The War That Should Never Have Been

Behind the much-feted victory in Kargil lurks a colossal blunder. A bungle which involves the top hierarchy of the government as well as the army. In a gist, had the political and army leadership simply been more alert and alive to the situation, Kargil need not have happened at all. As it transpired, India plodded into a needless war, and bled itself in terms of sterling men and material, before eking out a redeeming, if costly, military triumph. Yet, for all the to-do surrounding this definitive episode, it is a shame that no questions are being asked-or entertained-at the highest levels, and no answers given.

There is no denying the gallant efforts of the officers and the jawans in the battle, but placing Kargil in its military/political context can't be said to have the sole intention of politicising the army. A sizeable section of senior and junior army officers too have been stressing the need to conduct a thorough examination of the lapses which led to the two-month-long operation in Kargil.

New facts sourced by Outlook from various officials in the army headquarters and intelligence agencies-raw, Intelligence Bureau (IB), Military Intelligence (MI)-reveal the exact nature of the failures both in the government and the army. Of how, in the run-up to Kargil, army presence in the sector was 'pared down' rather than stepped up despite ominous signals.

The Army Bungle

As early as August 25, '98, Brig Surinder Singh, commander of the Kargil-based 121 Brigade, had briefed the visiting Chief of Army Staff (coas), Gen V.P. Malik, on the situation in his sector which extended from Mushkoh to Batalik. Also present was Maj Gen Budhwar, General Officer Commanding (goc), 3 Infantry Division, and Brig Singh's immediate superior. The briefing was later put under a file and sent to the army chief. At the briefing, it was specifically pointed out that the threat perception had increased along the Line of Control (LoC), calling for additional resources.

To quote from the file sent to the army chief:

"

Brief/coas/124/gsd/vif/dg dated Aug 25, '98

"Threat Perceptions: The ene (enemy) is active in the sec (sector) along the LC (LoC). The areas where incursions/intrusions are possible are:

"Marpola
"Mushkoh
"Tololing
"Kaksar
"Bhimbhat
"Batalik
"Yaldor.

"Need For Additional Resources:
"
In view of enhanced threat perceptions following resources are needed on an urg (urgent) basis:
"(a) Weapon locating radar system to detect and determine ene arty (artillery) fire
"(b) Remote piloted vehicles for recce along the LC
"(c) Winter eqp (equipment) for trps (troops) undtk (undertaking) patrolling at inhospitable heights."

The warnings from the commander of 121 Brigade did not stop here. He also wrote to Maj Gen Budhwar, reiterating the points he made at the briefing to the coas. This letter, sent to the HQ of the Leh-based 3 Infantry Division on September 1, '98, states: "

106/gs(ops)/(Brief/coas/124/gsd/vif/) dated 1-9-98
"(b) Remote piloted vehicles for recce
"(c) Winter eqp for trps
"It is also requested that the commander be provided with hepters (helicopters) for physical verification of vulnerable points on the LC."

According to officers posted in this sector, these communications by Brig Singh were followed up in several meetings with the goc, 3 Infantry Division. These officers say the threat of intrusions and the urgent need for more resources were two key points stressed at these meetings.

But with the goc remaining unimpressed with the outlined threat perceptions, a frustrated Brig Singh took recourse to the only option available to him through the mechanism of the Redressal of Grievances (rog). Normally, it is a well-known fact that a brigadier cannot directly write to the army chief, given the rigid chain of command built into its structure. But under the provisions of rog, an officer is allowed to air his grievances to the chief.

Here is an excerpt from what Brig Singh wrote in his rog to Gen Malik on November 12, '98.
"do/rog/coas/
dated 12-11-98

"Dear Sir,

"Serious professional differences have developed between self and goc, 3 Inf Div in matters of op (operational) details.

"Possible infl (infiltrations) along the LC at the areas pointed out in my briefing to you have been ignored.

"These points have become vulnerable due to lack of adq (adequate) trps (troops) and ptrls (patrols).

"My requests and urgent communications to goc 3 Infantry Div in view of enhanced threat perceptions have been turned down in writing.

"Whenever I brought up the topic in meetings with the goc I was termed an alarmist..."

Failing to get any response from the army chief, Singh again wrote to his immediate superior, Budhwar, reiterating the threat perceptions and need for additional resources. Here is an excerpt from that note dated December 17, '98:

"

186/gs/ops/17.12.98

"Ref: 106/gs(ops)/1.9.98

"In absence of any reply to the aforementioned communication, it is reiterated that the help and resources sought are imperative for eff svl (effective surveillance) and patrls (patrols) along the LC.

"The ene (enemy) is active here and the need to strengthen the defences along the LC cannot be overstated. Urgent action in the above matter is sought..."

When senior retired generals were quizzed by Outlook, they were of the view that these were not ordinary sit-reps (situation reports) as is being made out by the army establishment. It will be recalled that the army headquarters had earlier denied the very existence of any communications relating to increased threat perceptions. But now newspapers quoting top sources in the army grudgingly admit such notes were written, while attempting to downplay their nature and content.

Together with the brigade commander's warnings, reports sent by operatives of the IB, raw and the two wings of MI-ifsu and LU (Intelligence and Field Surveillance Unit and Liaison Unit)-spoke of similar threat perceptions in the Kargil sector. The reports reached various decision-makers within the government and the army but were not taken seriously for reasons best known to them.

