The Soldier’s Lament

For the men on the ground the eight-day drama that started in the skies and ended in the war-torn, desolate landscape of Kandahar wasn’t just a cause of anger and anguish-it was the proverbial last straw. For the security forces operating in the counter-insurgency theatre of Jammu and Kashmir, the release of three hardcore militants-two of them leading figures-in exchange for the passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines Airbus is nothing short of a body-blow to their efforts to combat terrorism. "It takes months, if not years to apprehend important militants. In the process, we lose several men and officers. It is therefore very galling to see these militants walk free after we have sacrificed our men," says a divisional commander in the Valley.

At the junior level, the anger is much more palpable. Says a company commander, "It is very difficult to motivate my boys when they realise that all their efforts in capturing a militant might come to naught one day." And it is not only the army which is unhappy with the swap, even senior officers in the Border Security Force (BSF) are resentful. "We understand that the government was left with no choice in this particular episode, but for the men on the ground no amount of logic will suffice to explain the need to free the militants. The jawan will simply wonder about the futility of his job in these circumstances," says a senior BSF official.

At the army headquarters in Delhi there is growing concern about the impact on the morale of the troops in the Valley. "The release of the militants is the biggest blunder the government could have made. Now that the militants have got away by holding people to ransom, more such acts will follow. The after-effects would be immediately felt in the Valley itself," a senior general told Outlook. "It is going to be very difficult to keep motivational levels high under such conditions," he added. Commanders in the Valley say troops and their officers will subconsciously get into a "siege mentality," wherein most of their energies will be directed towards self-protection rather than offensive action against militants. Concurs a retired general who has served in the Valley, "The futility of apprehending militants will play on the soldier’s mind and subconsciously the effort will be to ensure that a minimum amount of casualties are suffered. In the process, all formations will be spending more time and energy in defending posts and garrisons rather than launching ambushes," he observes.

While the immediate repercussions will certainly be felt in J&K, security analysts fear that militants in the Northeast will also be emboldened to resort to kidnap and ransom tactics. Recalls a general, who has served in the Northeast, "In 1991, the ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) had abducted 14 government officials in one day to secure the release of over 120 hardcore militants. What is the guarantee that this will not happen again especially in the light of what the government has done in the hijacking case," he asks pointedly. As it is, serving army and police officials feel helpless in the face of inadequate legal provisions which technically enable a hardcore militant to walk out of custody after a maximum of six months in detention. In Assam, for instance, the security forces have been arresting close to 1,400 militants every year for the past three years, but according to top police officials at least 60 per cent of these militants have to be released due to legal loopholes. "On top of this helplessness, if militants employ kidnap/hijack tactics and get away with it how can you expect us to be constantly motivated," asks a senior commander.

In the top echelons of the armed forces the fact that the service chiefs were not taken into confidence by the crisis managers during the hijacking crisis is a sore point. Says a senior general, "The tendency to use the armed forces only as a last resort and at the same time treat them as something outside the immediate decision-making machinery is what hurts us. Post-Kargil, we’d hoped that we would form an integral part of the inner circle. Unfortunately, we’re still treated like outsiders by the bureaucracy and the decision-makers." Strong words these. But the fact remains that the armed forces are yet to become an integral part of the highest decision-making bodies in matters of national security.