Column | We Must Design Structures Adaptable To Evolve, Says Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh

I would not characterise this as a departure from the fundamentals of air power. Speed, reach, flexibility and precision remain as relevant as ever. The most important lesson is that the battle space no longer divides neatly into separate domains. Air power must now operate across the entire spectrum—from the traditional air domain to the electromagnetic, cyber and space domains—with far greater integration.

This is why we now think in terms of aerospace power rather than air power alone. Our understanding of air superiority has evolved in the same way. It is no longer only about fighter aircraft engaging other fighter aircraft. It is about achieving the degree of control over the air and aerospace environment that our operations need, while denying the adversary the freedom to interfere. Increasingly, it depends on information and decision superiority: the ability to sense earlier, understand faster and act before the adversary.

Recent conflicts have also sharpened specific lessons. Drones have evolved from eyes in the sky to claws in the sky. Attacking forces now use saturation attacks, sending waves of inexpensive drones to exhaust interceptors. Using an expensive missile against a cheap drone is unsustainable, so air defence is being reshaped around cost-efficiency as well as altitude. We are building low-cost hard-kill layers, soft-kill measures and directed-energy options, and moving from single, large radars towards distributed networks of sensors. We have also learnt that a modern force must be able to fight even when communications, navigation and space-based services are degraded or denied. Our own experience in Operation Sindoor reinforced every one of these lessons. The adversary’s drones and stand-off weapons were defeated by our home-grown, networked air defence.

Information superiority, decision superiority and the effects-based employment of air power are now central to how we plan and fight, while the fundamentals of air power remain firmly intact. This approach is reflected at the national level in the Joint Doctrine for Multi-Domain Operations, released by the defence minister in August 2025. It is also visible in concrete steps. The IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System is connected with the army’s Akashteer and the navy’s Trigun to create a common, real-time air picture. Exercises such as Antariksha Abhyas examine the consequences of losing access to space.

The IAF has graduated from a platform-centric approach to a capability-centric one. Let me assure the nation that the IAF is more than capable of meeting its requirements today. We are addressing this through a phased roadmap that builds squadron strength progressively, ensuring that the nation’s deterrence is never compromised along the way.

The first element of that roadmap is to make the most of the fleet we have. The IAF has inducted the Rafale and the indigenously developed light combat aircraft. The upgrade of the Su-30MKI fleet, the backbone of our combat force, is being progressed as a design and development project with significant indigenous equipment. A contract for 12 additional Su-30MKI aircraft, signed in December 2024, is under execution.

The second element is rebuilding numbers through the LCA Mk-1A, which will be central to restoring squadron strength. The IAF has signed two contracts with Hindustan Aeronautics for 83 and 97 aircraft respectively. At the same time, the multi-role fighter aircraft [MRFA] will bring a contemporary fighter into service in an early timeframe. The third element is the development of the LCA Mk-II and the advanced medium combat aircraft, our fifth-generation fighter. The IAF is actively involved in both programmes and together they will boost our capability significantly in the coming decade.

Three structural factors lie at the root of these delays. The first is inadequate core research and development capability in niche technologies. Military aviation projects are among the most complex in the world, design and development timelines inevitably stretch. The second is our limited exposure to airworthiness compliance, quality assurance and certification requirements. These processes are rightly stringent, but when industry and developers are still building experience with them, they become a source of delay rather than assurance. The third, and perhaps the most consequential, is foreign dependence for aero engines, base platforms and the modifications needed to integrate indigenous systems. When a critical component sits outside our control, so does the timeline.

That line falls between operational necessity and strategic irreversibility. Where a capability gap is immediate and mission-critical, and no short-term indigenous solution can cover it; a time-bound foreign acquisition is justified. Even then, it must be linked to technology absorption, domestic work-share or a defined transition to an Indian solution. Where a requirement lies in a core technology area and repeated imports would lock India into long-term dependence, the IAF will hold the line and back indigenous development, even if it takes longer. Engines, advanced sensors, mission software, autonomous systems and combat electronics fall firmly in this category.