Operation Vijay was launched on May 26 and Brig Singh was removed from his command on June 9 without assigning any reason. He was asked to report to the headquarters of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps. On June 13, his transfer was cancelled, he was told the next day to report at Srinagar. Coincidentally, Gen Malik was on a visit to Kargil on June 13.

On reaching Srinagar, Singh applied for a meeting with the chief in Delhi and also wrote out a detailed 68-page note recalling the entire sequence of events starting from the August 25, '98, briefing and ending in his removal from the Kargil brigade command.

Although the brigadier was asked to travel to Delhi to meet the chief in the last week of June, on reaching the army headquarters, Malik refused to meet him despite Singh's best efforts for nearly a week. Finding no other alternative, the brigadier handed over the 68-page note to a personal staff officer of Gen Malik. Appended to the note were all the relevant documents and communications made with regard to the Kargil episode.

After his failed bid to meet Gen Malik, Brig Singh went to Secunderabad where he was supposed to take over as the commander of the Andhra Sub Area. However, on July 16, '99, he was again transferred to Ranchi as the deputy general officer commanding, 23 Division. There he was granted leave and was allowed to go to his family in Chandigarh.

In Chandigarh, fearing harassment from army authorities, Brig Singh filed a writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The petition, which came up for hearing on August 20, elaborated on the actions taken by Singh as the Kargil brigade commander and the warnings issued by him. Singh did not attach the letters he sent to his chief and the goc in view of their sensitive nature but his counsel promised to the court that they would be shown as and when required. The two-judge bench advised the petitioner that in view of its sensitive nature involving national security, he should withdraw the case. But the ruling had a rider: Singh was given the liberty to approach the court again should the army take any punitive action against him.

A day after the judgement, the brigadier was taken to Leh, ostensibly for an inquiry. All efforts to contact him proved futile.

The government Bungle

As far back as August '98, defence minister George Fernandes had intelligence reports on enhanced Pakistani activity in the Kargil sector. On August 5 last year, the minister himself told the Lok Sabha of intelligence reports which suggested that Pakistan's focus had shifted from the Kashmir valley to the Kargil sector. According to sources in the intelligence agencies, there was no dearth of inputs to the defence minister, the home minister, the prime minister and the national security advisor on Pakistan's designs.

In the normal course, all the intelligence inputs are processed and put up to the respective ministries. For instance, all IB reports are sent to the home minister and in fact the IB chief briefs the prime minister (in this case, Vajpayee) on a weekly basis on the latest developments. Similarly, all inputs from the two arms of MI are given to the army chief, who, in turn, briefs the defence minister and key ministry of defence (MoD) officials.

Here are definite inputs given by IB, raw and MI to their respective ministries on Kargil since September '98.

An MoD says the intelligence inputs were brought to the notice of Fernandes and the prime minister. But these were not taken seriously. "There was a clear lowering of guard which led to the ignoring of these warnings. There was also the thinking that there would be a de-escalation along the borders since both India and Pakistan had achieved nuclear parity," the source says.

According to him, the fact that all the repeated warnings were taken lightly stands to logic because of one reason: the inherent dichotomy in the bjp's policy of busying itself in hawkish postures, then veering to a hasty peace agenda on which the prime minister put his reputation at stake. This explains why the warnings in January-February this year were not acted upon. Any flexing of muscle by the Indian army along the LoC would have been a spanner in the works for Vajpayee's bus ride to Lahore and the peaceable image he was then trying to portray.

The indicators are clear-Fernandes, home minister L.K. Advani and above all Vajpayee as head of the executive knew of the heightened activity along the LoC but, mystifyingly, failed to attach any significance to the intelligence inputs made available to them. At another level, the nsc-formed late last year for the explicit purpose of dealing with security issues-was informed of the intrusions in February. Brajesh Mishra, who is the national security advisor as well as the principal secretary to the PM, was aware of the intelligence warnings given to the nsc. A source in the nsc has confirmed this to Outlook.

With the culpability at various levels, the government started to speak in different voices. Fernandes initially denied that there was any intelligence failure. Jaswant Singh said the intelligence failure would have to be investigated. The prime minister denied any failure.

Meanwhile, as the pressure on Fernandes to own up responsibility and quit came from his enemies in the bjp, one camp follower of the defence minister even suggested to Outlook that it investigate the prime minister's culpability in the Kargil failure. "Why should you keep on needling only George? Why don't you look into the role played by Vajpayee? He (Vajpayee) knew about the enemy build-up but he said he would sort out the problem with Nawaz Sharif," he said.

With Kargil the main electoral plank of the bjp, no one in the political establishment would like to expose its underbelly, to talk about failures of any kind. But intelligence officials point out that the army as well as the top political leadership failed in not taking cognisance of the inputs given to them.

Says an IB official: "There have been instances of failure, like in the Rajiv Gandhi case. The intelligence on a possibility of an assassination was there but no one acted upon it. But this time there wasn't just a stray report. The Kargil area was identified as the point of possible intrusion. However, the defences in the area was surprisingly not strengthened but instead, pared down."

But was the army deliberately ignoring the warnings or was the top brass toeing the government's soft approach vis-a-vis Pakistan? Although many critics of the Vajpayee government subscribe to the second line of thought, a former vice-chief of the army has another view. Says he: "Anybody can go wrong in assessing a war situation. The need is to come clean on the mistakes. But to do that, moral courage of the highest order is required. It must be realised that the nation is more important than individuals and organisations.