings in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan.
The BSP leadership is confident that its Dalit support will not shift, and this strong base, it hopes, will lead the party to a position where it can bargain with the single largest party—be it the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) or the Congress—at the Centre.
The BSP's past performance shows that, irrespective of a poll pact, it has more or less tended to retain its share of total votes polled. In the 1989 Lok Sabha elections, it got 9.9 per cent of the vote, though it managed to win only two seats. In the elections two years later, even at the height of the Hindutva wave, it retained 8.7 per cent of the vote. It was only during the 1993 Uttar Pradesh assembly election that the party entered into an alliance with Mulayam Singh Yadav's Samajwadi Party (SP) to form a coalition government, with 69 assembly seats and 11 per cent vote to its credit. But 19 months later, the BSP broke away from the coalition to form its own government with BJP support. Mayawati's consequent fall has not dampened the BSP's spirits. She is visibly upbeat and—with obvious exaggeration—claims victory will be hers in nearly 70 Lok Sabha seats.
However, Yadav says that the SP's electoral pact with the Janata Dal will bear rich dividends for the Third Force. According to him, in the last assembly elections, the Janata Dal polled more votes than the BSP, but won only 27 seats. But this analysis is no longer considered relevent as the Dal has lost much of its base—one of the reasons why it had to satisfy itself with only 16 seats out of 85 in the present seat adjustment among the Joint Front parties. This has caused heartburn in a section of the Janata Dal, and its state president Ram Asrey Verma, resigned as a result of his dissatisfaction over the seat allotment.
However, the main fight in Uttar Pradesh remains between the Samajwadi Party-Janata Dal-Communist combine on one side and the BJP on the other. Both the Congress and the breakaway Tiwari Congress are in complete disarray. Consequently, the BSP factor has assumed significance by default. The more votes it polls, the greater the damage it will cause to the Third Force.
But all is not well in the BSP. The stand taken by BSP supremo Kanshi Ram that he had no reservations in having an understanding either with the Congress or the BJP has caused considerable embarrassment to his partymen—already being viewed with suspicion by the minorities for having earlier taken the BJP's help in forming the government in Uttar Pradesh. In a bid to prevent further damage, May-awati called a press conference and blamed the press for 'distorting' Kanshi Ram's statement. She announced that the BSP would give 25 per cent of the tickets to the Muslims. She also met Imam Abdullah Bukhari of the Jama Masjid, Delhi, to solicit an appeal from him to the Muslims to vote for the BSP.
Singing her own hosannas, Mayawati explained how her government had not allowed the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) to have its way in Varanasi and Mathura. She blamed V.P. Singh and Yadav for having formed the government at the Centre in 1989 with the help of the BJP and thus ensuring the expansion of the latter's base, which ultimately "led to the destruction of the Babri mosque". The Congress, she added, was also to be blamed as it did nothing to prevent the destruction.
Yet, while Mayawati said that the BSP would not have any truck with any of the two Manuvadi parties, she refrained from categorically ruling out an understanding after the Lok Sabha polls. She says: "The question of giving support to the Congress or the BJP comes only after the declaration of results. We will decide on that when we come to it, taking into account the welfare of the Bahujan Samaj."
This does not redeem the party from charges of dalliance with the BJP—the damage has already been done. Yadav has received a shot in the arm and will use the issue to paint Kanshi Ram and Mayawati as anti-minority leaders.
In the final analysis, the BJP gained little out of its tactical move of extending support to Mayawati in order to remove Yadav from office, since it could not penetrate the Dalit base as desired. On forming the government, the BSP went all out to consolidate its Dalit base. Mayawati, as chief minister, held a series of major public rallies and when the BJP realised that it was losing the game and withdrew support on June 3, 1995, it was already too late. Mayawati dubbed the move as yet another conspiracy of Manuvadis against the Bahujan Samaj.
And this message has gone deep down to the remotest of villages. Dalits view the BJP's withdrawal of support to Mayawati as a great betrayal. Says Ganga Prasad Kuril of Shekh Pur village, who earlier used to vote for the Congress and then worked for the Janata Dal before becoming a BSP supporter: "Brahmins and Thakurs conspired to remove Mayawati within three-four months. Uski rallion mein bheed dekh kar BJP ne haath kheench liya. (The BJP withdrew its support after Mayawati's popularity began showing in massive rallies.)" This is a com mon sentiment which keeps Dalits away from the BJP, however loudly it may swear by Baba Saheb Ambedkar.
A majority of the Dalits contacted by Outlook in the interior villages favour the BSP because they say the party gave them self-respect—and, of course, they understand the language Mayawati speaks. Though initially a little hesitant to express their views, for most of them Mayawati symbolises the BSP. As Chedi, a resident of Katra village of Unnao district, says: "Dekho, haan sabse bhari jaegi, par vote Mayawati ko hi diya jayega. (We will say yes to all the parties but our vote will go to Mayawati)."
Political observers argue that ultimately the BJP will stand to gain out of this division of Dalit and OBC votes. The absence of a poll agreement between the Samajwadi Party and the BSP has also created a lot of confusion—bordering on cynicism—among the Dalits. Says daily wage worker Dayal (75) of Bhawani Kheda village: "Sarkar puri chalaote nahina. Kauno du mahina rahat hai, kauno teen mahina. Ham kahat hain pura samay to raho post par. " (They don't even complete the full term. Nobody remains in office for more than two or three months.)
The dilemma before the Dalit voter in the state is that even if he votes for the BSP, chances of its winning are thin. The feeling is that with no alliance between Samajwadi Party and the BSP this time, there will be a sharp division of Dalit and OBC votes with Dalits being the probable victims in the event of resultant conflicts. This will affect both the parties. Kuril of Shekh Pur village has a clear analysis to offer: "Dono ko nuksan pahunchega. Rajbhavan ke jhagde jan jan mein phail gaye hein (The people have been divided on the political lines and it will adversely affect both parties)." Still, he feels that the Dalits will not vote for any other party but the BSP. And the OBC vote—particularly of the Yadavs—will go to Mulayam Yadav.
Members of the Raidas community air the same view. "When everyone else is toeing the caste-line why can't we?" is the refrain among Scheduled Caste voters.
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