Pokhran-II:What Led To The 53-Kiloton Bombshell?

ONLY nine decision-makers in a nation of 975 million were in on it before the others. Four weeks before India dropped the 53-kiloton bombshell on the world—scorching an indelible mark on the nation’s life-story and sending the average Indian into a web of delight—Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee met an even smaller club of officials and cabinet colleagues to give the final nod. Secrecy was the utmost element in the prime minister’s brief, official postures gave no hint of any such covert operation. The world was lulled before the storm.

Pokhran-II was staggered over May 11 and 13—a batch of three the first day, including the thermonuclear device, and two on the second. Defence Research and Development Organisation chief Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, the man on the spot along with Atomic Energy Commission chairman Dr R. Chidambaram, gave the signal. The tests, conducted within milliseconds of each other, showed up as a single explosion on the Global Seismic Network. That technical fact became a metaphor for the post-test scenario. World leaders, stung to the quick, let loose a deluge of angry admonitions.

Before all the brouhaha, on May 11 afternoon, the same select group waited for news of what was code-named Operation Shakti from the two scientific heads on the spot at Pokhran. They comprised the PM, home minister L.K. Advani, defence minister George Fernandes, finance minister Yashwant Sinha, planning commission deputy chairman Jaswant Singh, political advisor to the PM Pramod Mahajan and principal secretary Brajesh Mishra. When Kalam’s call came that the tests were done at 3.47 pm, at least Advani was seen wiping his eyes. An old, deep-seated desire in his party had been fulfilled.

That desire is now construed of as national consensus. What is the nature of this consensus? The scientists have long asked for N-tests, as the logical culmination to years of research. Strategic analysts have consistently clamoured for it, citing breathlessly compelling reasons. Popular opinion too has sporadically shared this gung-ho feeling, albeit in vaguer and less informed terms. This strand of thinking fructified in what was undoubtedly a scientific achievement. But where do we go from here? More tests? Nuclear warheads? Sources say a cabinet minister privately disclosed that there would be more "fireworks".

The political class, though coveting the credit for such a statement of national machismo, never gathered enough spunk to go the whole hog. Globally, India kept parroting a righteous dissent for a world order built around the imbalance of nuclear haves and have-nots. For the BJP, the decision to resolve this thorny issue by simply going ahead and joining the elite band seemed to come easy. After 50 years of posing as a Third World spokesman, India now entertains gleeful visions of superpower status.

Even when the BJP was a party on the threshold of power, the global community was wary of its nuclear agenda. But once it assumed power, the world was lulled into thinking that the BJP would not carry out any tests, either nuclear or missile, at least not till they had a majority of their own. Domestic judgement too veered around to the same point of view, the fractious nature of the coalition hogging most of the headlines.

VAJPAYEE, while releasing the national agenda, said there was no time-frame for inducting nuclear weapons but he dropped some hints. "The option will be exercised if need be," he had said, a statement then taken to be the usual nominal genuflection. For, the national agenda had spun an elaborate yarn: "We will establish a National Security Council to analyse the military, economic and political threats to the nation and continuously advise the government. This council will also undertake India’s first ever Strategic Defence Review. We will also re-evaluate the nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons." Nothing betrayed haste, and red herrings bloomed aplenty.

In fact, George Fernandes, in his first press conference as defence minister, said the N-question had been kept on hold despite the statement to the contrary in the national agenda. "We did not say that we are going in for nuclear weapons". He categorically stated that a decision on atomic weapons would depend on a thorough strategic review which a revived National Security Council would undertake. "In the light of that we will decide on the nuclear option. We will not fight shy of inducting them if that becomes necessary," he had asserted. A line he mouthed innumerable times in the last two months.

The uncharacteristically restrained Indian reaction to the test-firing of Pakistan’s Ghauri missile must have also misled the world into believing the BJP government would not go in for any nuclear or missile adventures. Ironically, the Americans had not even tired of complimenting the Indians about this "mature" response.

The American ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, who was in Delhi on April 12 harped on this point when he met Indian leaders and officials. Especially sent to Delhi to get to know the BJP government, he pleaded with the Indians to desist from conducting any tests until President Bill Clinton left Indian shores at the end of the year. The government had obviously decided on the tests much before he arrived. A decision which, critics say, was based on questionable motivations.

