Muddier By The Day

The Kargil mess is getting murkier. In a multi-pronged cover-up attempt, the army top brass is pulling out all stops to ensure that the truth about early warning signals on intrusions in Kargil does not come to public notice. This move, according to sources at army headquarters, is designed not only to protect the army top brass but also the defence minister and the Vajpayee government which hopes to reap a rich harvest of votes from the Kargil victory. Should the true facts of the intrusion be revealed, then the success claimed for Operation Vijay would be victory in a war that could have been avoided.

Fresh investigations by Outlook have revealed that Brig Surinder Singh of the Kargil-based 121 Brigade had personally briefed the Chief of Army Staff (coas), Gen V.P. Malik, about the "enhanced threat perceptions," during the chief's visit to Kargil in mid-August 1998. Maj Gen V.S. Budhwar, the General Officer Commanding the Leh-based 3 Infantry Division, was also present during the official presentation about the border situation in that sector.

Brig Singh had outlined the possibility of Pakistan exploiting the gaps in the defences across the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil sector and mentioned nine vulnerable points through which the intrusions were likely to take place. The 121 Brigade, which was then looking after a border frontage of over 160 km, felt that given the saturation of forces in Siachen, east of its jurisdiction, and in the Kashmir Valley, the only vulnerable stretch of the LoC was in Kargil and Batalik. Keeping these points in mind, the 121 Brigade prepared the presentation for the visit of the army chief.

As the brigade commander, it fell upon Brig Surinder Singh to brief Gen Malik. In fact, the points outlined in the briefing were put down in writing and sent to the army headquarters under a file-Brief-coas-124/gsd/vif/dg-dated August 25, 1998. It was this letter that Congress spokesperson, Kapil Sibal, referred to when he talked of early warnings at a press conference. But he got the title of the file wrong. Army headquarters was quick to deny the existence of the file. But Outlook now confirms from unimpeachable sources that the brief was sent to Gen Malik. During the briefing Brig Surinder Singh had stressed the following:

But why is army headquarters trying to suppress the fact that it had early warnings? And why is Gen Malik sticking his neck out to defend the generals in the northern command? No one has any clear answers. One theory doing the rounds is that the army chief has been asked by the defence minister and the bjp government to keep things under wraps till the elections are over. As a quid pro quo, Malik would be rewarded with the proposed post of chief of defence staff after his tenure as army chief is over.

The cover-up attempt has already been initiated. Lt Gen A.R.K. Reddy, Chief of Staff of the Northern Command, has been asked to conduct an inquiry into the events leading to the Kargil intrusions. However, to date no queries have been directed at Brig Singh and there's no sense of urgency. Sources at army HQ also point out that the appointment of Lt Gen Reddy narrows the inquiry's scope since Lt Gen H.M. Khanna is his immediate boss, and any inquiry by Gen Reddy can't include his superior officer. The Kargil sector comes under Gen Khanna's overall northern command.

Simultaneously, as a follow-up to the removal of Brig Surinder Singh from the command of 121 Brigade, several staff officers who had served under him and were privy to his warnings to the bosses have been transferred out of Kargil. These include the brigade major (BM), the general staff officer-3 (called G-3 in army parlance) and the daaq (Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master). The BM, who acts as a liaison between the brigade commander and the battalions under the brigade as well as the colonel general staff of the division, is the key post in a brigade. The officer is a key strategist in the brigade and is therefore privy to all the important and even confidential developments. The G-3, who directly works under the BM, also comes into the picture. Officers manning these posts under Brig Surinder Singh have been posted out of Kargil post-haste, army sources told Outlook. This move was aimed at ensuring that there would be no leaks to the media.

Brig Surinder Singh himself has been transferred six times in the past two months. In fact, he was first relieved of his command in Kargil in end-May. When he asked the reasons for his transfer, the first order was cancelled. Two days later, he was posted out again. Coincidentally, Gen Malik was visiting Kargil around that time. Brig Singh took the opportunity to ask the army chief about the reason for his sudden transfer, Gen Malik reportedly told him that he was being removed on medical grounds. Apparently, a shell explosion had damaged Brig Surinder Singh's right ear.

But the reason was clearly flimsy since the brigade commander had not initiated a battle casualty report, which is mandatory for an officer to be removed from his command on medical grounds. From Kargil, Surinder Singh was sent to Srinagar and then to Secunderabad. At Secunderabad, he was supposed to take over as the commander of the Andhra sub-area but on second thoughts, the authorities did not allow him to take over that post.

Sources in the army headquarters have an interesting explanation about why Surinder Singh was not allowed to take over in Secunderabad. Apparently, Maj Gen Budhwar, with whom Singh has had major differences, was earlier posted as sub-area commander in Secunderabad. During his tenure in the Andhra sub-area, Gen Malik was the Southern Army Commander and both were extremely close. Many officers in the army believe that to have Brig Singh handling the sub-area would be uncomfortable for both Gen Malik and Maj Gen Budhwar since he would be privy to some of their joint actions. "This unease felt by the coas, and not any objection from the present Southern Army Commander as is being made out, is the main reason for Surinder Singh being transferred out as deputy goc of the 23 Division based in

Ranchi," the sources say. His final posting as of now is as the number two man in the 23 Division, which in the meantime has moved out to Rajasthan. Apart from shunting him around, there have been crude attempts to harass Surinder Singh. Operatives from the military intelligence have been visiting the neighbourhood where his family stays in Chandigarh and have been questioning the neighbours. In another incident, a wooden box sent by Surinder Singh to his family through an army aircraft and carried by a colonel, was broken open by the military police in Leh before the officer boarded the plane at Leh. The official explanation given to the colonel was that they wanted to check the contents of the box for arms. The real reason, many of Surinder Singh's friends feel, was to ascertain whether some official documents were being smuggled out.

Not surprisingly, a campaign has now been launched to discredit Surinder Singh through selective leaks in a section of the media. But, as many senior officers in the army point out, brigade commanders of "hot" brigades such as the 102 Brigade posted in Siachen, the 121 Brigade in Kargil and 190 Brigade posted at Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh bordering China, are handpicked officers, especially chosen to lead these vital formations. Indeed, after the 102 Brigade in Siachen, the 121 Brigade is regarded as a tough and vital formation. "If he was so incompetent how was Surinder Singh chosen to lead such a vital brigade," asks a senior officer.

According to senior officers at army headquarters, the truth about Kargil will emerge despite efforts by the MoD and the government to suppress it. "The warnings sent by Surinder Singh came through official channels and are recorded and logged at every step. The top brass at army headquarters knows this and the MoD is aware of it," says a staff officer. It is only a matter of time before the Surinder Singh papers become available for public scrutiny.