Militancy, on the other hand, appears to suffer from no such shortcomings. The BW, formed in March 2003, is led by the erstwhile leader of the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), which entered into an official ceasefire with thegovernment in January 2003. With a cadre-strength of about 300 militants, 100 of whom are believed to be armed with AK series rifles and a handful of Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) launchers, the BW has been responsible for a majority of the militancy related activities in thedistrict. About 300 DHD cadres, who are lodged in four designated camps following the ceasefire, have also often been found to have moved out of the camps to engage in extortion. Among the targets of both the BW and the DHD are the gauge conversion project of the railways, the National Highway project, projects of the North Eastern Electric Power Corporation (NEEPCO), a number of tea gardens, traders andgovernment servants.
The BW, whose strength lies in the legacy it inherited from the DHD, has been courted by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), operating in the neighbouringstate of Nagaland. Reports indicate that in exchange for a share of its funds, the Naga outfit trains and arms BW cadres. NSCN-IM facilities in Nagaland have also been used by the BW cadres during security force raids in NC Hills. Apart from the flow of finances, links with the BW help the NSCN-IM maintain a crucial level of influence in thedistrict, which forms a part of its Greater Nagaland (Nagalim) project.
The greatest advantage for militancy in NC Hills remains its localised nature. While, on several occasions, both the DHD and the BW cadres have clashed with each other and also with outfits operating in neighbouring areas, their activities have largely been restricted to the limits of three contiguousdistricts of NC Hills, Karbi Anglong and Cachar. The dominant militant outfits operating in Assam, including the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), too, do not operate in NC Hills. As a result, counter-insurgency operations in thedistrict, seen to be directed against few a hundred militants, in the absence of any larger repercussions on the security of Assam, are characterised by a certain measure of tedium and indifference, unless aggravated by a ‘major’ incident such as the one on June 4.
NSCN-IM’s shadow appears to hang heavy over the June 4 incident. Two NSCN-IM militants, ‘sergeant major’ Colombus alias Jangjing Newmai and ‘corporal’ Ango Lotha, who were arrested on June 5 in connection with the killing, not only provided details of the incident, but also of the linkages between the BW and the Naga outfit. In fact, both Colombus and Ango Lotha were overseeing the entire operation for which the BW had constituted a nine-member team. The NSCN-IM, however, has denied its involvement in the killing.
Following the June 4 killings, the Assam government rushed in additional Central Para-military Force companies into thedistrict. Such moves have become far too predictable and, given the unaltered geographical and infrastructural drawbacks that have aided militancy over the years, are not expected to deliver any significant results. Similarly, thestate government is reportedly mulling over a full-scale Army flush-out operation in the NC Hills and the neighbouring Karbi Anglongdistrict. Opinions in the Police establishment, however, favour an increase in the Police strength and infrastructure, rather than such intermittent operations by Central Forces.
The June 4 killing, according to authoritative sources in Haflong, confirmed the nexus between the local political establishment and the militants. The Police, on the other hand, complain of an absolute lack of intelligence on the militants and the problems of operating in a vacuum. With little help, apart from the customary deployment of additionalforce, coming from the powers that be, the war on militancy in this remote and neglected corner of the country, remains un-winnable.