Operation Sindoor: How India Rewrites Its War Doctrine

Operation Sindoor “is not just a name but a reflection of the feelings of millions of people of the country… our unwavering commitment to justice”, said Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his address to the nation on May 12, 2025. Operation Sindoor was India’s response to the barbaric killing of innocent citizens in front of their families and children on the basis of religion by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists. India retaliated with precision strikes on nine terrorist targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), including the headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) at Muridke, approximately 50 km north of Lahore, and the headquarters of the Jaish-e-Mohammed at Bahawalpur, approximately 400 km south of Lahore. More than 100 terrorists were killed in these attacks.

In the ensuing military engagements, India demonstrated unequivocal superiority. On the offensive, India successfully degraded Pakistan’s air defence capability, and then penetrated across the entire length and breadth of Pakistan, undertaking precision strikes against very sensitive and high-value targets. In defence, India neutralised hundreds of drones and missiles launched by Pakistan against India’s military installations and civilian targets. The impact of the strikes, particularly against Pakistan’s sensitive air bases, was so profound that Pakistan had to find ways to de-escalate and seek a pause in the hostilities from India.

Having suspended the operations, the Prime Minister declared that Operation Sindoor had carved out a new benchmark in our fight against terrorism and set up a new normal. He announced the three pillars of India’s new policy against terrorism. First, every terrorist attack on India will be met with a befitting response on our terms only. We will take strict action at every place from where the roots of terrorism emerge. Second, India will not tolerate any nuclear blackmail. India will strike precisely and decisively at the terrorist hideouts developing under the cover of nuclear blackmail. Third, we will not differentiate between government-sponsored terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism.

The first pillar requires capability for resolute action; striking at the roots of terror—precision strikes and ability for pinpoint targeting of masterminds. India showed some of its cards on the night of May 6-7, 2025, but it has to rapidly evolve both technologically and professionally to the next level to be sure that we stay ahead of the curve—keeping in mind where Pakistan might be with the help of China, Turkey, Azerbaijan and other countries.

Sound intelligence and strong investigation will be the foundation of Pillar Number 1. We are dealing with a country that thrives on deceit and denial. Even after all the evidence of the Mumbai attack, including Ajmal Kasab’s testimony, Pakistan had very reluctantly accepted that only ‘part of the attack’ may have been planned in Pakistan. Post-Pahalgam, and earlier Pulwama and in multiple such terror attacks, Pakistan has gone around on a propaganda blitzkrieg deflecting the narrative with conspiracy theories, calling the attacks as the handiwork of Indian agencies for political or other motives. For effective decision-making, generating the political will, national unity and resolve, and swift retaliation, intelligence and investigation prowess are the major factors.

The second pillar of India’s new policy against terrorism states upfront that nuclear blackmail will not be tolerated. In the run-up to Operation Sindoor, Pakistani ministers had begun their nuclear sabre-rattling as usual, but over the years, India has refined its art of calling out Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. India demonstrated its resolve to respond conventionally during the Kargil War in 1999, in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. The same could be said about India’s retaliatory strikes post the Uri attack in 2016 and Pulwama in 2019. Building on the new normal, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, in an address in Srinagar on May 15, 2025, called Pakistan a rogue nation with nukes, and said its nuclear arsenal should be placed under the watch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Incidentally, this is not a new call; it was the common refrain amongst leaders and think tanks of the Western world in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the US, whose masterminds—Osama bin Laden and Khalid Mohammad Sheikh—had deep connections with Pakistan.

The third pillar—no distinction between terrorists and their sponsors—redefines India’s threshold for tolerance. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) press release at 1:44 AM on May 7, 2025, clearly stated that only “terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir” had been targeted. “Our actions have been focused, measured and non-escalatory in nature. No Pakistani military facilities have been targeted.” Unstated but implicit in the message was this: Should Pakistan choose to engage military targets, India shall be forced to respond appropriately. By choosing to retaliate against not only military establishments, but also civilian targets across the entire front, and to make matters worse, provide state funerals to the eliminated terrorists, Pakistan made its stand very clear that terrorists will get state support and their status continues to be that of ‘strategic assets’. As India’s Defence Minister highlights: “The Pakistan government is planning to spend Rs 14 crore on Masood Azhar (JeM) even though he is a UN-designated terrorist.” According to media reports, Pakistani minister, Rana Tanveer Hussain, visited the LeT headquarters in Muridke and announced its reconstruction at government expense. Clearly, the embrace between the Pakistani Army, the Inter-Services Intelligence ISI and the terrorist leaders has got tighter.

In a sense, by linking the Pahalgam terror attack with major terrorist attacks like 9/11 on USA and the London Tube bombings, Prime Minister Modi has tried to renew the global war against terror. And positioned India as fighting the vanguard action of Pakistan, the epicentre of terror.

But Pakistan is on a propaganda overdrive to deny any involvement with the Pahalgam attack and is pushing it back on India. As people have a very short memory span, the world needs to be reminded that Osama bin Laden was found hiding close to a Pakistan military academy in Abbottabad, and Khalid Mohammad Sheikh, the chief planner of 9/11, was of Pakistani descent and was also found in Pakistan. With US President Donald Trump’s desire to seek credit for the mediation, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout package for Pakistan, and China, Türkiye and Azerbaijan rallying together strongly in favour of Pakistan, India has serious diplomatic and political challenges going forward.

On the economic front, the IMF bailout may come with preconditions that could have some impact until the full package is released, but for too long Pakistan has managed to hoodwink these international bodies. The impact of the Indus Waters Treaty being held in abeyance will take time to manifest. Des­pite its fragile economy, the Pakistan Army will divert these funds for defence preparedness with the help of its friends.

From a military perspective, in line with the demands of the new policy against terrorism, India has to review its response strategy. Improved intelligence and investigation, multiple levels of readiness and swift retaliatory capability are going to be the key determinants. Inherent in this capability is a very high degree of self-reliance, a sine qua non for a befitting response on its own terms. Operation Sindoor was a good demonstration of what indigenous capability can achieve. As Pakistan-sponsored terrorism—direct or indirect—is going to be an ongoing feature, I reiterate my favourite exhortation to my colleagues in the armed forces, academia, industry and our scientific community: “We must win India’s wars with India’s solutions.”

(Views expressed are personal)

Lt Gen Dr Subrata Saha (Retd) is executive chairman of the Manekshaw Centre Of Excellence For National Security Studies And Research

This article is part of Outlook’s 1 June 2025 issue, 'Gated Neighbourhood', which examines the state of diplomacy, media, and democracy in the wake of the ceasefire. It appeared in print as 'The New Normal Policy.'