For, whether or not it was sparked by a bloated threat perception, as critics say, is just one question—a host of domestic factors remain unvoiced amid the flood of strategic analyses. Strip away the gloss and examine the political scenario pre- and post-Pokhran. Beyond bluster, it was a masterly way to hijack a strategic security issue and turn it into a ‘patriotic’ one—identified, of course, with the BJP’s often hypertensive vision of it. India’s bomb —that’s an umbrella issue that leaves no ground for dissent, and renders it virtually impossible to question the party’s motives.

When asked if the tests were meant to buoy up the BJP, Mishra snapped at this correspondent: "If you are not concerned about the nation’s security, what can I say?" He flatly denied there was any word on conducting a strategic defence review before the N-tests. The euphoric response to Pokhran led ex-prime minister I.K. Gujral to remark: "Vajpayee shouldn’t project the tests as a BJP victory," otherwise it may break the consensus on the issue.

For the BJP, the Pokhran N-tests bring some welcome salutary byproducts. Soon after the tests, a top government offi-cial observed: "The explosions will silence the implosions within the coalition government," adding that the key question of stability had now been settled. "The nation’s morale, which had taken a beating over the last couple of years, has been lifted by this bold measure. People are happy that we are self-reliant. Every third world country will develop a certain respect for us. It is unlikely that the Congress or other parties will try to destabilise the government." Observe the convenient dove-tailing of domestic and global concerns.

THE BJP had made several promises to the country in its manifesto and national agenda—a Ram temple in Ayodhya, a uniform civil code,repeal of Article 370 and induction of N-weapons. "What the government has done is to fulfil the easiest promise it made. This did not require support of its allies or the Opposition. It only required a consensus on the nuclear issue," said the official.

The stated consensus among all parties, barring the BJP, was that India needed to keep its nuclear option open. From that point to actually going nuclear is a long step. Observed Mahajan: "It needed a bold prime minister to take this step. Others in the past have only thought about it." That’s the crux in the image game. Vajpayee was being seen as a weak prime minister, exhausted by the endless effort of holding a squabbling coalition together. That’s when Pokhran happened. The significance of the timing is lost on most. Says former minister Prof. Y.K. Alagh: "We need to be told about the immediate strategic objectives. You can state the policy without revealing national secrets."

Scientifically, there are no quibbles. The world did not know India could conduct the low-yield and the thermo-nuclear tests. As it still reeled from May 11, the second tests came. These were equally sophisticated low-yield, sub-kiloton tests—a progress towards weapon miniaturisation. Says Savita Pande, fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: "The micro and mini-nukes that were tested were the most sophisticated and the latest series of nuclear tests in the world." The tests helped generate data for improved computer simulation of weapon designs and attain the capability for subcritical experiments, if necessary.

Pokhran ‘74—the peaceful nuclear experiment (a contradiction in terms) meant essentially for the "greater glory of Indira Gandhi" at a time when her stars were on the wane—has long rankled with the BJP and ever since it has wanted something similar. When it was in power for 13 days in 1996, confirms defence analyst Brahma Chellaney, it had authorised a nuclear test, but it lost the confidence vote before it could be conducted. This time, it wasted no time. For the party that has overdrafted the Ram temple cheque, the Brahmastra hasn’t come too early.

The government’s most potent argument for the tests is the regional security environment. It has specifically trained its guns on Pakistan and China and their clandestine nuclear and missile cooperation. In the post-Ghauri days, this threat assessment is valid. The entire Pakistani missile programme and much of its N-programme is of Chinese origin, believe international experts.

In the aftermath of the tests, the US has rejected Indian concerns, voiced in Vajpayee’s letter to President Clinton that cited China and Pakistan’s nuclear status. Somewhat hypocritical, given that a month ago Karl Inderfurth, assistant secretary of state, said in Delhi that he understood India’s concerns. Beijing also attacked India for "undermining the international effort in banning N-tests so as to obtain hegemony in South Asia in defiance of world opinion." Strong words these.But they came only after Vajpayee’s letter was leaked to the US media. China’s initial reaction had been mild.