The same line must be drawn in maintenance because a fleet is only as sovereign as its ability to stay serviceable. Sustainment will, therefore, be an integral part of every acquisition. Any foreign purchase must come with:

•  Maintenance, repair and overhaul capability established in India

•  Technology transfer for repair and overhaul

•  Access to technical data and test equipment

•  The right to upgrade and,

•  A plan to progressively localise spares

We are applying AI across the spectrum: intelligence and surveillance, sensor fusion and mission planning, electronic warfare, autonomous systems and logistics. We are developing AI indigenously, through our AI Centre of Excellence, UDAAN and building secure high-performance computing infrastructure and operational datasets. We are experimenting with autonomous systems and swarming-drone concepts, developing AI-enabled electronic warfare and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and investing in advanced simulation environments. Alongside the technology, we are developing the human-machine teaming doctrines needed to use it well. Electronic warfare will become increasingly software-defined and adaptive. Quantum technologies may open new opportunities in sensing, timing, communications and computing.

Yes, we are moving towards greater autonomy in combat systems, but deliberately and with clear guardrails. Autonomy will first appear in the sensor-to-shooter loop, for specific, well-defined tasks such as target recognition, threat prioritisation and time-critical engagement support. Swarming-drone operations will require a degree of autonomy that cannot be achieved with a human directing every individual unit. But the strategic and tactical decisions that matter most will remain firmly in human hands: the decision to commit forces, to select targets and to define the rules of engagement.

Over the next 10–15 years, the role of the pilot will evolve from that of a manual flyer to that of a battle manager. The pilot will no longer be primarily a stick-and-rudder operator. Instead, they will lead a network of manned aircraft, unmanned systems, sensors and weapons, supervising a team of autonomous assets, including loyal wingmen and managing the tempo of the engagement. The skill set will shift accordingly. Flying proficiency will remain essential, but it will be joined by cognitive dominance, situational awareness at scale and the ability to trust machine recommendations, and to override them in real time.

Our fifth-generation capability will come through the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, being developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisa­tion with the IAF actively involved. The Cabinet Committee on Security has sanctioned the programme’s milestones and timelines. The induction is slated for the next decade. The IAF reviews the programme regularly with all stakeholders because we are clear that its timely progress is essential.

Our approach rests on several mutually reinforcing elements. The first is the fleet roadmap I have already outlined: an upgraded Su-30MKI fleet, the MRFA in an early timeframe and the LCA Mk-1A, with 180 aircraft contracted, to rebuild squadron strength.

The second is to deny an adversary’s stealth platforms the advantage they seek. Stealth is not invisibility. Extending the distributed sensor network, we are building a networked counter-stealth capability. Very high-frequency technology and passive radars are being inducted, multi-static radars are under development and ground-based and airborne sensors are being fused, so that a target detected by one sensor is correlated by another and tracked by the network.

The third is reach without exposure. Long-range precision and stand-off weapons, combined with electronic warfare and self-protection suites, allow us to hold targets at risk deep in hostile territory without exposing our platforms to the densest defences. Operation Sindoor demonstrated what this combination can achieve.

It is also worth remembering that the arrival of an aircraft is not the arrival of capability. Turning new fighters into operationally meaningful squadrons takes pilot conversion, maintenance ecosystems, weapon integration, infrastructure, doctrine and years of hard flying. We watch these markers closely and we judge capability on that basis rather than on headline numbers.

The IAF is fully committed to jointness and to the ongoing transformation. My point is about how we transform, not whether we do. Reform must build on what already works, rather than dismantling it for the sake of change. Its design must come from within: from India’s own security needs and experience, not from a template borrowed from elsewhere.

Looking within also means recognising the strengths we already have. Operation Sindoor demonstrated that our existing joint mechanisms work. Under a joint architecture, established by the chief of defence staff and the three service chiefs, the army, navy and the air force synergised their efforts and the centralised allocation and timely reallocation of critical resources proved decisive in the outcome. These are proven foundations, and any new structure should be built on them, not built all over by dismantling existing structures. An Indian model must also respect the nature of each service’s power and domain expertise. Jointness should never be confused with the subordination of one form of military power to another. For air power, this means preserving its defining strengths: speed, reach, flexibility, precision and the ability to concentrate and redistribute combat power rapidly. A future structure must allow air power to be massed where it is needed most and shifted between sectors as the situation demands.

A transformation of this scale must be implemented in phases. Each step should be tested, validated and refined before the next is taken, so that operational readiness is never compromised during the transition.
We must also avoid designing structures around a fixed prediction of what the next war will look like. They should be adaptable enough to evolve as warfare itself evolves.

(This interview was conducted before Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh demitted office)