Shoot The Breeze

2011

• Gen V.K. Singh and Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik say the Indian defence forces are capable of conducting an Operation Geronimo.
• When Pakistan reacts, Gen Singh counters, "I never named a country nor did I imply Pakistan.... It only shows immaturity on their part."
• Lt Gen K.T. Parnaik says the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in J&K is required until Pakistan’s terror infrastructure is dismantled.

2010

• Gen Singh says he is not sure about China's intentions in building border infrastructure.
• Gen Singh describes China and Pakistan as "two major irritants".
• Air chief marshal Naik says he doesn't favour use of air power in anti-Maoist ops. Gen Singh too echoes similar views.
• Army says J&K CM Omar Abdullah's political compulsions prompted move to thin out security forces from urban areas.
• Gen Singh says politicians should build upon the gains of the 2008 elections.
• Air Chief Marshal Naik defends AFSPA and says "legal protection" is a must for the troops to efficiently perform their tasks.

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Firing from the mouth is a malaise that afflicts the Indian defence chiefs who, like their brethren elsewhere in the world, enjoy the tremendous gratitude of the people for protecting the country’s borders. But in India, at least, the defence chiefs are expected to refrain from commenting on issues falling in the domain of the elected government and diplomats. On the chief’s remarks, a secretary-rank official in the mea said, “Such comments unnecessarily create a turbulent atmosphere which makes things difficult for us in conducting our business.” Former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal agrees, “In a system like ours, you cannot muzzle the army chiefs. But even they should know that there are limits within a democracy which they must observe.”

At times, though, the seemingly indiscreet remarks of defence chiefs are deliberately scripted. A top source told Outlook, “It’s not that they’re always speaking out of turn. There are times when we ask them to talk. It’s more like playing good cop, bad cop.” Former ambassador Ronen Sen argues for a nuanced response from India, saying, “While India should welcome America’s action in Abbottabad, it should not depend totally on Washington to pull out the Indian chestnuts from the fire.” He feels New Delhi should have options on what it can do for an “appropriate and calibrated” response to deal with Pakistan. “But what we can do is something that we shouldn’t talk about. It doesn’t serve any purpose,” Sen says emphatically.

The army establishment, of course, has opinions of a contrary nature. It doesn’t find fault with its senior members airing their views. As Lt Gen (retd) Vijay Oberoi puts it, “The army chiefs are expected to keep their lips sealed. But what’s wrong if the army chief wants to assure the people of India that the forces have the capability of dealing with any situation that threatens the country?” Rear Admiral (retd) Raja Menon, in fact, faults Gen Singh’s remarks not for its intended purpose—warning Pakistan and the terror groups there—but for false bravado. “They are bluffing the nation. We don’t have any such capabilities. Warnings such as Gen Singh’s will only be effective when we have the capability and, if need be, can follow up our words with action.”

Remarks by defence chiefs have in the past often created impediments in conducting diplomacy, particularly vis-a-vis China. Just last year, Gen Singh had called Pakistan and China the “two major irritants” for India while questioning Beijing’s intention in developing infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control. Beijing latched on to the comments to ask whether New Delhi was really keen on the ties. No wonder Sibal says, “The forces will do well to avoid making such remarks for they only help countries like Pakistan to tell the world about India’s real intentions and allow it to pursue a hostile India-centric policy.”

And it’s not just foreign policy the defence chiefs have been commenting on. They have voiced their opinions on the situation in J&K, prompting Union minister Farooq Abdullah to write to the prime minister that the generals should desist from talking on issues falling within the state government’s purview. They have also articulated their views on whether or not to withdraw the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)—though, to be fair, their openly stated reluctance to deploying airpower against the Maoists due to the risk of civilian casualties, even if out of turn, was a welcome intervention in many ways. Former air chief marshal S. Krishnaswamy defends the statements saying “they often talk when they are put in a tight corner”. For instance, he says the generals spoke on the AFSPA at a time when people wanted to know the army’s perception of the debate raging over its efficacy. In other words, such remarks should be judged on a case-to-case basis.

But the civilian-military relationship started getting redefined even in those early days. In 1951, taking into account intelligence reports that Pakistan wanted to send intruders across the border, then army chief Gen K.N. Cariappa asked Nehru to deploy troops along the Kashmir border. Nehru rejected the idea believing it would roil Indo-Pak relations. The irrepressible Cariappa then appealed to the president, and Nehru had to retract his earlier decision. On his retirement, Cariappa began to speak on matters political, articulating his views even on the kind of economic model India should follow. Sensing the dangers the popular general posed to the still-evolving Indian polity, Nehru despatched Cariappa on an ambassadorial assignment to Australia.

After 1962, India’s humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese that year further tilted the balance in the military’s favour. This was because it was popularly believed the army’s inherent prowess had been compromised because of interference from the civilian authority. As the executive began to lose its sheen, the generals tended to be more outspoken. In 1992, army chief General S.F. Rodrigues openly demanded good governance and dubbed some foreign countries “bandicoots”.

Srinath Raghavan of Delhi’s Centre for Policy Research cites another reason: “Whilst the military has not intruded in the formal machinery of politics, it is an important and influential player in certain areas of policy. It has managed to do so by an expansive definition of what constitutes its domain of ‘operational expertise’ and by insisting that politicians stay clear of its turf.” The army, Raghavan says, has also sought to resist and limit the civilian authority from monitoring it, claiming it essentially means accepting the diktat of the bureaucrat.

Krishnaswamy says the current set-up is an “excellent one” which has worked very well, but others differ. As Gen Oberoi says, “The existing system is the pits. A constant dialogue is required between the political and military leadership but this hardly takes place. We are kept out of the loop of policymaking and brought in only at a much later stage.” The civilian-military relationship will continue to evolve as India’s rise inevitably complicates its security challenges. Sure, the defence chiefs must have a role in framing policies, but even they will admit to the necessity of not crossing certain red lines. In a democracy, beyond a point, the general has got to say, ‘Yes sir’.