Several questions remain: Does India have the guts to take on everyone at the same time? The sanctions, heightened tensions with China, not to speak of Pakistan? Are we opening too many fronts at the same time? Could the complaint against China have been tackled more diplomatically? The BJP’s own supporters are asking these questions. The cited threat assessment is not new. It has existed for years. What has changed in the last six weeks? By declaring its N-status, says a senior Indian diplomat, India has made "a symbolic statement" but "not changed the objective strategic situation. The only real change is the popular perception of the government."

Then, there’s the looming spell of severe sanctions that India will have to live with for some years. The point was made by finance secretary Montek Singh Ahluwalia in a secret report on the worst-case scenario he prepared in 1995. But other ministries, especially the MEA, had differed. Was such a study done recently? Officials say yes, but the government is fudging. "India has taken a leap in the dark. If you can pull it off, it’ll be great. If you can’t, our problems could snowball," said an analyst.

Since the tests the government has made two other crucial points—perhaps the moot point of the whole exercise. First, that it’s willing to accept parts of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and second, that India is an N-power and should be accepted as the world’s sixth nuclear power. "India (can) consider being an adherent to some of the CTBT undertakings. But this can’t be done in a vacuum...and would depend on a number of reciprocal activities," said Mishra on May 11.

This, then, may be India’s trade-off with the world. The defence community has argued for two years that India could go in for the CTBT provided it tests its N-capability and generates data, as was done by France and China before they acceded to the CTBT. France conducted five tests and China seven before they signed on the dotted line—India had then been a bitter critic.

While preferring not to spell out its precise reservations, India is not willing to accept the treaty in toto as demanded by Clinton. Yet some guesses can be made. Two years ago when India blocked the treaty in Geneva before it was passed at the UN in New York, its main problems with the CTBT were the following: that the entry into force clause hurt the country’s sovereignty; that it was discriminatory because it allowed the N-powers to conduct computer simulation and subcritical tests and that it didn’t provide for timebound disarmament. After Pokhran, India will now have to explain why has it done exactly what it was criticising the nuclear powers for.

Experts say the CTBT is non-discriminatory like the Chemical Weapons Convention. It bans nuclear testing by all countries, while allowing computer simulation and subcritical testing. But fact is, these sophisticated lab tests can only be conducted by the five N-powers, which have already conducted extensive tests. India is a new entrant to this club.

Indian missions abroad have all been sent a brief in case the host governments question India’s motives. One of these dealt with the CTBT’s entry into force clause. The way this clause was framed, it could never have come into force unless India signed and ratified it. This kind of force, India has consistently argued, violates its sovereignty.

It’s difficult to believe the world will open the CTBT and modify it now for India to adhere to only some provisions. Conceded a top security analyst: "We have to accept it completely. There can’t be a partial acceptance". What is possible is that India can sign the treaty after registering its reservations, an accepted practice the world over. The tough verification regime is also a serious hindrance. India wants negotiations to get around its reservations, and also get the sanctions reduced. That seems to be the government’s gameplan.

The other Indian wish of being formally accepted as the sixth nuclear power in the world, is even more difficult to realise. Under the NPT, only the countries which carried out nuclear tests before January 1967 are recognised as nuclear powers. And India is late by 31 years with no hope of any NPT member even thinking of amending the treaty. India, said a senior defence analyst, does not want to be treated like a rogue nuclear state. But perhaps that’s what it has to be prepared to live with.

The Radiation Effects Research Foundation in Hiroshima, which has conducted epidemiologi-cal studies of long-term health effects, says people exposed in-utero have shown a reduction in IQ with increasing dose, a higher incidence of mental retardation in the heavily exposed.

Researchers say that an aggressor will specifically focus on energy and transport targets—which means the atomic power plants at Tarapur (near Bombay), Kakrapar (in Gujarat), Kota (near Delhi) and Narora (in UP). That will cause further radiation havoc.

The only saving grace for Bombay will be that a lot of the thermal radiation will sweep into Arabian Sea. But only just.

Of course, if you are half way from hitting water with your triple somersault in the Talkatora Indoor Swimming stadium when Ghauri strikes, what could be a moot point to wonder is whether the water in the pool would vaporise before you hit it.

That is, if you made it that down.