Column | India Needs To Prevent Chinese Naval Dominance In The Indian Ocean Region: Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (retd)

Where do we stand in com­parison to China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy? The answer lies in asking ourselves: do we need to match perma­nent roster cadres ship-to-ship, sub­marine-to-submarine and aircraft-to-aircraft? If one dissects the conflict between the US/Israel and Iran, there is a distinct lesson. Power asymmetry notwithstanding, a weaker power too can hold a much stronger power at bay if it has the sustenance ability and its geo­graphy is such that it can attack at will.

These lessons may have been learnt by us now. Our predecessors have long known that the Indian Navy’s doctrine and strategy is built around these realities. The maritime strategy of India states:

• The safety and security of seaborne trade and energy routes, especially in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), considering their effect on global economies and India’s national interests.

• The importance of maintaining freedom of navigation and strengthening the international legal regime at sea, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, for all-round benefit.

• The considerable scope and value in undertaking cooperation and coordination between various navies to counter common threats at sea.

• Warfare at sea is always non-contact warfare. Once targets are acquired, either by satellites or radars, the firing sequence is autonomous—no human intervention. Making every activity autonomous is not desirable at sea. Unlike land warfare, where it is black and white, at sea, most are grey. There are more commercial vessels than warships at any point in time. Artificial intelligence should be able to get that identification resolved. Yet to avoid collaterals, human selection of targets will still be needed probably. So no human in the loop is fine, where the other side of the border is always the adversary, and hence, target identification can be left to non-humans. In maritime scenarios, humans may always be in loop. However, sea to land or land to sea, automation will be helpful.

With these broad strategies, the navy has been developed to meet the strategic aims. The question is: are we adequately prepared to protect our interests in the IOR with the arrival of China as a formidable maritime power with considerable influence on our neighbours? Our neighbourhood could be exploited by China in the event of a land conflict on our borders. This is the challenge.

There is a major transformation in the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. China has developed the largest navy in the world by ship-count, supported by a formidable shipbuilding industry, exponentially expanding missile production, modern submarines, aircraft carriers and an extensive network of maritime surveillance. China’s modernisation is rapid with its ambition to displace the US from the leadership of the free world. It is gradually surpassing the US in capabilities in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, the East Sea and the IOR. It will breach the Second Island Chain and gain control of the Pacific.

On the other hand, India possesses an increa­singly capable blue-water navy, with considerable operational experience of operating in the IOR. India’s geography—access to its island territories and proximity to choke points leaning towards important sea lanes—provides an overwhelming advantage. The IOR, which brings home waters to its proximity to shore up support, renders sustenance to the platforms operating in the region. Geography and sustenance are two important tenets of maritime warfare, particularly in a capability asymmetrical situation.

Therefore, the central issue is not whether India can match China platform-to-platform—ship, submarine and aircraft—but whether it can prevent Chinese naval dominance in the IOR and protect India’s maritime interests.

While these are the strengths of India, numbers do matter. Short­comings can broadly be categorised in underwater warfare, industrial capa­city, mine-laying and sweeping, and the pace of modernisation.

China’s numerical superiority is substantial. Open-source intelligence indicates a plan of having 370 battleships with further expansion likely. India’s fleet is smaller with 140-150 warships and submarines. These are not really comparable since there are various classes of ships, or support ships, and different types of ships for different missions.

China also builds ships concurrently. It must be borne in mind that China is trying to challenge the leadership of the United States Navy, and hence, cannot field an entire asset in the IOR. It also has to cater for the Taiwan Strait and the Pacific.

What India Should Do

India has its own challenges—a shortage of warships and numerical inferiority; the disadvantage in the size of the fleet; inadequate submarine strength—and this is a serious capability gap, though Project-75(I) submarines are being negotiated with Germany.

There is also a need to build at least six nuclear-powered attack submarines; at present, two are being built. Notwithstanding the delays prior to 2014, at least the present government has seen the completion of Scorpène submarines and the commencement of two SSNs (Submersible Ship Nuclear). The acceleration to build the 75(I) submarines is an urgent necessity. Also, the indigenous air-independent-propulsion should be retrofitted in quick time on the Scorpènes. This will enhance the underwater endurance of the diesel submarines.

India maintains round-the-clock surveillance at seven locations, using P8I aircraft and satellites to monitor surface ships and submarines. Though the maritime domain network is strong, the numbers require a quick increase to reduce the pressure. India has maritime domain awareness (MDA) partnerships with a large number of maritime nations which collectively add to the MDA population. There is a need to lay underwater sensors, unmanned surface ships and underwater vessels. The navy needs dedicated imaging satellites and secure data centres. These are all work in progress whereas China is way ahead.

The integration of all these inputs to maritime operation centres will help develop a common picture to share with ships at sea. Our need for mine layers and mine hunters should have been addressed long ago. After the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, it is quite clear that mines will play an important role in restricted water warfare. Our mine-laying and minesweeping require more than urgent procurement under operational powers. China has invested in replenishment ships, overseas access arrangements and support infrastructure which could sustain its naval operations. On the other hand, India is in home waters and shore support. While the eastern seaboard has the Andaman Islands for long-range support, it needs sustained partnership for shore support in the southwest Arabian Sea. A treaty with island nations is worth consideration. Requirement of supply and replenishment ships is in the process of being beefed up.

While warships are designed and built in India, the approval and construction processes are lengthy and often plagued by bureaucratic delays. Each proposed class of vessel needs to have an implementation team, which can take executive and financial decisions. This will cut down the time at each stage. What is needed is an empowered committee which has all powers.

(Views expressed are personal)

Vice-Admiral Shekhar Sinha (Retd) is a former Commander-In-Chief, Western Naval Command, and Chief Of Integrated Defence Staff Governing Council, ICWA & PPF