Intelligence Dumped

If laxity at the highest levels marked the Kargil crisis, an equally casual approach by the Leh-based 3 Division headquarters in not recognising the threat to an ammunition depot in Kargil resulted in a loss of close to Rs 500 crore. This depot was destroyed completely in Pakistani shelling at the beginning of the conflict in May. Such a huge loss could have been prevented had the general officer commanding (goc) of 3 Infantry Division heeded the warnings given by the 121 Brigade at Kargil. Documents seen by Outlook indicate that the ammunition depot had come under threat following the increased shelling by the Pakistanis since August '98.

Despite the warnings, the Divisional Ordnance Unit (dou) of 3 Infantry Division wrote in December '98 to 121 Brigade that an ammunition dump would be moved from Leh to Kargil. The ammo was to be transported in 22 three-tonne trucks of the 503 Army Supply Corps (asc) battalion and 10 three-tonners of the Kargil brigade.

Here is the relevant excerpt from that communication:

"1. Ref. Infantry dou letter No. C/5006/ Amn/1922/cont. dated 14 Dec. 98...

"2. The goc has directed that the inter-AP (ammunition point) shifting of amn (ammunition) from 31 AP (based in Leh) to 36 AP (based in Kargil) be carried out with immdt (immediate) effect...

"In addition, 22x3 tons of 503 asc bn (battalion) and 10x3 ton ex-121(I) bde (brigade) will also be emptied..."

Following the December 14 letter, the 121 Brigade commissioned a feasibility study on whether it was wise to shift an additional ammunition dump to Kargil. The study made it clear that enemy artillery could easily strike at the ammunition dump. This was communicated to the 3 Infantry Division on January 7, '99 under letter No. 106/GS/(Ops-Firing) by the brigade major at Kargil. This is what the letter had to say:

"Technically there is nothing that can stop the ene (enemy) rds (rounds) from falling in bde HQ and 36 AP loc (location). The trajectory of falling rds is much steeper than the angle of the two sites."

This communication made it clear that the depot was under serious threat from enemy fire. But this didn't deter 3 Division, which kept sending ammunition. This forced the brigade commander to write a letter in end-February '99 to the General Staff branch of the division. This letter spoke of the increased threat to the ammo dump and also pointed out that the ammunition point was being shifted to a safer location and that is why it was not necessary to send more ammunition.

This letter, No. 510/Q/Mov. 2 (PC), said:

"Ref Despatch of Amn to 36 AP...

"1. Due to shelling in Kargil, it has been proposed to shift all lgs (logistical) elements/units to Mulbek/ Budhkharbu. A gp (group) of offrs (officers) has been ordered by HQ for the purpose and are proceeding accrd (accordingly).

"2. However on 30 Jan. 1999 18 chts (civil hired trucks) were sent from 31 AP (based at Leh) to loc. loaded with amn. even though no deficiency/ demand of amn. was projected to your HQ. Despatching amn to 36 AP at this juncture when the threat of destruction/damage looms large and the AP itself is under shifting, may create trouble."

As feared by the brigade, the ammunition dump was hit by Pakistani shells in the early stage of the Kargil conflict. All the ammunition stored there-estimated to be worth nearly Rs 500 crore-went up in smoke, a loss that could well have been avoided had a little more precaution was taken in the matter.